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It is possible that the world contains infinitely many agents that have positive and negative
levels of well-being. Theories have been developed to ethically rank such worlds based on the
well-being levels of the agents in those worlds or other qualitative properties of the worlds
in question, such as the distribution of agents across spacetime. In this thesis I argue that
such ethical rankings ought to be consistent with the Pareto principle, which says that if
two worlds contain the same agents and some agents are better off in the first world than
they are in the second and no agents are worse off than they are in the second, then the first
world is better than the second. I show that if we accept four axioms – the Pareto principle,
transitivity, an axiom stating that populations of worlds can be permuted, and the claim that
if the ‘at least as good as’ relation holds between two worlds then it holds between qualitative
duplicates of this world pair – then we must conclude that there is ubiquitous incomparability
between infinite worlds. I show that this is true even if the populations of infinite worlds are
disjoint or overlapping, and that we cannot use any qualitative properties of world pairs to
rank these worlds. Finally, I argue that this incomparability result generates puzzles for both
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Introduction
Infinite ethics is the investigation of the ethical implications of living in a universe that
contains infinitely many agents whose lives are of moral worth. Aggregative ethical theories
like utilitarianism identify the value of a world with the total utility or wellbeing at that
world. In infinite worlds, however, the total utility of a world is often not well-defined.
Therefore alternative aggregative principles have been proposed to allow aggregative theorists
to rank worlds that contain infinitely many agents. Attempts to formulate such principles
bring to light tension between certain fundamental ethical principles in worlds that contain
infinitely many agents.
In this thesis, I argue that if we accept four fundamental axioms – Pareto, the claim that
the ‘at least as good as relation’ < is a qualitative relation, the Permutation Principle, and
transitivity, then we must conclude that most infinite worlds are ethically incomparable,
meaning that world w1 is not at least as good as world w2 and world w2 is not at least as
good as world w1. We must therefore reject the claim that < is a complete relation.
In chapter 1 I survey the existing literature in infinite ethics. I begin by arguing that we
have reason to be uncertain about whether the world we occupy contains infinitely many
agents. I introduce the basic problems in infinite ethics and the solutions to these problems
that have been proposed in the literature.
In chapter 2 I consider examples of worlds that contain infinitely many agents. I argue
that we should accept agent-based Pareto principles over ‘expansionist’ principles in infinite
worlds. I also defend the view that the at least as good as relation < is a qualitative,
transitive relation. I defend the Permutation Principle, which says that we can permute
the populations of world pairs without altering the qualitative properties that hold at and
1
between the pair of worlds in question.
In chapter 3 I demonstrate that the four axioms I defend in chapter 3 entail that many
infinite worlds are ethically incomparable. I begin by showing that world pairs with disjoint
populations of agents such that infinitely many agents are better off in w1 than in w2 and
infinitely many agents are better off in w2 than in w1 are ethic ally incomparable by a
‘four world’ argument. I then extend this result to identical population world pairs and
overlapping world pairs. I extend these results further by introducing a ‘cyclic’ argument,
which allows us to demonstrate the incomparability of more world pairs.
In chapter 4 I extend the results of the previous chapter by introducing extensions of the
Pareto principle. I argue that we can extend Pareto to a further class of world pairs, which
extends the results of the previous chapter. I show that attempts to extend Pareto fur-
ther entail implausible rankings of infinite worlds. I argue that we should accept ‘addition’
principles in infinite ethics, which further extend the incomparability of the previous chapter.
In chapter 5, I formulate the incomparability results as an impossibility result: we cannot
jointly accept Pareto, transitivity, the qualitativeness of <, the Permutation Principle, and
completeness. I consider each of the first four axioms in turn and argue that giving up each
is highly undesirable. I then consider the implications of accepting ubiquitous incompara-
bility between infinite worlds. I argue that this generates highly troubling puzzles for both
consequentialist and non-consequentialist theories of objective and subjective permissibility.
2
Chapter 1
The Foundations of Infinite Ethics
In this chapter I provide a comprehensive summary of the motives for and problems in
infinite ethics. In section 1.1 I point out that there is a distinct possibility that the universe
we live in contains infinitely many agents with lives that are of moral worth. I then show in
section 1.2 that in infinite worlds aggregative ethical principles are more sensitive to what
we take to be the ‘basic locations of value’. I survey existing results in section 1.3, showing
that it can be difficult to jointly satisfy certain core ethical commitments if generations are
treated as basic locations of value. In section 1.4 review the literature on Pareto principles
in infinite ethics, which treat agents rather than generations as basic locations of value. I
conclude with a review of infinite aggregation principles in section 1.5.
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1.1 The Possibility of an Infinite World
Infinite ethics is the investigation of the ethical implications of living in a universe that
contains infinitely many agents whose lives are of moral worth: agents that have preferences
like we do or are able to feel pleasure and pain like we do. The ethical implications of this
possibility are, however, somewhat immaterial if we can be certain that we do not live in
such a universe.1 In this section I will show that we have compelling reasons to believe that
the universe does contain infinitely many agents whose lives are of moral worth.
If the universe is infinite and the probability that agents will come into existence in an ar-
bitrarily large finite region of spacetime is positive and non-infinitesimal, then we should
expect there to be infinitely many agents in the universe. We do not know if our universe
is finite or infinite in size, but our current evidence suggests that the universe may in fact
be infinite. In standard cosmology, for example, a curvature of the universe that is zero
or negative suggests that the universe is infinite, and recent data from the Wilkinson Mi-
crowave Anisotropy Probe (WMAP) and the Planck Collaboration are strong evidence that
the curvature of the observable universe is zero.2 So the standard model of cosmology and
our current data are at least consistent with the hypothesis that we live in a universe that
is spatially infinite and contains infinitely many agents.
The standard model of cosmology is not the only reason we have to believe that the universe
may be infinite, however. Perhaps the most compelling evidence we currently have that the
universe is infinite comes from inflationary cosmology.
1The implications are important even if we achieve near-certainty but not absolute certainty. For ex-
ample, as I will show in Chapter 5, many of the problems raised in infinite ethics affect our ethical decision
making even if our credence that the universe contains infinitely many agents is extremely low.
2By ‘standard cosmology’ I mean models that use the Friedmann-Lemaâtre-Robertson-Walker (FLRW)
metric. On Planck and WMAP data see Adam et al [2] and Bennett et al [33]. The universe can have zero
or negative curvature and be finite if it has a non-trivial topology. The 2013 Planck results do not provide
support for a non-trivial topology [159] but this remains an open question. See Ellis and Brundrit [77] on
the possibility of infinite populations in FLRW cosmology.
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Inflationary cosmology was initially formulated as a solution to several important problems
facing the standard Big Bang model. One important problem this model faces is the ‘horizon
problem’. Regions of the early universe are assumed to be extremely homogeneous on the
Big Bang model despite the fact that, given the finite speed of light and the finite age of
the universe, these regions must have been out of causal contact with one another. We do
indeed observe such homogeneity. The microwave background that we observe if we look
in one direction is extremely similar to the microwave background that we observe if we
look in the opposite direction (it is highly isotropic) and yet the different regions that this
background radiation is being from are outside of each other’s particle horizons: light from
the radiation background in one direction cannot have reached the area we observe in the
other direction or vice versa. It is difficult to explain how such homogeneity could occur if
the two regions have never causally interacted with one another.3
The inflationary model, originally proposed by Guth [93] posits that there was a phase
of exponential expansion a very short period after the Big Bang singularity, after which
expansion continued at a much slower rate. This expansion occurred because the early
universe existed in a false vacuum state: an unstable state with an energy level higher than
the ‘true minimum’.4 This false vacuum decays into bubbles of true vacuum that grow at the
speed of light.5 A period of early inflation could explain the homogeneity that we observe,
since the areas of the universe that we observe now would have been able to causally interact
prior to this period of exponential expansion.
Guth’s version of the theory could not, however, explain why the universe transitioned into
a phase of less rapid expansion that would result in a post-inflationary universe with the
3A further problem with the initial conditions of the Big Bang model is the ‘flatness problem’. See
Guth [93] and Maudlin [161, p. 40-44] for a discussion of these problems.
4A false vacuum can be metastable, meaning that it can remain at its local minimum energy level for a
relatively long time, but can decay to a true vacuum by quantum tunneling. See Coleman and De Luccia [58].
5Steinhardt and Turok [215, p. 91-93] give an accessible description of this process.
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properties we observe: one that is non-empty and non-homogeneous.6 A solution to this
‘graceful exit’ problem was proposed by Linde [155] and Albrecht and Steinhardt [4]. On
this new theory, there was a slower transition from the false vacuum into a true vacuum.
The process of inflation can continue outside of the ‘pockets’ that have decayed and the
inflationary universe can give rise to infinitely many such ‘pocket universes’ that are spatially
infinite (see Aguirre [3]).7 This has become known as ‘eternal inflation theory’.
Infinitely many of these pocket universes will have conditions that are conducive to life,
meaning that if the eternal inflation theory is true then there will be infinitely many agents:
[Inflationary] theory is fantastically successful by normal scientific standards.
But models of the universe as a whole which provide a mechanism for such
inflation typically feature eternal inflation – a kind of universe in which pockets
of ordinary, non-inflating space keep forming, but in such a way that that the
inflating portion of space is never completely filled, but keeps expanding and
giving rise to new noninflating pockets. In the most plausible such models,
there are many different kinds of pockets, only a few of which are hospitable
to life. Nevertheless there is plenty of life: in fact there will be infinitely many
life-friendly pockets as well as infinitely many life-unfriendly ones, and the life-
friendly pockets will typically contain infinitely many agents each.
Dorr and Arntzenius [71, p. 419]
Therefore, if eternal inflation theory is true then we can predict that infinitely many agents
exist in the universe, and that there are likely infinitely many agents in our ‘life friendly’
pocket of the universe. Many of these agents – even those within our own pocket – will be
beyond our ability to causally interact with8 but if the eternal inflation theory is true then
6See Linde [154] for a description of the transition from ‘old inflation’ to ‘new inflation’.
7Steinhardt [214] showed that inflation need not end, while Vilenkin [238] showed that this generalizes.
Linde [156] offers an early account of eternal inflation theory. The advantages of eternal inflation theory are
explored in Guth [94].
8On causality and the particle horizon, see Ellis and Stoeger [78]. Bostrom [42] discusses views that
restrict ethical consideration to regions that we can causally interact with. I will discuss this more in
Chapter 5 when I consider subjective principles in infinite ethics. Until then I will be concerned primarily
with objective ethical principles that rank entire worlds (i.e. entire universes).
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each bubble universe is infinite and so our future light cone – the part of the universe that
our current actions can affect – may contain infinitely many agents.9
We now have two models that result in an infinite universe. The first is the standard model of
cosmology in which the curvature of spacetime is negative or zero. The second is the standard
model of cosmology with the addition of eternal cosmological inflation. The possibility of
an infinite universe is therefore not a mere flight of fancy, but is consistent with some of
the most successful theories in recent cosmology.10 It is therefore important to explore the
ethical implications of living in a universe that contains infinitely many agents.
1.2 Basic Locations of Value
Some ethical theories like utilitarianism are wholly aggregative. According to wholly ag-
gregative ethical theories, the normative status of an action is entirely a function of how
much of some basic value that it produces and the goodness of a world is just a function
of the value that exists at that world. Some ethical theories are partially but not wholly
aggregative. For example, a partially aggregative ethical theory might treat rights as side
constraints on action – it is never permissible to act in a way that violate a person’s rights
– but say that if we are choosing between acts that don’t violate any rights then it is better
9See sections 4 and 7 of Dorr and Arntzenius [71]. The possibility that the causal ramifications of our
actions are infinite produces a much more troubling version of Lenman’s [151] ‘cluelessness’ objection to
consequentialism. In Chapter 5 I will discuss how this affects the subjective permissibility of actions.
10There are other hypotheses that predict that the universe contains infinitely many agents. We can list a
few examples. If the Everettian interpretation of quantum mechanics is true then there may be infintely many
agents on different Everettian branches (though see Wallace [241] on the ontology of Everettian branches).
In addition, some have hypothesized that if the Everettian theory is true then individual agents may live
forever (see p. 5, Tegmark [221]). The ‘cyclic’ cosmological model allows infinitely many ‘big bangs’ and ‘big
crunches’ (see Steinhardt and Turok [216]. Modal realism posits infinitely many agents in real worlds that
are, from the perspective our world, not actual (on the potential ethical consequences of this, see Heller [108]).
If the simulation hypothesis [41] is true, there may be infinitely many simulated universes besides our own
or that our own (simulated) universe may be infinite.
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to perform the act that produces more of some basic value.11
Most wholly or partially aggregative ethical theories share two key components. First, they
have a theory about what is of final value.12 According to hedonists, for example, pleasure is
of final value and suffering is of final disvalue, while all other things, such as moving aesthetic
experiences, are only of value insofar as they generate pleasure or suffering. Second, they
have a theory about how to aggregate value: how to get from pro tanto final values to all-
things-considered value.13 Average utilitarianism, for example, identifies the overall value of
a world with the average wellbeing level of its occupants, while total utilitarianism identifies
the overall value of a world with the total wellbeing of its occupants.14
Wholly or partially aggregative theories face problems in infinite worlds if (i) their theory of
final value includes something that there can be an infinite amount of if the world is infinite,
such as pleasure and suffering, and (ii) their aggregative theory does not give diminishing
weight to final values such that their overall value tends towards an upper and lower bound.15
The key problem that such aggregative theories face in infinite worlds is that their aggrega-
tions rules are underspecified: even though they produce a precise account of overall value
in finite worlds, they do not produce a precise account of overall value in infinite worlds.
Consider the total utilitarian rule for comparing possible worlds: world w1 is strictly better
11Nozick [177] is a well-known advocate of such a view.
12Here I use Berker’s [36] terminology. Bostrom [42] calls this a ‘value rule’.
13Berker calls this a theory of all-things-considered value, while Bostrom calls it an aggregation rule.
14Aggregative theories also have a theory of primary evaluands and a deontic theory. A theory of primary
evaluands is a theory about what things we should assess the rightness and wrongness of directly, which
Shelly Kagan [118] calls evaluative focal points of a theory. A deontic theory is a theory about how we
get from facts about total value to facts about rightness and wrongness. Bostrom [42] also argues that
aggregative theories have a ‘domain rule’, which specifies what the relevant domain of an aggregative theory
is. I believe that we can fold the domain rule into the theory of overall value rule: if something is outside of
the domain of evaluation, then it is not of final value.
15Average utilitarianism may be a kind of special case here. If the utility of agents is bounded then
technically the overall value of a world cannot be unbounded according to an average utilitarian aggregative
theory. But if agents and their utilities are not given diminishing weight then, in infinite worlds, the average
utility will often be undefined. Given this, I will treat average utilitarianism as a member of the class of
aggregative views that face problems in infinite worlds.
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than w2 if and only if the total utility of w1 is strictly greater the total utility of w2. This rule
is underspecified in infinite worlds because the different ways that we can aggregate utility
in finite worlds produce conflicting results in infinite worlds.
For example, consider a finite world that contains five agents that are born on the same day
and that each experience 10 ‘utils’ (units of wellbeing) per year before dying painlessly 50
years later. We can find the total utility of this world by adding up the total number of utils
being experienced each year – 10 utils times five agents, so 50 utils total – and then multiply
this by the total number of years in which agents exist – 50 utils times 50 years, so 2500 utils
total. Call this ‘time-first’ aggregation since we are aggregating across every year that the
agents in a given spatial region exist.16 Alternatively, we could add up the total number of
utils that each agent experiences across his or her lifetime – 10 utils for 50 years, so 500 utils
total – and then multiply this by the number of agents – so 500 utils times 5 agents, so 2500
utils total. Call this ‘agent-first aggregation’. It doesn’t matter which of these methods we
use in finite worlds because they will always produce the same result and the total utility of
the world will always be well-defined, regardless of which method we use. In this case, they
both say that the total value of the world is 2500 utils.
As Cain [48] demonstrates, however, in infinite worlds it is possible to increase the utility
across spacetime while decreasing the utility experienced by each agent. To show this, we
can consider his case, ‘The Sphere of Suffering’, which it is worth quoting in full:
Imagine the following situation. We have an infinite universe in which there are
infinitely many persons (and there are only finitely many persons in any given
finite volume). We imagine that, with respect to some given frame of reference,
the spatial locations of these people remain fixed. These beings are immortal
and no other living beings exist or will come into existence. I will assume that
there are no other utilities to consider beyond those of these people. Both action
16Many ‘time-first’ views seem to assume a Newtonian spacetime but – as Arntzenius [6, p.41-2] points
out – temporal or spatiotemporal orderings will be relative to frames of reference in Newtonian worlds.
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a1 and a2 will bring into existence a sphere one foot in diameter which will
remain centred on the same point and will grow in diameter one foot per year.
Action a1 brings it about that everyone within the sphere suffers disutility at a
fixed finite level per unit of time, and anyone outside the sphere has a positive
utility, again, at a fixed finite level per unit of time. Action a2 is similar, except
that those within the sphere have a positive utility and those outside suffer.
Suppose these are the only utilities to be considered. Which course of action is
preferable?
Cain [48, 401-2]
If we use the time-first aggregation method described above then we will conclude that the
total utility of this world is positively infinite because there are always infinitely many agents
in the space outside of the sphere experiencing positive utility and only finitely many agents
in the space inside of the sphere experiencing negative utility at any given time. But if we use
the ‘agent-first’ aggregation method then we will conclude that the total utility of the world
in which the agent performs a1 is negatively infinite because every agent in this world has a
life that contains a finite period of happiness when they are outside the sphere followed by
an infinite period of happiness when they are inside the sphere. Since any positively infinite
amount of utility is strictly better than any negatively infinite amount of utility, the total
utilitarian criterion will say that the world in which the agent performs a1 is better than
the world in which the agent performs a2 if we use the time-first aggregation method and it
will say that the world the agent performs a2 is better than the world in which the agent
performs a1 if we use the agent-first aggregation method.17
Broome [45] uses the term ‘locations’ to refer to the things that good occurs at, such as time,
space, or agents. In infinite worlds, aggregative principles must be relative to a specified kind
of location, such as agents or times, as we can see in the case above. Let us call this the basic
locations problem. In the philosophical literature, the main candidates for basic locations of
17In Chapter 2 I will show that this kind of conflict still arises even if we assume that agents can only
have lives of finite length and with finite utility.
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value in infinite worlds are agents and times.18 In order to avoid taking a stance on what the
‘basic locations of value’ are, some authors formulate versions of their principles that can be
adapted to both agent-first and time-first aggregation.19
I am sensitive to the fact that personal identity for the purposes of ethics is not trivial. Many
ethicists have argued that properties like psychological continuity,20 biological continuity,21
or having a unified narrative,22 are what matter in ethics even if they are not necessary or
sufficient for the identity relation. For example, Parfit [179] defends the view that an agent
must bear what Parfit [179, p. 215] calls ‘relation R’ to her past and future self in order
to remain the same agent across time for the purposes of ethics. Relation R holds between
an agent at an earlier time and an agent at a later time if there is psychological continuity
with ‘the right kind of cause’ between the two agents. The some agent-based principles are
neutral about issues like personal identity but they do assume that the identity relation is
ethically important. I return to this issue in Chapter 5, where I will also consider the view
that it is subjective experiences and not agents that are basic locations of value.
Running in parallel to the philosophical literature on infinite ethics is the economics litera-
ture on intergenerational equity with infinite ‘utility streams’. This literature can arguably
be traced back to Frank Ramsey’s 1928 paper ‘A Mathematical Theory of Saving’, which
discusses the optimal rate of saving if we assume an infinite time horizon [188, p. 554-5].
It was revitalized in the 1960s by Koopmans [126] and Diamond [68]. These economists
18Vallentyne and Kagan [233, p. 5] argue that the locations of goodness could be ‘points or regions in time,
space or spacetime; or they might be people or states of nature’. I haven’t included states of nature in my
list here because if we change some state of nature like global temperatures (to use Broome’s example [45, p.
1]) in an infinite world, the goodness of this change seems to depend on whether it improves agents’ lives or
increases utility across spacetime.
19Vallentyne [232], Kagan and Vallentyne [233], Lauwers and Vallentyne [148] and Arntzenius [6] all offer
both time-first and agent-first versions of their principles.
20This view originates in Locke [158, II.27] and the relevance of of psychological continuity in ethics is
explored more recently by Parfit [179, Ch. 10-11].
21This view, sometimes called ‘animalism’, has been defended by DeGrazia [67], for example.
22See Shoemaker [205, 2.3] for an overview of the narrative criterion.
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consider how to weigh the interests of future generations of people. And so in this literature,
generations are often treated as the basic location of value.23
What is a generation? In the intergenerational equity literature, we are typically asked to
consider a set X of possible infinite utility streams. Each element x of X is an infinite
vector (x1, x2, x3, ...) of utilities, where each xi in the vector denotes the utility level of the
generation of agents at time ti. These generations are assumed to comprise finitely many
agents and the utility of each generation is assumed to be finite. So if, in some vector x, there
is a generation at the first time t1 that we are considering with utility 4 and a generation at
the second time t2 with utility 5 then this vector starts (4, 5, ...).
This generations framework is, I believe, highly underspecified. For example, I could find
no discussion of whether each infinite vector is composed of the same agents or of entirely
different agents, or if each generation in each infinite vector is composed of the same agents
or of entirely different agents. As we saw above, however, the choice of interpretation is
important here, since treating agents and times as basic locations of value can yield very
different results in infinite worlds. For example, suppose that the future will contain the same
agents regardless of what action we take now and we have to choose whether to undertake
action A or action B, where the outcomes for each generation are as follows:
g1 g2 g3 g4 g5 g6 ... gn gn+1 ...
A 3 3 3 3 3 3 ... 3 3 ...
B 2 2 2 2 2 2 ... 2 2 ...
Figure 1: Act outcomes for generations
If we treat generations as the basic locations of value, then it seems clear that action A is
better than action B since it produces more utility at every future generation. But suppose
23An alternative idealization developed by Weil [242] appeals to ‘infinitely-lived agents’ rather than over-
lapping generations of agents.
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that if action A is performed then each generation will consist of three agents. If action B
is performed then the exact same agents will exist, but at a rate of one agent per generation
(to make this more plausible, suppose that all agents are born from frozen fertilized eggs
that can be incubated at any time). Since there is only one agent per generation, each agent
can use more resources. The utility per agent conditional on A and B is as follows:
g1 g2 g3︷ ︸︸ ︷ ︷ ︸︸ ︷ ︷ ︸︸ ︷
a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 a6 a7 a8 a9 ...
A 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 ...
B 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 ...︸︷︷︸ ︸︷︷︸ ︸︷︷︸ ︸︷︷︸ ︸︷︷︸ ︸︷︷︸ ︸︷︷︸ ︸︷︷︸ ︸︷︷︸
g1 g2 g3 g4 g5 g6 g7 g8 g9
Figure 2: Act outcomes for agents within generations
Therefore the action that produces strictly more utility at each generation produces strictly
less utility for every agent who will ever live. This is a strong reason to think that generations,
insofar as they have been specified in this literature, are not basic locations of value.24
Blackorby et al [38, p. 580] claim that non-standard interpretations of the generations
framework are possible. For example, that each xi could be treated as the utility level of a
single agent in a countably infinite population. But as we see above, which interpretation
one adopts can reverse how one ranks the same pair of outcomes. Moreover, if we think that
each xi is the utility level of a single agent then it is not clear why we should be allowed to
help ourselves to ordered utility streams since agents come in no natural order (unless we
claim, quite implausibly, that birth order has some kind of moral significance).
24The generation theorist might try to avoid this problem by claiming that (i) if the future contains the
same people then each generation must contain the same number of agents, or (ii) agents cannot be born at
times other than the actual time at which they are born, or (iii) all futures contain entirely different people.
None of these seem especially plausible. Further problems for this temporal interpretation arise if we believe
that each future time may contain infinitely many agents across space, but I won’t discuss these here.
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For now I will assume the standard time-based interpretation of generations when discussing
the intergenerational equity literature, since most of the problems and solutions in this
literature assume that utilities come in a privileged ordering and are therefore inconsistent
with an agent-based interpretation of generations. Theories that focus on generations are
therefore best understood as time-based theories, rather than as distinct theories about what
constitute basic locations of value. The case above shows that the generations-based view
inherits the standard problems associated with time-based views.
I have identified two basic locations of value: agents and times, and identified generation-
based views as a species of the latter, since generations are just the set of agents that exist
during a given temporal period. It is worth pointing out, however, that those who treat agents
as the basic locations of value may hold very different views about the nature of agents, or
they may believe that subjective experiences and not entire lives are basic locations of value.
I return to these issues in the final chapter of this thesis.
In this section I have surveyed agents and times as basic locations of value and demonstrated
the ways in which they conflict. Throughout this thesis I will argue that when we are faced
with choosing between treating agents or times or anything else as basic locations of value,
the claim that agents are the basic locations of value is more plausible than the alternatives.
1.3 Sensitivity, Equity, and Completeness
Once we have established what our basic locations of value are, we need to specify how we are
going to aggregate utility across these basic locations of value. In finite worlds this is fairly
simple. If we favor purely aggregative principles then we could simply add up the utility
across all of our basic locations of value and the result will be sensitive to any increases in
utility. If we increase one agent’s lifetime utility by 3 utils, then the total utility of the world
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will increase by 3 utils regardless of whether we use time-first or agent-first aggregation.
Alternatively, we could aggregate utility in a way that pays attention to the distribution of
utility across basic locations of value. For example, we might weigh utility above above some
threshold more than we weigh the utility of agents below that threshold25 or we might favor
distributions that are more equal over those that are less equal.
In infinite worlds, it is not so simple to aggregate utility, let alone to do so in a way that is
sensitive to the distribution of utility across agents.26 In ‘A Neglected Family of Aggregation
Problems’, Krister Segerberg [201] asks us to consider a firm whose sole goal is to maximize
profit. It must consider what the perfect policy to employ is, where h is a policy and h(n) is
the amount of profit the firm will make in year n. At first, we might think that the value of
a policy – V (h) – is just the sum of the profit the policy will make for the firm each year, for
all years the policy is implemented:
∞∑
n=0
h(n). As Segerberg points out, however, if the firm
exists forever and implements the same policy every year, then this sum will not always be
well-defined because the series will diverge. Segerberg then shows that the following näıve
extension of the summation account of the value of a policy is also inadequate:




larger respectively less than every finite bound as i grows towards infinity. The
definition thus extended does not quite agree with our intuitions. For example,
let h0(n) = 1 and h1(n) = 1000000. Then V (h0) = V (h0) =∞, so according to
the extended definition h0 and h1 would be equally good. But one need not be
an ideal board member to see that h1 is a better policy. [201, p. 224]
As this example shows, if we say that two sequences whose sums diverge to positive infinity
are equally good then we will be insensitive to local increases in value at our basic locations
of value. An infinitely-long life in which an agent experiences utility +1 every day and an
25This aggregation method is consistent with ‘critical level utilitarianism’ [37].
26I will touch on some of the problems with appealing to distributive principles in infintie ethics in
Chapters 4 and 5.
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infinitely-long life in which an agent experiences utility +20 every day will be deemed equally
good because they both have the same cardinality of utility,27 even though the second has
more utility at each basic location – in this case each day of life – than the latter does.28
This problem of insensitivity has been repeated throughout the history of infinite aggregative
ethics. For example, Mark Nelson [169] asks us to consider two actions, J and K. Act J
produces 1 util every minute from the time that it is first performed, while act K produces 2
utils every minute from the time that it is performed.29 It seems better to perform act J since
this produces more utility at every basic location of value (in this case, times). But Nelson
argues that since these two actions produce the same quantity of utility, the utilitarian would
have no basis for choosing between them.30
The claim, then, is that an aggregation rule that ranks worlds or outcomes should be sensitive
to improvements in utility at basic locations of value, even if these improvements do not
affect the cardinality of the utility at the world or outcome as a whole.31 Segerberg’s näıve
extension rule and Nelson’s ‘same quantity of utility’ rule are not sensitive to such changes,
27Infinity can come in different cardinalities. In this case, if the agent lives for countably-many days then
the cardinality of both lives is the same as the cardinality of the natural numbers, ℵ0. If an agent lives
for uncountably many days – for example, the days can be put in one-to-one correspondence with the real
numbers – then her life will have a strictly greater cardinality of utility. (See Shelah [204] for an overview of
cardinal arithmetic.) Even if our aggregative ethical theory is sensitive to different cardinalities of infinity,
the problem of insensitivity remains. Many sequences with strictly greater value at each basic location will
have the same cardinality of utility. I will discuss larger cardinalities of infinity in Chapter 4.
28In this case days of life are basic locations of value because we are assessing the value of a life and not
the value of a world. If lives contain infinite utility then I believe any agent-first aggregation principle must
be sensitive to improvements within the agent’s life. I return to this in the next chapter.
29I have added the units of value and length of times. I follow Nelson in focusing on the utility produced
by each action, but we could replace ‘utility’ with ‘expected utility’ in this case and the point would hold.
30The utility of most actions will be different be different at only finitely-many locations. This means that
if the future is infinite, the utility of most of the actions available to us will be either positive or negative
infinity (depending on whether the future is infinitely good or infinitely bad). If we accept Segerberg’s näıve
extension, most of the actions available to an agent in an infinite world will be equally good.
31It might be suggested that what it is to accept that x is a ‘basic location of value’ is to accept Sensitivity
with respect to x. But there are some that accept that agents are the basic locations of value but reject
agent-based Sensitivity principles: for example, those that adopt the Maximin principle (since, according to
Maximin, the utilities (1,3) are no better than the utilities (1,1). I do not wish to rule out such views and
so I won’t equate basic locations of value with Sensitivity commitments.
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since improvements that do not affect the cardinality of the utility at the world will not
affect the ranking of that world under either rule.
Both Segerberg’s rule and Nelsons’s rule fail to meet the following desirable condition for
aggregation rules, a condition that has appeared in slightly different forms and under several
different names in the literature, and that I will call ‘Sensitivity’32
Sensitivity (Locations)
(<) If w1 and w2 share the same basic locations of value and every basic location of value
has at least as much utility in w1 as it does in w2, then w1 is at least as good as w2.
() If w1 and w2 share the same basic locations of value and every basic location of value has
at least as much utility at w1 as it does at w2 and some basic location of value has strictly
greater utility in w1 than it does in w2, then w1 is strictly better than w2.
This general Sensitivity principle is relative to whatever our basic locations of value are.
Cain’s [48] sphere of suffering case shows that we cannot treat both agents and times as
basic locations of value in infinite worlds. If the world is infinite then it is not possible to
jointly satisfy a sensitivity principle over agents and a sensitivity principle over times. Any
aggregation rule that entails Sensitivity for times will say that policy h1 is better than policy
h0 in Segerberg’s infinite firm case, and that act J is better than act K in Nelson’s case.
33
Time-first aggregation rules that entail Sensitivity for temporal locations can therefore avoid
the problems presented by Segerberg and Nelson. Relativizing Sensitivity to a basic location
of value is not sufficient to produce well-defined results in all cases, but attempting to satisfy
32This basic idea has been called ‘Monotonicity’, ‘Pareto’, ‘Sensitivity’, or ‘Basic Idea’. Vallentyne [230,
p.215]; [232, p. 413] argues that this principle preserves the ‘spirit’ of traditional utilitarianism. Sensitivity
also preserves the spirit of other aggregative ethical views, however, and I don’t believe its appeal will be
limited to traditional utilitarians.
33Endorsing Sensitivity is not sufficient to resolve a broader problem with subjective ethical decision
making involving infinities that Bostrom [42] calls infinitarian paralysis. If the world contains infinite positive
utility and infinite negative utility then, according to many aggregative ethical theories, nothing I can do
will make a difference to the total utility of the world (assuming that my actions can only produce a finite
utility). I return to the problem of subjective ethical decision making in Chapter 5.
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a Sensitivity principle for multiple basic locations of value will often produce inconsistencies
in infinite worlds even if those Sensitivity principles are consistent in finite worlds.
In the cases that Segerberg and Nelson construct all of the basic locations of value (times)
and are better in one outcome than they are in the other. It would therefore be sufficient to
endorse the ‘Weak Sensitivity’ principle, which says that if w1 and w2 share the same basic
locations of value and every basic location of value has strictly greater utility at w1 as it
does at w2 then w1 is strictly better than w2. But it is easy to construct cases that require
the full strength of Sensitivity. For example, suppose that act L produces the same utility
as act J at t1 and it produces twice as much utility as J at every time after t1.
34 Act L
clearly seems better than act J , but this is not entailed by Weak Sensitivity. So if we want
our aggregative ethical theories to be sufficiently sensitive to local improvements in value in
infinite worlds, then it seems that they should at least entail full Sensitivity for whatever
they take the basic bearers of value to be.
In the previous section I identified three candidates for ‘basic locations of value’. These were
times, generations, and agents.35 Rather than talking about this general Sensitivity princi-
ple for locations, we can refer to the Sensitivity principles for each of these basic locations
of value. In the previous section I argued that generations are underspecified and that a
time-based interpretation of generations seems implicit in the literature on intergenerational
equity. Since the intergenerational equity literature focuses primarily on generations, how-
ever, it will be helpful to formulate a Sensitivity principle for generations as well as for times
and agents. I will assume that if two worlds contain the ‘same generations’, this means that
they have the same temporal structure and that they share exactly the same set of agents
at each temporal period. The three Sensitivity principles that result if we substitute basic
34Similarly, if an act produces more utility than J at t1 and the same utility as J at every time after t1,
then this act seems better than J .
35Two further plausible candidates include subjective experiences and spatiotemporal regions.
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locations with generations, times, and agents are as follows:36
Generational Sensitivity
(<) If w1 and w2 contain the same generations and every generation has at least as much
utility in w1 as it does in w2, then w1 is at least as good as w2.
() If w1 and w2 contain the same generations and every generation has at least as much
utility at w1 as it does at w2 and some basic location of value has strictly greater utility in
w1 than it does in w2, then w1 is strictly better than w2.
Temporal Sensitivity
(<) If w1 and w2 have the same temporal structure and every time has at least as much
utility in w1 as it does in w2, then w1 is at least as good as w2.
() If w1 and w2 have the same temporal structure and every time has at least as much
utility at w1 as it does at w2 and some basic location of value has strictly greater utility in
w1 than it does in w2, then w1 is strictly better than w2.
Pareto (Agent Sensitivity)
(<) If w1 and w2 contain the same agents and every agent has at least as much utility in w1
as they do in w2, then w1 is at least as good as w2.
() If w1 and w2 contain the same agents and each agent has at least as much utility at w1
as they do at w2 and some agent has strictly greater utility in w1 than they do in w2, then
w1 is strictly better than w2.
In the intergenerational equity literature it is common to refer to Generational Sensitivity as
‘Pareto’. I have reserved the term Pareto for the agent-based Sensitivity principle because I
will focus on agents as basic locations of value in subsequent chapters.
These sensitivity principles conflict with one another. We can see this when we consider the
36Temkin [225, p. 586] develops a similar set of dominance principles to demonstrate their inconsistency.
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Sphere of Suffering case from the previous section. The world in which everyone is happy
and a sphere of suffering expands throughout the universe is worse than the world in which
everyone is unhappy and a sphere of happiness expands throughout the universe by Pareto
because all agents have infinitely bad lives in the first world and all agents have infinitely
good lives in the second world. The world in which everyone is unhappy and a sphere of
happiness expands throughout the universe is worse than the world in which everyone is
happy and a sphere of suffering expands throughout the universe by Temporal Sensitivity
because at each time there is infinite suffering in the first world and infinite happiness in the
second. Many have found Pareto to be more plausible than Temporal Sensitivity in cases
where the two principles conflict. For example, Temkin calls Pareto the ‘Personal Dominance
Principle’ and Temporal Sensitivity the ‘Temporal Dominance Principle’. In cases where the
two conflict, Temkin is inclined to endorse Pareto over Temporal Sensitivity:
[I]f the same people would exist in each outcome, and they would each be
better off in one of the outcomes than the other, then, in accordance with the
Personal Dominance Principle, I would regard the outcome in which they were
all better off as better than the other outcome, regarding utility, regardless
of how the two outcomes compared in accordance with either the Spatial or
Temporal Dominance Principles. [225, p. 590]
Although Temkin favors Pareto over Temporal Sensitivity, other ethicists like Vallentyne and
Kagan [233] and Arntzenius [6] have formulated principles that are sensitive to improvements
across space and time. The conflict between Pareto and sensitivity to improvements in utility
across space and time will be explored in more detail in subsequent chapters.
Sensitivity captures the component of aggregative theories that says we make a world or
outcome better by adding more utility to it. There is another important component shared
by many aggregative theories, however, which we might call equity. A theory is thought to
be equitable if it does not prefer one distribution over another if the two distributions are
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identical but differ only in terms of who has a given utility level. For example, if agents
are basic locations of value then a theory is inequitable if it prefers a distribution in which
agent A has utility 7 and agent B has utility 5 over a distribution in which agent A has
utility 5 and agent B has utility 7. If times are the basic locations of value then adding 10
utils to time slice t1 is just as good as adding 10 utils to any other time slice according to
equitable theories. One of the earliest defenders of giving equal weight to utility across times
is Sidgwick [208] who states:37
If we are rational, our concern for a moment of our conscious experience won’t be
affected by the moment’s position in time; so when a man is wondering whether
to do x, thoughts and feelings that he expects to have later on should be given
their due weight, and not discounted because they are off in the future. [208, p.
52]
A related class of principles that capture this component of aggregative ethical theories
have appeared under different names in the literature.38 I will refer to these as ‘anonymity’
principles. First we can consider the Strong Anonymity principle. Let the ‘utility profile’ of
a world be all of the utility levels that exist at the basic locations of a world (i.e. if a world
contains one location at utility 2 and infinitely many locations at utility 1, then this utility
profile of this world consists of one 2 and infinitely many 1s). Strong Anonymity says that
if we keep the utility profile of a world the same but we change which locations have those
utility levels, then the resulting world is equally as good as the original:
Strong Anonymity (locations)
If the utility of each basic location of value in w2 is a permutation of the utility of finitely
many or infinitely many basic location of value in w1, then world w1 and w2 are equally good.
37Similar sentiments in favor of equity are expressed by Ramsay [188] and Smart [211] regarding times
and Bentham [34], Mill [163], and Pigou [182] regarding agents.
38These include ‘equity’, ‘anonymity’ (this is the near universal term used in the intergenerational
anonymity literature), ‘impartiality’ and ‘neutrality’ (Vallentyne [232, p. 414-5]).
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Suppose the utility levels at t1, t2, t3, ... in world w1 are (1, 2, 1, 2, 1, 2, ...). And suppose
we permute the utility of each basic location of value in w1 so that the utility levels at
t1, t2, t3, ... in world w2 are (1, 2, 2, 1, 2, 2, ...). Worlds w1 and w2 are equally good by Strong
Anonymity. It doesn’t follow that two worlds are equally good if we transfer utility between
basic locations of value. For example, if we transfer utility from the 1-util agents to the 2-util
agents so that the utility levels at t1, t2, t3, , , are (0, 3, 0, 3, 0, 3, ...) then the world that results
has a distinct utility profile from w1.
39 Strong Anonymity is intended to capture the equity
desideratum. If Strong Anonymity holds then it doesn’t matter which particular locations
bear the utility levels of a world as long as the profile of utility levels remains the same.
Just like the Sensitivity principle, Strong Anonymity is relative to whatever our basic lo-
cations of value are. If our basic locations of value are times, for example, then Strong
Anonymity says that it doesn’t matter when a given utility level is being experienced as
long as the utility profile of the world remains the same. If our basic locations of value are
people, then Strong Anonymity says that it doesn’t matter who a given utility level is being
experienced by, as long as the utility profile of the world remains the same. We can formulate
Strong Anonymity principles for each of the basic locations of value discussed above:
Strong Generational Anonymity
If the utility of each generation in w2 is a permutation of the utility of finitely many or
infinitely many generations in w1, then world w1 and w2 are equally good.
Strong Temporal Anonymity
If the utility of each time in w2 is a permutation of the utility of finitely many or infinitely
many times in w1, then world w1 and w2 are equally good.
39We might find ‘utility transfer’ principles plausible in their own right. I will not discuss transfer
principles here, but will return to them in Chapter 4.
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Strong Agent Anonymity
If the utility of each agent in w2 is a permutation of the utility of finitely many or infinitely
many agents in w1, then world w1 and w2 are equally good.
In ‘Should utilitarians be cautious about an infinite future?’ Luc Van Liedekerke [236]
presents a problem for those who want to adopt both Sensitivity and Strong Anonymity
about the same basic locations of value. He shows that a time-first ranking of worlds w1 and
w2 cannot satisfy both Temporal Sensitivity and Strong Temporal Anonymity by asking us
to consider the following utility streams:40
t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 t6 ... tn tn+1 ...
u1 1 0 1 0 1 0 ... 1 0 ...
u2 1 1 1 0 1 0 ... 1 0 ...
Figure 3: An infinite temporal permutation
We can turn the first utility stream u1 into the second utility stream u2 by permuting the
utility levels of u1 – we just need to move utility 1 from t3 to t2, utility 1 from t5 to t3, utility
1 from t7 to t5, and so on, and keep all other utility levels at their original locations. Since
these two utility streams have the same utility profiles and u2 can be obtained from u1 by
means of an infinite permutation, if we accept Strong Temporal Anonymity then we must
conclude that u1 and u2 are equally good. But if we take times to be the basic locations of
value then u2 is strictly better than u1 by Temporal Sensitivity. This shows that we cannot
satisfy both Temporal Sensitivity and Strong Temporal Anonymity in infinite worlds.
The same problem arises if we believe that agents are the basic locations of value. To show
this, let us consider a variation of a case given in Hamkins and Montero [99]. Suppose that
40Many of the papers in infinite ethics prior to Vallentyne and Kagan [232] discuss time rather than
spacetime. I follow the conventions of these papers here. In Chapter 2 I show that similar problems arise if
we treat spatiotemporal regions rather than temporal regions as basic locations of value.
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w1 contains an infinite population of agents, where each person is named after an integer:
..., p−2, p−1, p0, p1, p2, ... and in world w1 each agent has a utility level that corresponds with
their name, so p1 has utility 1, p2 has utility 2, and so on. We can permute the utility levels
of the agents of w1 by moving each utility level i to the agent with the name pi−1 to get
world w2. If we do this, the populations of w1 and w2 are as follows:
... p−3 p−2 p−1 p0 p1 p2 p3 ...
w1 ... -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 ...
w2 ... -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 ...
Figure 4: An infinite permutation of agent utilities
We obtained the second world from the first world by permuting the utility levels of the
agents in w1, and the utility profiles of w1 and w2 is the same. This means that w1 and w2
are equally good by Strong Agent Anonymity. But w2 is better than w1 by Pareto. The
conflict between Strong Anonymity principles and Sensitivity principles over the same basic
locations of value therefore arises regardless of our choice of basic locations of value.41
If we want to retain at least one of these axioms for some basic location of value then we
can either weaken our Sensitivity axiom and retain our Strong Anonymity axiom, or we can
retain our Sensitivity axiom and weaken our Strong Anonymity axiom. Sensitivity axioms
are generally taken to be the more plausible of the two. Theorists may deny Sensitivity for
locations of value that they do not take to be basic, since we have seen that it is not always
possible to satisfy Sensitivity across multiple candidates for basic locations of value, such as
time and agents. But it is difficult to accept that we could add utility to the locations of
value that we consider to be basic and decrease utility at none of these locations without
thereby making the world better. For this reason, most theorists have concluded that since
41Hamkins and Montero [99] argue that we should reject Sensitivity because it is inconsistent with the
‘Isomorphism Principle’. I will discuss this problem, Hamkins and Montero’s isomorphism principle, and
their objections to Sensitivity more in Chapter 2.
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Strong Anonymity conflicts with Sensitivity, we must reject Strong Anonymity.42
Yew-Kwang Ng [172] argues that aggregative ethicists should retain their Sensitivity principle
but adopt a principle weaker than Strong Anonymity: a principle that I will call Finite
Anonymity.43 This principle says that two worlds are equally good if we swap the utility
levels of finitely many basic locations of value, but worlds may not be equally good if we
swap the utility levels of infinitely many basic locations of value:44
Finite Anonymity (locations)
If the utility of each basic location of value in w2 is a permutation of the utility of finitely
many basic locations of value in w1, then world w1 and w2 are equally good.
For any given basic location of value, it is always possible to jointly satisfy Sensitivity and
Finite Anonymity, as Vallentyne (p. 415-6, 1995) shows. To see why, suppose we permute
only finitely many utilities in a world. If one location has lower utility than it did prior to the
permutation then, since this is a finite permutation, another location must have more utility
than it did prior to the permutation. Therefore neither world can be better by Sensitivity.
And so we cannot generate the kind of examples given by Van Liedekerke and Hamkins and
Montero if we reject Strong Anonymity and accept Finite Anonymity instead.
In ‘Infinite utility: Insisting on strong monotonicity’, Luc Lauwers [136] argues that Finite
Anonymity is too weak to guarantee that the utilities of each basic location of value will
be given equal weight in infinite worlds. In defense of this, he asks us ( [136, p. 224]) to
42There are exceptions, however. Nelson [169], Garcia and Nelson [91], Hamkins and Montero [97] [99]
argue that Sensitivity is false because adding more value at locations does not increase overall utility at a
world and (in the case of the latter) because it is inconsistent with the view that worlds are not as good as
their ‘isomorphic copies’. I discuss these objections in chapters 2.
43Svensson [219] calls this principle ‘finite equitableness’, but it is generally called ‘finite anonymity’ or
just ‘anonymity’ elsewhere in the literature.
44Ng [172, p. 411] argues in favor of this principle on the grounds that ‘infinity times zero need not
equal zero’ in cases where x = yc where c is a positive constant and so the value of x approaches zero as y
approaches infinity. But even if we think that this is a plausible reason to reject some applications of Strong
Anonymity, but in Van Liedkerke’s example no such dynamic is present.
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consider a contrived aggregation rule that says the value of a utility stream is the limit of
its even-indexed utilities. He then asks us to consider the following two utility streams:
u1: 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, ... , 0, 1, ...
u2: 5, 1, 5, 1, 5, 1, ... , 5, 1, ...
Figure 5: Difference at even-indexed and odd-indexed utilities
The contrived aggregation rule will say that the value of u1 and u2 are the same: they
both have value 1. Even though this contrived rule completely ignores the odd-indexed
utilities (and therefore violates Sensitivity with respect to whatever our basic locations of
value are in the two utility streams above), the rule satisfies Finite Anonymity because finite
permutations of this sequence will not change the limit of its even-indexed utilities.
Lauwers contends that a principle that ignores infinitely many locations entirely surely can-
not be equitable. In light of this, Lauwers proposes an alternative ‘Fixed-Step Anonymity’
principle. In order to formulate this principle, we need the concept of a ‘fixed step permuta-
tion’ of a utility stream. Suppose that we cut an infinite utility stream into segments of equal
finite length.45 If there is some length of segment such that we can transform utility stream
u1 into utility stream u2 by permuting only the utilities within each of these finite-length
segments, then we say that u2 is a fixed step permutation of u1. With this concept of a fixed
step permutation, we can formulate a ‘Fixed-Step Anonymity’ principle that is stronger than
Finite Anonymity but weaker than Strong Anonymity:
45It is important that the segments are of equal length. If they are not then the permutation is a
‘variable step’ permutation. The Variable Step Anonymity principle conflicts with Sensitivity (Fleurbaey
and Michel [87]) but not the  condition of Sensitivity (Sakai [195]).
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Fixed-Step Anonymity (locations)
If w1 and w2 share the same basic locations of value and the utilities of the basic location of
value of w2 are a fixed step permutation of the utilities of the basic locations of value of w1,
then world w1 and w2 are equally good.
In the case above, the aggregation rule does not satisfy Fixed Step Anonymity because
we could cut u1 and u2 into segments of length 2 and switch all of the even-indexed and
odd-indexed utilities in u1 and u2. If we did this, then u2 would be better than u1 by our
contrived aggregation rule, which violates Fixed-Step Anonymity. Unlike Strong Anonymity,
Fixed-Step Anonymity is consistent with Sensitivity over the same basic locations of value.46
Since Fixed Step Anonymity entails Finite Anonymity, however, any results that appeal to
Finite Anonymity will also affect theories that satisfy Fixed Step Anonymity. Within the lit-
erature on intergenerational equity, several important negative results have been established
for aggregative ethical theories that satisfy both Sensitivity and Finite Anonymity over the
same basic locations of value.47 In order to appreciate these results, we must first introduce
a third desideratum to our list, namely Completeness :
Completeness of <
For all worlds w1, w2, either w1 < w2 or w2 < w1
If the ‘at least as good as’ relation is complete then there are no pairs of worlds that are
incomparable, where being incomparable means that neither world is better than, worse
than, nor equal to the other.48 Completeness seems like a desirable property for the ‘at least
46The cases that demonstrate a conflict between Sensitivity and Strong Anonymity require permutations
over segments that are infinitely long. Van Liedkerke and Lauwers [237] propose a stronger notion of
anonymity, ‘Bounded Anonymity’, that is not consistent with Sensitivity. I will discuss anonymity principles
in more detail in Chapter 3, where I will also argue against the fixed-step anonymity principle.
47I cannot summarize all of the work in this field here. For an excellent overview, see Asheim [8].
48As Chang [53] points out, it is possible for the ‘at least as good as’ relation to not hold between two
worlds and for this worlds to still ethically comparable if we accept some additional ethical relation. However,
I will focus on whether the ‘at least as good as’ relation holds between worlds.
27
as good as’ relation to have. If an ethical relation is incomplete then there may sometimes
be no fact of the matter about which of two outcomes is better and, as I will argue at the
end of this chapter, we currently have no satisfactory framework for making ethical decisions
in which the outcomes of our actions are incomparable.
If our ethical relation is complete then we are able to rank all worlds: to put them in an
order from best to worst. It would be even better to know now how much better or worse
each world is than every other world.49 The intergenerational equity literature distinguishes
between these. In this literature a ‘social welfare relation’ is a relation that compares utility
streams across generations and that satisfies transitivity and reflexivity.50 A ‘social welfare
ordering’ is a social welfare relation that is also complete. And a ‘social welfare function’
is an order-preserving function from the set of utility streams to the real numbers.51 Social
welfare functions can therefore tell us how much better one utility stream is than another.
If we accept that infinite worlds can be incomparable but continue to hold that the < relation
is transitive, reflexive and anti-symmetric, then the the < relation is a weak partial order
rather than a non-strict total order. And if we continue to hold that the  relation is
transitive and irreflexive then the  relation is a strict partial order rather than a strict
total order. We can represent partial orders of worlds diagrammatically, where w1 −→ w2
indicates that w1  w2 and w1 ←→ w2 indicates that w1 ∼ w2 and a lack of connector
between w1 and w2 indicates that w1 and w2 are incomparable. Consider:
49In other words, we would prefer for the value of worlds to be measurable on an interval scale rather than
just an ordinal scale. If we are able to say how much better outcome O1 is than outcome O2, for example,
then we are also able to say how much an agent should value a gamble that involves probability n of O1
and probability 1 − n of O2. Being able to measure worlds, actions, and outcomes on an interval scale is
therefore particularly useful for ethical decision making.
50I will discuss these axioms in more detail in Chapter 3.




Figure 6: A partial order of worlds
In this example 〈w2, w3〉 and 〈w2, w4〉 are incomparable outcome pairs. Note that there is
no incomparability if two outcomes are comparable by transitivity. For example, claiming
that w1 and w4 are incomparable would be inconsistent with transitivity since w1  w3 and
w3 ∼ w4. If any two worlds are incomparable then transitivity entails the following:52
(i) If w1 4
< w2 and w2  w3 then w3 6< w1
(ii) If w1 4
< w2 and w2 ∼ w3 then w1 4< w3
We can see that the example of a partial order above is consistent with both (i) and (ii).
In ‘The evaluation of infinite utility streams’, Diamond [68] expands on an earlier result by
Koopmans [126]53 by showing that there is no complete social welfare ordering that satisfies
Sensitivity, Finite Anonymity, and continuity with respect to the same basic locations of
value. Since the literature on intergenerational equity focuses on generations as basic loca-
tions of value, I will use Sensitivity and Finite Anonymity to refer to Generational Sensitivity
and Finite Generational Anonymity in the remainder of this section. The third axiom in
Diamond’s result – continuity – says that we can alter a utility stream by an arbitrarily small
amount without this giving rise to a large difference in the ranking of that utility stream.54 If
52To show (i), suppose that w1 4
<w2, w2  w3 and w3 < w1. It follows that w2  w3 < w1 and so w2 < w1
by transitivity, contrary to our assumption that w1 4
< w2. To show (ii), suppose that w1 4
< w2 and w2 ∼ w3
and w1 < w3 or w3 < w1. Then either w1 < w3 ∼ w2 and so w1 < w2 by transitivity, contrary to our
assumption that w1 4
< w2, or w2 ∼ w3 < w1 and so w2 < w1, contrary to our assumption that w1 4
< w2.
53Koopmans shows that ethical relations cannot satisfy Sensitivity, continuity, non-complementarity (if
we change all but a single period then we can ignore the periods we do not change) and stationarity (moving
a positive change forward or backward should not make a difference) without violating Finite Anonymity.
54As Koopmans [126, p. 289] notes, in infinite spaces the concept of continuity depends on what distance
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a social ordering does not satisfy continuity then we cannot find a numerically representable
social welfare ordering – i.e. a social welfare function – that satisfies Sensitivity and Finite
Anonymity. Basu and Mitra [21] extend this result by showing that there is no social welfare
function that satisfies Sensitivity and Finite Anonymity even if we don’t assume continuity.
In other words, if a social welfare relation satisfies Sensitivity and Finite Anonymity then it
is not numerically representable.
Svensson [219] shows that the concepts of Sensitivity and Finite Anonymity do not funda-
mentally conflict with one another, however. He proves that there are finer topologies than
those appealed to in Diamond [68] that admit a social welfare ordering that satisfies Sensi-
tivity, Finite Anonymity, and Continuity. These orderings are extensions of the ‘Suppes-Sen
grading principle’.55 The Suppes-Sen grading principle says that two utility streams u1 and
u2 are equally good if one can be obtained from the other by a finite permutation, and
that stream u1 is strictly better than stream u2 if there is a finite permutation of u1 that is
strictly better than u2 by Sensitivity.
56 Svensson therefore establishes that the Diamond’s
result only holds if we assume a more coarse-grained topology.
Svensson’s possibility result does not do much to offset the restrictions on social welfare
relations imposed by the Diamond-Basu-Mitra result, however. First, the topologies that
Svensson appeals to have been the subject of powerful critiques.57 Second, Svensson’s proof
requires the Axiom of Choice, and it has been argued that the the Axiom of Choice and non-
measure one selects. Stronger distance measures result in larger topologies, since the topological space is
more fine grained, and it is easier for continuity to be satisfied in larger topologies. See Heal, Ed. (1997).
55This principle originates in Sen [203] and Suppes [218].
56The Suppes-Sen grading principle is the least demanding social welfare relation that satisfies Sensitivity
and Finite Anonymity (Asheim, Buchholz and Tungodden [10]). In his paper, Svensson shows that there
exists an extension of the ‘Overtaking Rule’ (due to von Weiszäcker [239]) that satisfies Sensitivity, Finite
Anonymity and continuity. Neither principle is complete on its own.
57Svensson first appeals to the discrete topology and then to a topology that is weaker than the discrete
topology but stronger than the sup topology that Diamond uses. As Campbell [49] points out, continuity is
easier to satisfy as one’s topology expands but larger topologies are less useful because they contain fewer
compact sets. Lauwers [134] argues against the Svenssson topology for infinite utility streams and provides
a comprehensive overview of these issues.
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constructive proofs should have no place in ethics. The main objections are usually twofold.
First, non-constructive objects like nonprincipal ultrafilters introduce an unacceptable level
of arbitrariness into ethics, as I will show in the next section.58 Second, non-constructive
existence proofs demonstrate the existence of an object without offering an explicit descrip-
tion of that object. As a quote attributed to Weyl states, non-constructive existence proofs
‘inform the world that a treasure exists without disclosing its location’. Objects that lack
any explicit description can be of little practical use within ethics and economics.59
It is worth emphasizing that the Diamond and Basu-Mitra results show that there is no social
welfare function that can satisfy Pareto and Finite Anonymity, but as others have noted,
it may be sufficient to have a social welfare ordering – a reflexive, transitive, and complete
relation – to rank infinite utility streams even if this ranking cannot be represented by a
real-valued function.60 Numerical representability may not be possible given the Diamond
and Basu-Mitra results. But even in finite cases social welfare ordering can sometimes be
complete without being numerically representable. For example, as Debreu [66, p. 164]
points out, the lexicographic ordering is complete but not numerically representable.
Although it seems that, for the purposes of ethics, a social welfare ordering over infinite
worlds is sufficient. Lauwers [143] and Zame [247] proved a conjecture first articulated
by Fleurbaey and Michel [87], namely that we cannot offer a constructive definition of a
social welfare relation that satisfies Sensitivity, Finite Anonymity and completeness: i.e. a
social welfare ordering that satisfies Sensitivity and Finite Anonymity. They show that the
existence of such a social welfare ordering requires a non-constructive axiom like the Axiom
of Choice. Therefore, although we can prove that there exists a social welfare ordering that
satisfies Sensitivity, Finite Anonymity, and completeness using non-constructive axioms, we
58The arbitrariness of free ultrafilters is also discussed by Lauwers and Liedkerke [149, p. 223-6].
59This is quoted in Kline [125, p. 239] and Lauwers [142]. See Weyl [243] on the topic of non-constructive
mathematics.
60For example, this point is made by Dutta [75, p. 137].
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can never offer an explicit description of such orderings.61 Lauwers concludes that we must
reject Sensitivity or Finite Anonymity or completeness.
A final important set of results are the Zame-Lauwers results. Zame shows that for any
social welfare ordering that satisfies Finite Generational Anonymity, the set of infinite utility
streams that are not strictly better than or strictly worse than one another has outer measure
1. Zame and Lauwers offer independent proofs that no social welfare ordering that satisfies
Finite Generational Anonymity and Generational Sensitivity is explicitly describable. I will
return to the Zame-Lauwers results in the next section.
Sensitivity, Equity, and completeness are desirable features for any ethical relation to have,
and important tensions between these three desiderata have already been highlighted by
some philosophers and economists. However, I believe that many of the results discussed
above are limited by the impoverished models employed in this literature. In Chapter 2 I
will argue that we are better able to capture the equity desideratum by combining Pareto
with an axiom stating that haecceitistic facts should have no bearing on the ethical ranking
of worlds, rather than with anonymity principles. Many of the important theorems, such as
the Basu-Mitra theorem and the Zame-Lauwers theorem assume that agents have utilities
within the [0, 1] interval and that there are infinitely many agents with utilities at each end
of the interval. In Chapter 3 I will show that we can generalize incomparability results to
worlds in which agents can have utility levels outside of the [0, 1] interval. Many of these
theorems also assume that ethical rankings cannot be grounded in facts about the world
61In a related result, Chichilnisky [55] shows that a social aggregation rule cannot Continuity, Anonymity
and Unanimity (which says that if everyone prefers p over q then the social choice rule prefers p over q)
unless the preference space is contractible. A rule that satisfies these axioms is sometimes referred to as a
Chichilnisky rule. Candeal et al. [51] and Efimov and Koshevoy [76] extend the Chichilnisky approach to
cases that involve infinite populations. However, Lauwers [132] shows that infinite Chinchilnisky rules do not
exist in any Hausdorff space of preferences or in any Tychonoff (product) topologies of preferences. Lauwers
[132] does show that Chichilnisky rules exist in some box topologies, but box topologies are arguably less
appropriate topologies of preferences than the coarser product topology since the compactness of Cartesian
products whose components are compact is guaranteed in the product topology and not the box topology,
i.e. the preference space is not always contractible.
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other than utility levels at basic locations of value. I will show that my incomparability
results hold regardless of what qualitative features we use to compare worlds.
Further problems with the intergenerational equity literature arise primarily because they
assume that ‘generations’ are basic locations of value even though, as I have shown, the
temporal interpretation of generations conflicts with Pareto. The assumption that basic
locations of value come in a natural order has led to a focus on order-dependent rather than
order-invariant principles for ranking infinite worlds. And whether the agents of different
possible futures are identical is often not specified.62 In order to avoid these problems we
could simply adopt Pareto rather than Generational Sensitivity. If people are basic locations
of value then we will naturally focus on order-invariant principles because people, unlike
times, do not seem to come in any natural order. Since Pareto only applies if the agents in
both worlds are identical it will also be important to specify whether populations contain
the same people or not. There is not a large literature focusing specifically on Pareto rather
than Generational Sensitivity, but in the next section I will offer a survey of the existing
literature on the Pareto principle in infinite ethics.
The problems I discuss in this thesis arise for orderings of infinite worlds. Since an ordering
is just a transitive and complete relation, it has fewer constraints a social welfare functions,
which must be numerically representable. As we have seen, the Diamond-Basu-Mitra re-
sults present problems for the claim that a social welfare function can satisfy Generational
Sensitivity and Finite Generational Anonymity. Since I will be focused on the difficulties
of trying to construct an ordering of infinite worlds, these results are less relevant than the
Zame-Lauwers results, which present problems for the claim that a social welfare ordering
can satisfy Generational Sensitivity and Finite Generational Anonymity. The Diamon-Basu-
Mitra results present problems for social welfare functions that satisfy Sensitivity and Finite
62Tungodden and Vallentyne [229] consider anonymous Pareto principles for variable population cases
but they assume that populations are finite and are focused on egalitarian, person-affecting views.
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Anonymity while the Zame-Lauwers results present problems for social welfare orderings
that satisfy Sensitivity and Finite Anonymity. I will therefore explore the Zame-Lauwers
results for orderings that satisfy Pareto rather than Generational Sensitivity.
1.4 Pareto Principles in Infinite Ethics
I introduced the Pareto principle in the previous section. Pareto is the Sensitivity principle
that is endorsed by those who take agents to be basic locations of value. It says that if w1
and w2 contain the same agents and every agent has at least as much utility in w1 as they
do in w1 then w1 is at least as good as w2, and if it’s also the case that some agents have
strictly greater utility in w1 than they do in w2 then w1 is better than w2.
There are many principles that are similar to Pareto whose generational equivalents have
been explored in the intergenerational equity. Let us assume that x and y are agents and
that the two worlds being ranked have identical populations. In the intergenerational equity
literature the  condition of the Pareto axiom formulated in this chapter is called ‘Strong
Pareto’ the following axioms have also been identified (here interpreted as principles about
agents and worlds that contain the same populations):63
Weak Pareto If w1 and w2 contain the same agents and each agent in w1 has strictly
greater utility in w1 than they do in w2, then w1 is strictly better than w2.
Monotonicity If w1 and w2 contain the same agents and each agent in w1 has at least
as much utility in w1 than they do in w2 and some agent has strictly greater utility in w1
than they do in w2, then w1 is at least as good as w2.
These weaker principles have generally been employed to prove stronger results not as alter-
63These are modeled on principles of the same name in Asheim [8, p. 203-4, 211] but I have removed
order-dependent elements from the principles and formulated them as agent-based principles.
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natives to Strong Pareto.64 As I noted above, most of those working in the intergenerational
equity literature have taken Strong Pareto to be a more fundamental axiom than anonymity
principles, and have scaled back anonymity principles to Finite and Fixed Step Anonymity
in response to the inconsistencies between Strong Anonymity and Pareto. This is also true in
the literature on infinite ethics within philosophy. In response a conflict between ‘temporal
neutrality’ (akin to Strong Anonymity) and Paretian principles presented by Van Liedek-
erke and Lauwers [149], Ng [172] notes that Paretian principles are ‘so compelling that one
is likely to be inclined to reject the time neutrality that necessitates their rejection.’ and
Vallentyne (p. 414, 1995) describes Pareto as a ‘core commitment of utilitarianism’ that, in
infinite worlds, captures the spirit of utilitarianism better than the sum total rule.65
Within the literature on infinite ethics in philosophy, however, some have started to question
the plausibility of the Pareto principle in infinite worlds. The most common challenges are
based on the inconsistency of Pareto with other principles such as Strong Agent Anonymity.
Some of those who question Pareto do so in a rather lukewarm way, acknowledging that it
will strike many as a fundamental principle of ethics. For example, after noting that the
theory that he puts forward (which I will discuss in the next chapter) is inconsistent with a
Paretian principle – the ‘weak people criterion’ – Arntzenius says the following:
I expect that most people will think that the verdict of the weak people criterion
is better on the grounds that ethics is fundamentally concerned with people, or
at least, with utility bearing living creatures, not with locations. If one can
make some people happier and none less happy, who cares if some regions are
less happy while the others are just as happy. I myself have no strong views on
this matter, and I would prefer the view that it is indeterminate which act is
better when the weak people criterion yields a different verdict from the weak
location criterion. But I am happy to leave it to readers to make up their own
64See, for example, Dubey and Mitra’s [74] on Monotonicity and Strong Anonymity.
65This is in contrast with Nelson and Garcia [91, p. 188] who prefer to treat the sum total in infinite
cases as equal, even though this conflicts with the Pareto prinicple.
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minds, especially since I doubt that we are likely to be faced with a situation
in which it matters which of the two criteria we use [6, p. 56]
In the next chapter I will show that the claim that we if the Pareto principle does not say
that one world is better than another, we can employ a principle that sometimes conflicts
with Pareto to compare those worlds, we will violate a plausible axiom about the ‘at least
as good as relation’.66 We can see that Arntznius is disinclined to reject Pareto outright.
Others have been more willing to at least weaken the Pareto axiom on the basis of its
conflict with other principles in infinite ethics. For example, Van Liedkerke and Lauwers [237]
argue that we should replace Pareto with a principle they call ‘Infinite Sensitivity’. Infinite
Sensitivity says that w1 is strictly better than w2 if all agents have at least as much utility
in w1 as they do in w2 and there is a group of agents with positive measure that has strictly
more utility in w1 than they do in w2. In finite worlds, any group composed of a positive
number of agents will have positive measure. Therefore the verdicts of Infinite Sensitivity
coincide with the verdicts of Pareto in finite worlds. In infinite worlds, however, only infinite
groups of agents will have positive measure. So in infinite worlds Infinite Sensitivity does
not entail that w1 is strictly better than w2 if all agents have at least as much utility in w1
as they do in w2 and finitely many agents have strictly more utility in w1 than they do in
w2. Van Liedkerke and Lauwers offer two main arguments for accepting Infinite Sensitivity
over Pareto:
Ultimately, we do not need strong sensitivity because in this article we have
set ourselves the task of comparing tails of utility streams, or to put it more
bluntly, of comparing infinite groups in a utilitarian manner. Consequently the
strong form of sensitivity is no longer a necessity. [237, p. 170]
First, in an infinite world strong Pareto is an excessive demand. Loosely speak-
ing it demands from us that, looking upon an infinite crowd, we still see the
66This axiom – the ‘Qualitativeness of <’ – will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter.
36
face of every single person - a difficult task indeed. Secondly, because it is
such a strong demand, accepting it leads to a slippery slope. When you start
from strong Pareto you might get forced into the discounting rule. And, on the
normative level, discounting is very unattractive indeed. [237, p. 173]
Lauwers argues that it is not necessary to satisfy Pareto when comparing infinite groups of
agents. But even when comparing infinite groups of agents we should surely reject principles
that entail that are indifferent to (potentially very large) increases in utility across a (po-
tentially very large) finite set of agents. If this is the case then we will be inclined to think
that Infinite Sensitivity is an inadequate alternative to Pareto in infinite worlds.
Lauwers argues that we might be forced into the discounting rule because, as argued in
Lauwers [133], ‘time neutrality’ can be characterized by continuity, and linearity, and a
bounded anonymity principle. Therefore if we accept Pareto, which is inconsistent with
the bounded anonymity principle, discounting is the only decision rule available to us. The
strength of these arguments against Pareto depends on the relative plausibility of these
alternative principles. In the next chapter, I will argue for an alternative conception of
equity than is offered by Lauwers’ bounded neutrality principle. If we wish to reject temporal
discounting we could, of course, reject the continuity or linearity axioms instead.
A further argument against Pareto in infinite worlds has been offered by Hamkins and
Montero [98]. They use the term ‘Basic Idea’ to refer to the Weak Pareto principle formulated
above and the term ‘Fundamental Idea’ to refer to the < condition of Pareto, which says
that if w1 and w2 contain all the same agents and all agents have at least as much utility
in w1 as they do in w2, then w1 is at least as good as w2. Hamkins and Montero accept
the the < condition of Pareto but reject the Weak Pareto principle. They argue that Weak
Pareto judges certain worlds to be better than others even though they are equally good.
The example they offer in defense of this is as follows:
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Suppose that, in some vast grassy field, there is a soccer team with infinitely
many players, some of who are very talented, and some of who are, frankly,
dreadful athletes. The talent levels of the players accords with the following
pattern:
Team A: ...3, 2, 1, 0, -1, -2, -3, ...
The players with positive talent are very good, while the players with negative
talent are terrible, and actually hurt the team by occasionally passing the ball to
the opposing team or, worse, scoring goals on the wrong side. The numbers are
meant to capture each player’s overall contribution to the success of the team.
The players wear numbered jerseys, and as it happens, conveniently enough,
the talent of each player is identical with the number on his or her shirt. Thus,
the player wearing shirt number 27 coincidentally has talent 27, and he is more
talented than player number 5, and certainly better than player number -3,
who sometimes has problems controlling the ball. Imagine now another team
in another field with exactly the same spectrum of talent:
Team B: ...3, 2, 1, 0, -1, -2, -3, ...
And as on Team A, the jersey numbers of the Team B players just happen to
match their talent. Now, which is the better team? If we judge the teams in
the utilitarian manner, paying attention only to the spectrum of talent on each
team, then the answer is obvious: because the teams have exactly the same
pattern of talent, we judge them to be equally good. [98, p. 237]
In order for Weak Pareto to be applicable to this example, we must also suppose that the
two teams are composed of the same agents and that the agent with talent level 0 on Team
A is identical to the agent with talent level 1 on Team A, and so on. Hamkins and Montero
ask us to suppose that this is indeed the case: that Team B is actually Team A after some
training that increases each agent’s talent level. They point out that, after this training,
everyone on Team A could pass their shirt down to the person at one talent level below them
so that everyone’s shirt still reflected their talent levels. They could do this without having
to order any new shirts. Hamkins and Montero contend that if Team B is truly better than
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Team A, we would expect that the team would have to buy new shirts.67
This case shows that two worlds can have the same number of agents and the same ‘utility
profiles’ – the same distribution of utilities across agents – and yet every agent can be better
off in one world than they are in the other. If this is the case then we have to decide whether
a world must have a different utility profile than another in order to be strictly better than
that world. If we believe that the project of ethics is about improving the lives of people
then, if this doesn’t entail a change in the utility profile of a world, the lesson that we could
take away from this case is that one world can be better than another even if they have the
same utility profile. After all, if all we care about is how much soccer talent we have then
we would clearly think that it’s better to be in Team B than in Team A because we know
that, no matter who we are, we will have more talent if we are in Team B than if we are in
Team A. If everyone agrees that they would prefer to exist in world w1 than in world w2,
this seems like a strong reason to believe that world w1 is strictly better than world w2.
I will return to these and other objections to the Pareto principle in Chapter 2 and again
in Chapter 5. In the remainder of this section, however, I want to offer a more detailed
discussion of the Zame-Lauwers results using Pareto rather than Generational Sensitivity.
The results that have the most similarity to those that I formulate in this thesis are Zame’s
theorems. In his 2007 paper, ‘Can intergenerational equity be operationalized?’ [247], Zame
proves four theorems. First, he shows that any complete and transitive relation across infinite
utility streams that is invariant to he permutation of the utility of two locations must be
indifferent between almost all possible infinite utility streams. Streams that can be strictly
ordered by an irreflexive, transitive relation that is invariant to the permutation of the utility
67This is only true because there is an isomorphism between the talent levels of the agents in the two
worlds. There is not always such an isomorphism between worlds that are strictly ranked by Weak Pareto:
for example, a world in which the players are all at talent level 2 and a world in which they are all at talent
level 1. Hamkins and Montero would prefer to make such comparisons using an Isomorphism Principle,
which I will discuss in the next chapter.
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of two locations has measure zero and so if the relation is complete then the streams that
it is indifferent between must have measure one (Theorem 1). Zame’s remaining theorems
show that no complete and transitive relation across infinite utility streams that satisfies
Generational Sensitivity and is invariant to the permutation of the utility of two locations
is measurable (Theorem 2) and therefore the existence of such a relation is independent of
Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory with the Axiom of Choice (ZFC) (Theorem 3). If such a relation
exists, it cannot be explicitly described (Theorem 4).68
I refer the reader to Zame’s paper for the proofs of each of these theorems, but it is worth
trying to consider the affect that using Pareto rather than Generational Sensitivity has on
Zame’s results. First, let us use  to refer to an irreflexive, transitive relation that satisfies
Pareto and is invariant to the permutation of the utility of finitely many agents.69 If some
worlds are not strictly better than others (e.g. if they are equally good) then  will not be
complete. Assume that agents can have utility levels within a bounded interval [0,2].70 The
claim that  is invariant to the permutation of the utility of finitely many agents means
that w1  w2 if and only if there is a world w1′ such that the utilities of the agents in w1′
are a finite permutation of the utilities of the agents of w1 and w
′
1  w2.71
Although Zame does not discuss the identities of the basic locations of value across worlds
because these are assumed to be generations, their identities are important if we are appealing
to Pareto. I believe we must restrict the result to cases in which w1 and w1′ contain the
same agents. First I will show that if w1 and w1′ contain different agents then we have no
reason to accept the account of  given above. Suppose that we do not restrict the account
68Lauwers [142] established a similar result showing that a reflexive and transitive relation over infinite
streams of 0s and 1s that satisfies Generational Sensitivity and Finite Anonymity is not explicitly describable.
The domains in which such relations are non-constructive is explored in Dubey [73].
69I appeal to finite permutations rather than permutations of the utilities of just two agents. I don’t
believe much rests on this. I will often use examples in which only two utility levels are permuted.
70Zame only assumes that infinite utility streams contain the [0,1] interval. He offers analogous proofs of
his theorems under the assumption that utilities lie in a finite set.
71See Zame [247, p.188-9].
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of the  to cases in which w1 and w1′ have identical populations. Let w1 and w1′ be two
worlds, where a1, a2, a3,... are the agents in w1 and and b1, b2, b3,... are the agents agents
in w2 and the utilities of each agent in w1 and w2 are as follows:
a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 a6 a7 a8 a9 ...
w1 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 ...
b1 b2 b3 b4 b5 b6 b7 b8 b9 ...
w1′ 2 1 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 ...
Figure 7: A finite utility permutation with disjoint populations
If just the first two utility levels have been switched, the utilities of the agents of w1′ are a
finite permutation of the utilities of the agents of w1. Now consider w
′
1 and w2:
b1 b2 b3 b4 b5 b6 b7 b8 b9 ...
w1′ 2 1 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 ...
b1 b2 b3 b4 b5 b6 b7 b8 b9 ...
w2 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 ...
Figure 8: A world worse than w1′ by Pareto
World w1′ is strictly better than w2 by Pareto and so w1  w2 if we do not restrict the
account of the  to cases in which w1 and w1′ contain the same agents. Finally, consider
world w2 and w2′ :
b1 b2 b3 b4 b5 b6 b7 b8 b9 ...
w2 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 ...
a3 a5 a1 a7 a9 a2 a11 a4 a13 ...
w2′ 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 2 1 ...
Figure 9: A finite utility permutation of w2
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The utilities of the agents of w2′ are a finite permutation of the utilities of the agents of w2.
Therefore w1  w2′ by transitivity. But compare the utilities of the agents in w1 and w2′ :
a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 a6 a7 a8 a9 ...
w1 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 ...
a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 a6 a7 a8 a9 ...
w2′ 2 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 ...
Figure 10: Comparing worlds w1 and w2′
We can see that w2′  w1 by Pareto. This contradicts the claim that w1  w2′ and so we
must restrict the account of the  to cases in which w1 and w1′ have identical populations.
If w2 can have a different population from w1 and w1′ then w1 and w1′ will never be strictly
better than (or equal to) w2 by Pareto. But w1 or w1′ may be better than w2 by a principle
other than Pareto. Therefore we need not assume that w2 must have the same population as
w1 and w1′ . To most neatly draw out the analogue of Zame’s result using Pareto, however,
I will focus on a set of worlds with identical populations.
If we accept Pareto rather than Generational Sensitivity, the best analogue to Zame’s account
of the  relation is the claim that w1  w2 if and only if there is a world w1′ such that w1 and
w1′ contain the same agents and the utilities of the agents in w1′ are a finite permutation
of the utilities of the agents of w1 and w
′
1  w2. This claim is not ethically trivial. For
example, we might reject it because we think that it is better for more utility to one agent
over another because they are more deserving. In other words, this principle seems to be
inconsistent with the idea that one world can be better than another based on factors other
than it’s distribution of utility. Let us simply grant this assumption for now, however.
If we focus on worlds with identical populations and accept the assumptions listed above,
Zame’s theorem 1 shows that if  an irreflexive, transitive relation that is invariant to the
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permutation of the utility of finitely many agents, then the set of identical population worlds
that are comparable by  will have measure zero. It does not seem implausible that this
result will also hold across worlds with variable populations. Zame’s first theorem does not
rely on the Pareto principle. The set of identical population worlds that are comparable
by  will have measure zero because it is an irreflexive relation that is invariant to the
permutation of the utility of finitely many agents. As Zame notes:
‘even if we abandon completeness and respect for the Pareto ordering, every
irreflexive preference relation that displays intergenerational equity has the
property that almost all pairs of utility streams are incomparable (not strictly
ranked). [247, p. 188]
That the  relation is not complete should not be particularly troubling, since some worlds
may be equally good. However, Zame’s final three theorems show that if we find an extension
< of  that is a complete, transitive relation that satisfies Generational Sensitivity and
invariance to the permutation of the utility of finitely many agents then the existence of
this relation is independent of ZFC cannot be explicitly described. Let us suppose that this
proof can be extended to worlds that are comparable by Pareto rather than Generational
Sensitivity.72 It would follow from this that the existence of a complete, transitive relation
that satisfies Pareto and invariance to the permutation of the utility of finitely many agents
is possible is independent of ZFC and cannot be explicitly described. We have already
encountered objections to appeals within ethics to objects that cannot be explicitly described
when discussing Svensson’s possibility proof in the previous section.
As I noted in the previous section, the Diamond-Basu-Mitra results generate problems for
the claim that there is a numerically representable social welfare function that satisfies Gen-
72The key differences Pareto introduces are that it only holds between identical population worlds and
it is a principle across basic locations (people) that come in no natural order. We can simply restrict our
discussion to worlds with identical populations. We must show that Theorems 2-4 can be established without
the need to assume a privileged ordering of agents, however.
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erational Sensitivity and Finite Generational Anonymity. We may be able to extend these
results using Pareto and Finite Agent Anonymity rather than generation-based principles.
Since I am not concerned with the numerical representability requirement, however, the
Zame-Lauwers results are of greater relevance here. I believe that we may be able to extend
the Zame-Lauwers result to worlds using the Pareto principle rather than Generational Sen-
sitivity. If we do then we can establish that the existence of a complete, transitive relation
that satisfies Pareto and invariance to the permutation of the utility of finitely many agents
is possible is independent of ZFC and cannot be explicitly described.
In this thesis I will establish results that go beyond the problems generated by the Zame-
Lauwers result for ethical orderings. First, I will not assume that the <, the at least as good
as relation, must be invariant to the permutation of the utility of finitely many agents. As
I noted above, any ethical theory that does not rely wholly on the distribution of utility
levels to rank worlds may reject this principle. Even theories that rely entirely on the
distribution of utility levels to rank worlds need not endorse it. Within the intergenerational
equity literature it has generally been assumed that anonymity principles ensure that an
ethical theory is ‘equitable’. In the next chapter I will argue that this we can derive a more
plausible equity constraint from Pareto and the claim that if the world pair 〈w3, w4〉 is a
qualitative duplicate of 〈w1, w2〉 in all qualitative respects, then w1 is at least as good as w2
if and only if w3 is at least as good as w4. I believe that it is much more difficult to deny
the claim that < should hold between qualitative duplicates than the claim that < should
be invariant to the permutation of the utility of finitely many agents.
I will also show that if we can permute the populations of worlds then the existence of a
transitive and complete < relation that satisfies that satisfies Pareto and the ‘invariance
across qualitative duplicates’ principle mentioned above is not merely independent of ZFC:
such a relation does not exist. I therefore show using an axiom that is much more plausible
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than finite permutation invariance that it is not possible to find a transitive and complete
ordering of worlds that satisfies Pareto. I also show that an ordering that satisfies Pareto plus
these auxiliary axioms fails to infinite worlds whenever the utilities of the populations of those
worlds that will typically hold between infinite worlds. I conclude that if we accept Pareto
then incomparability between infinite worlds will be the norm rather than the exception.
Finally, I will show that these results apply not only to worlds with identical populations
but also to worlds with disjoint and overlapping populations. I also show that they generate
novel problems for objective and subjective theories of permissibility.
I will begin to lay the foundations for these results in the next chapter. Before concluding
this chapter, however, I will survey the principles that have been developed within economics
and philosophy to rank worlds that contain infinitely many ‘basic locations of value’.
1.5 Infinite Aggregation Principles
Within the infinite ethics literature and intergenerational equity literature, many principles
have been proposed for comparing worlds that contain infinite utility.73 In this section I will
attempt to offer an overview of the main solutions.74 I divide the main solutions into four
families. These families are: utility difference principles, utility density principles, alternative
formalizations of infinity, and discounting principles.
73Decision theorists working on the problems generated by the possibility of infinite streams of utility
for a single agent, such as Pascal’s wager, the St Petersburg paradox, and the Pasadena game, have also
formulated methods for comparing infinite utility streams that could be applied to the problems in infinite
ethics. I will discuss the analogueies between solutions proposed in decision theory and ethics in chapter 6.
74In this chapter I will focus on existing solutions that attempt to preserve Sensitivity. In chapter 7 I will
discuss some solutions that are inconsistent with Sensitivity and have not been explored in much depth.
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1.5.1 Utility Difference Principles
To make it easier to discuss utility difference principles, it will be helpful to introduce some
new terms. First, let δ1−2(li) be the utility at world w1 at location li minus the utility at
world w2 at location li. So if agents are locations and agent a4 has utility 7 in w1 and the
same agent has utility 2 in w2, then δ1−2(a4) = 5. Next, let σ1,2 be an enumeration of all of
the locations of w1 and w2 – i.e. an ordering of locations such as l1, l2, l3, l4, ... or l2, l1, l4, l3, ...
(for now, I will only consider pairs of worlds that share all of the same locations). Let S1,2
be the set of all possible enumerations of the locations of w1 and w2: the set of all σ1,2.
75 If
locations come in a privileged order, such as the natural ordering of times, then I will use
σ∗1,2 to refer to this one privileged enumeration of the locations of w1 and w2.
As we have seen, one of the key problems in infinite worlds is that simply summing the util-
ities in two infinite worlds will often fail to take into account important differences between
those streams. For example, the sums of 2, 2, 2, 2, ... and 1, 1, 1, 1, ... both diverge to positive
infinity, but presumably we believe that a world in which each location has utility 2 is bet-
ter than a world in which each location has utility 1.76 Expressed in our new terminology,
Sensitivity says that if, for all locations li in w1 and w2, δ1−2(li) ≥ 0 and for some location lj
in w1 and w2, δ1−2(lj) > 0, then w1 is at least as good as w2.
We have noted that reasonable aggregation principles should entail Sensitivity, but Sensi-
tivity is an extremely weak principle: if some locations have more utility in w1 and some
locations have more utility in w2 then Sensitivity is silent about w1 and w2. But consider
75Here I use symmetric group notation S1,2 to refer to the set of all possible permutations of these
populations, where the subscript 1, 2 refers to the shared locations of w1 and w2 (which comprise all the
locations of w1 and w2) and not to the worlds themselves. Since the locations in w1 and w2 are countably
infinite, there are uncountably many possible enumerations of these locations in S1,2 because the cardinality
of the symmetric group on an infinite set is equal to the cardinality of the power set of that set.
76Hamkins and Montero [98] [100] argue against this principle, while others have argued that it ought to
be weakened. I will consider these objection in Chapter 2 and 4, but here I will simply assume that it is
correct.
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the utilities at each location of worlds w1 and w2, which both have all the same loctions:
l1 l2 l3 l4 l5 l6 ...
w1 1 2 2 2 2 2 ...
w2 2 1 1 1 1 1 ...
Figure 11: World w2 is better at a single location
World w1 has one location – l1 – that is at utility level 1 and all of the other locations of
w1 are at utility level 2. World w2 has the same locations as w1, but location l1 is at utility
2 in w2 and all of the other locations of w2 are at utility level 1. World w1 seems better
than w2 since there is a set of locations l2, l3, ... that are jointly better off in w1 by infinitely
many utils and there is no set of locations that are jointly better off in w2 by infinitely many
utils.77 But Sensitivity does not entail that w1 is better than w2.
What I am calling ‘utility difference principles’ are principles that solve this problem by
using the differences in the utilities at locations to find the total value of a world. The
Catching-Up principle is a well-known principle of this sort developed within the economics
literature for comparing infinite streams of utility, an extension by Gale [89] of a principle
first developed by Atsumi [15] and von Weizsäker [239]. As we have seen, many in the
economics literature assume that generations are basic locations of value and that they come
in a natural temporal order. Since the Catching-Up principle first developed by Atsumi
and von Weizsäcker assumes a privileged ordering of locations (generations), I will call it
‘Ordered Catching-Up’. The principle is as follows:78
77Dutta [75] calls a similar principle for generations ‘Veto Power of Infinitely Many Generations’.
78Here and below I will mirror the formulation of Catching-Up given in Lauwers and Vallentyne [148].
Their formulation is slightly atypical: usually the Catching-Up principle says that w1 is at least as good as
w2 if w1 and w2 share all the same locations and there is some location lj ≥ 1 in w1 and w2 such that for all
locations at least as great as lj , the sum of utilities in the locations of w1 and is greater than or equal to the




u(lk), w2). One unfortunate feature
of Lauwers and Vallentyne’s formulation is that, unlike the standard formulation, it does not entail total
utilitarianism in finite worlds. Setting aside comparisons between infinite utility and finite utility worlds, we
would need to replace the limit inferior with the infumum if both worlds in a pair contain only finite utility.
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Ordered Catching-Up (identical locations)
If w1 and w2 contain the same locations in the order σ
∗
1,2 and the lower limit, as n approaches
infinity, of the sum of δ1−2(li) at locations 1 to n is at least as great as [strictly greater than]
zero, w1 is at least as good as [strictly greater than] w2.
Let p(w1) be all of the basic locations of w1, so that p(w1) = p(w2) if and only if w1 and w2
have the same basic locations. Given this, we can express the Ordered Catching-Up principle
more formally as follows:79








w1  w2 if p(w1) = p(w2) and w1 < w2 and w2 6< w1
We can demonstrate how the Ordered Catching-Up principle works by looking at what it says
in the example given above. To simplify things, let’s assume that the privileged enumeration
σ∗1,2 of the locations of w1 and w2 is just l1, l2, l3, ..., i.e. the order that they are presented in
above. We can add the values of δ1,2(li) for each of the locations in w1 and w2 and the sum
of these values to our diagram as follows:
l1 l2 l3 l4 l5 l6 ...
w1 1 2 2 2 2 2 ...
w2 2 1 1 1 1 1 ...
δ1−2 -1 1 1 1 1 1 ... lim inf = 1∑
δ1−2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 ... lim inf =∞
Figure 12: Applying Ordered Catching-Up to w1 and w2
Since the limit inferior of the sum of all δ1,2(li) diverges to positive infinity, w1 is strictly
79Generally, a strict better than condition for the Catching-Up principle is not explicitly formulated,
with the exception of Dutta [75]. This definition of strictly better than seems to be implicit in much of the
literature, however. For example, the verdict in the case in Asheim and Tungodden [13, p. 58] that I discuss
below does not follow unless we assume something like the definition I have given here.
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better than w2 according to the Ordered Catching-Up principle. The Ordered Catching-Up
principle also entails Sensitivity for the (ordered) locations being treated as basic locations
of value. If all locations have at least as much utility in w1 as they do in w2, then it is
clear that the limit inferior of the sum of δ1,2(li) for all locations must be at least as great as
zero. And if some of these locations have strictly greater utility in w1 than they do in w2,
then the limit inferior of the sum of δ1,2(li) for all locations must be strictly positive. Unlike
Sensitivity, however, Ordered Catching-Up can compare worlds in which finitely many of the
locations of w1 and w2 have strictly lower utility in w1 than in w2 and infinitely many of the
locations of w1 and w2 have strictly greater utility in w1 than in w2.
The Ordered Catching-Up principle says that w1 is strictly better than w2 if the limit inferior
of the sum of all values of δ1,2(li) is positive and not just that the limit inferior of all values of
δ1,2(li) is positive. This is because if finitely many locations of w1 and w2 have more utility
in w1 than in w2 and all other locations of w1 and w2 have the same utility in both worlds
then the limit inferior of all values of δ1,2(li) will be zero. So if we claimed that w1 is at
least as good as w2 if the limit inferior of all values of δ1,2(li) is at least as great as zero,
then we would be forced to conclude that w2 is at least as good as w1 in this kind of case,
which violates Sensitivity. But the limit inferior of the sum of all values of δ1,2(li) will be
some strictly positive finite value in this kind of case. Therefore Ordered Catching-Up will
say that w1 is strictly better than w2, which is consistent with Sensitivity.
Not all cases in which infinitely many agents are better off in w1 than in w2 and finitely
many agents are better off in w2 than w1 will be such that w1  w2 according to Ordered
Catching-Up. For example, suppose that the first agent of w1 has utility 2 and the remaining




80Finding the exact sum of this sequence was also known as the ‘Basel problem’ and was solved by Euler
who demonstrated that the exact value of the sum of this sequence is π
2
6 ≈ 1.645. Given this, the sum of
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... lim inf ≈ 0.355
Figure 13: Lower limit inferior with infinitely many agents better off
In this case there are infinitely many agents – l2, l3, l4, ... – that are better off in w2 than in
w1 but the total utility that those agents are better off by in w2 is approximately 0.645 utils.
There is only one agent – l1 – that is better off in w1 than in w2, but this agent is better off
by 1 util. So even though infinitely many agents are better off in w2 than in w1 and finitely
many agents are better off in w2 than in w1 the total utility of w1 is strictly greater than
the total utility of w2. The limit inferior of the sum of δ1,2(li) for all locations in w1 and w2
is strictly greater than zero, and so w1 is strictly better than w2 by Ordered Catching-Up.
The Ordered Catching-Up principle does have some questionable results, however. Consider
the following case given by Asheim and Tungodden [?, p. 58]:81
l1 l2 l3 l4 l5 l6 ...
w1 1 1 1 1 1 1 ...
w2 2 0 2 0 2 0 ...
δ1−2 -1 1 -1 1 -1 1 ...∑
δ1−2 -1 0 -1 0 -1 0 ... lim inf = −1
δ2−1 1 -1 1 -1 1 -1 ...∑
δ2−1 1 0 1 0 1 0 ... lim inf = 0
Figure 14: A single location makes a difference to Ordered Catching-Up
81Similarly, as Crespo, Núñez, and Rincón-Zapatero [64, p. 8] point out, the stream (1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, ...) is
strictly better than the stream (0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, ...) according to the Ordered Catching-Up principle.
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World w2 does not strike us as better than w1. After all, every two locations in world w2
have 2 utils and so do every 2 locations in w1. But according to the Ordered Catching-Up
principle, w2 is at least as good as w1 (since the lim inf of
∑
δ2−1 is 0) and w1 is not at least
as good as w2 (since the lim inf of
∑
δ1−2 is −1). Therefore w2 is strictly better than w1
by Ordered Catching-Up. Now consider what would happen if we were to remove location
l1 from this sequence, e.g. if times are the basic locations of value, we wait until the first
time period has passed. The limit inferior of
∑
δ1−2 if l1 is removed is 0 and so, by Ordered
Catching-Up, w1 is at least as good as w2. Surely adding or removing a single location at
the beginning of the sequence should not have this impact on world rankings.
To avoid this kind of result we can retreat to the subrelation82 of the Ordered Catching-Up
principle called the Overtaking principle, which is the principle originally formulated by von
Weiszäcker [239]. We can formulate the Ordered Overtaking principle as follows:
Ordered Overtaking:








To see how Ordered Overtaking works, suppose that w1 and w2 share the same locations
and the utilities of these locations in w1 are (−1,−1, 2, 2, 2, ...) while the utilities of these
locations in w2 are (1, 1, 1, 1, 1, ...). This means that the sequence δ1,2 is (−2,−2, 1, 1, 1, ...)
and so
∑
δ1,2 is (−2,−4,−3,−2,−1, 0, 1, 2, ...). We can see that
∑
δ1,2 is strictly positive
after location l6 in this case, and so w1 is better than w2 by Ordered Overtaking.
83
82If R1 is a subrelation of R2 then x <R1 y → x <R2 y. Dutta [75] notes that the Overtaking principle
is a subrelation of the Catching-Up principle: if w1 < w2 by the Overtaking principle than w1 < w2 by the
Catching-Up principle (but the reverse is not always true).
83I have formulated the ‘utilitarian’ version of the Ordered Overtaking principle here, but Aumann and
Shapley [16] formulate a ‘Long run averages’ principle that arguably plays the role of an average utilitarian
overtaking principle, while Bossert, Sprumont and Suzumura [40] formulate a version of the leximin criterion
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Unlike the Ordered Catching-Up principle, the Ordered Overtaking principle does not say
that w2 is strictly better than w1 in the case above. Since
∑
δ2−1 is (−1, 0,−1, 0,−1, 0, ..)
there is no location lj such that, for all locations after lj,
∑
δ1−2 is greater than zero and no
location lj such that, for all locations after lj,
∑
δ1−2 is equal to zero. The same is true of∑
δ1−2. Even though (1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, ..). is always at least as great as zero, there is no location
after which it is equal to zero or strictly greater than zero. Therefore worlds w1 and w2 are
not comparable by Ordered Overtaking.84
This illustrates a more general problem that affects both the Ordered Overtaking principle
and the Ordered Catching-Up principle: namely, that there are many world pairs that are
not comparable by either principle. Consider worlds w1 and w2:
l1 l2 l3 l4 l5 l6 ...
w1 1 3 0 1 3 0 ...
w2 2 0 2 2 0 2 ...
δ1−2 -1 3 -2 -1 3 -2 ...∑
δ1−2 -1 2 0 -1 2 0 ... lim inf = −1
δ2−1 1 -3 2 1 -3 2 ...∑
δ2−1 1 -2 0 1 -2 0 ... lim inf = −2
Figure 15: A world pair that Catching-Up and Overtaking do not rank
These worlds are not comparable by either the Ordered Catching-Up rule or the Ordered




δ2−1 are both negative and so neither
world ‘catches up’ with the other.85 And there is no location such that, for every location
for infinite worlds. Others like Asheim and Tungodden [13, p. 227] have formulated leximin versions of
both Ordered Catching-Up and Ordered Overtaking. I won’t discuss these non-utilitarian principles in much
detail here, but I will return to such principles in Chapter 5.
84This point is argued by Asheim and Tungodden [13, p. 227].
85Worlds w1 and w2 are incomparable even if we adopt the standard formulation of the Catching-Up
principle described in note 78.
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δ2−1(lk) is equal to zero or strictly greater than zero.
So neither world ‘overtakes’ the other. The Ordered Catching-Up principle and Ordered
Overtaking principle are both consistent with Sensitivity and Finite Anonymity.86 As we
can see, however, neither principle satisfies completeness. Neither relation can compare
ordered utility streams unless there is some finite location lj in the sequence such that after
with the sum of the difference in utilities across all future locations is strictly better in one
of the streams. As the example above shows, this will not always be the case.
A further limitation of the Ordered Catching-Up principle and the Ordered Overtaking
principle that they cannot be applied to basic locations that come in no privileged order,
such as agents. I will discuss ways that we can (and cannot) extend ordered utility difference
principles to basic locations of value that come in no natural order in Chapter 5.
1.5.2 Utility Density Principles
In ‘Sacrificing the Patrol: Utilitarianism, Future Generations and Infinity’ Luc Van Liedek-
erke and Luc Lauwers [237] offer an alternative to utility difference principles that appeals
to the density of utility levels within a given world. Van Liedkerke and Lauwers are not
the only authors to have proposed utility density principles for comparing infinite worlds87
but theirs is arguably the most sophisticated version of the utility density approach. It also
makes use of concepts like accumulation points and natural limits that I will refer back to
in later chapters, and so I will focus on their view here.
The first concept that Van Liedkerke and Lauwers’ utility density approach requires is that
of an ‘accumulation point’ of a set of utility levels, defined as follows:88
86Banerjee [17] and Kamaga and Kojima [122] show that, unlike the Ordered Overtaking principle, the
Ordered Catching-Up principle is not consistent with Fixed-Step Anonymity.
87See, for example, Lauwers [144], Bostrom [42], and Petri [181].
88Here I largely follow Van Liedkerke and Lauwers’ definition of accumulation points. They use the term
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Accumulation Points
Let U(w1) be the set of bounded utility levels (u1, u2, u3, ..., un, ...) of every location in world
w1. Then v is an accumulation point of the set U(w1) if, for all ε > 0 and for all n, there
exists an m > n such that |um − v| < ε.
So utility level v is an accumulation point of U(w1) if there are always utility levels that
are epsilon-close to v.89 As Van Liedkerke and Lauwers note, accumulation points can be
thought of as utility levels shared by infinitely many locations in w1. So if a world w1 contains
infinitely many locations at utility 1 and infinitely many locations at utility 2 and no other
locations, then the accumulation points of this world are 1 and 2, no matter what order
these locations come in (if any). The Bolzano-Weierstrass theorem entails that every infinite
sequence whose components are bounded has at least one accumulation point.90
Van Liedkerke and Lauwers argue that knowing the accumulation points alone is not enough
to be able to compare infinite worlds. In defense of this, they ask us (p. 16, ibid.) to consider
utility streams y : (1, 0, 1, 0, ..., 1, 0, ...) and z : (1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, ..., 1, 1, 0, ...). These two streams
have the same accumulation points – 1 and 0 – but Van Liedkerke and Lauwers claim that
more people hold utility level 1 in utility stream z than in utility stream y.
Whether this claim is true or not will depend on what our basic locations of value are. Van
Liedkerke and Lauwers assume that generations are the basic locations of value. As we saw
in the previous section, if we think that the same agents can appear in different generations
without altering those generations (i.e. we have a time-based account of generations) then
it is possible for a world w1 to be better than another world w2 according to Sensitivity for
generations, but for world w2 to be better than world w1 by Sensitivity for people. So Van
‘cluster point’, but this is merely a terminological difference. I will return to accumulation points and related
concepts in Chapter 4, where I will discuss methods for ranking worlds that appeal solely to the accumulation
points of their utility profiles.
89Note that v can be an accumulation point even if no locations have utility equal to v.
90Bartle and Sherbet [20, p. 78].
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Liedkerke and Lauwers’ claim that more people have utility 1 in z than in y seems most
plausible if we assume an agent-based account of generations: for example, if, for now, we
simply treat their ‘utility streams’ as a temporal sequence of individual agents.
It will also depend on what we mean when we say that ‘more’ people have utility 1 in the first
world. The agents that have utility 1 in stream y can be put in one-to-one correspondence
with the agents that have utility 1 in stream z,so by ‘more’ we must mean something other
than having greater cardinality.91 To see what is meant by ‘more’ here, consider the set of
natural numbers (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, ...) and the set of cube numbers (1, 8, 27, 64, 125, ...). All cube
numbers are natural numbers, but not all natural numbers are cube numbers. So there is a
sense in which there are ‘more’ cube numbers than there are natural numbers even though
the two can be put in one-to-one correspondence. Let’s grant that if the set of agents with
utility n in w1 is a proper subset of the set of agents with utility n in w2, then it is acceptable
to say that there are more agents at utility n in w1 than in w2.
92
Not only are cube numbers a proper subset of natural numbers; they also become more scarce
as we progress along the natural number line: there seem to be even more natural numbers
per cubed number as the natural numbers increase. We can imagine something similar
happening when we compare two utility streams. For example, consider utility stream z :
(1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, ..., 1, 1, 0, ...) compared with a utility stream x in which every cube-numbered
location contains utility 1 and all other locations contain utility 0. The utility 1 locations
seem scarcer in x than they are in either y or z.93
Let us say that an accumulation point v is of more relative importance in w1 than in w2 if
91Hamkins and Montero [99, p. 239] call the claim that ‘If a set U is obtained by adding elements to
another set V, then U has a larger size than V’ the Basic Mathematical Idea (BMI) and point out that
despite being overwhelmingly intuitive, it is false. This is correct if we adopt a Cantorian account of size.
92I will return to this non-Cantorian notion of set size in Chapter 5.
93We can think of the scarcity of a number type as the probability that a dart thrown randomly at the
natural number line will hit a number of that type.
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the locations with utilities in the neighborhood of v are less scarce in w1 than in w2 (and
therefore that there are ‘more’ of them). Van Liedkerke and Lauwers argue that we can
measure the ‘relative importance’ of each accumulation point using a density function. The
particular density function they appeal to is the ‘natural’ or ‘asymptotic’ density function.
Let L be the entire set of locations of world w1 ordered by σ and let G be some subset of
these locations. The natural density d of G relative to L is given by:
d(G) = lim
n→∞
|G ∩ {l1, l2, ..., ln}|
n
G has a natural density whenever this limit exists.94 As Van Liedkerke and Lauwers note,
natural density has several desirable features: if G has density d then its complement L\A
has density 1 − d and if G and G′ have natural densities d and d′ then G ∪ G′ has natural
density d + d′. Its results also accord with our intuitions. For example, the natural density
of the set locations H with utility 1 in streams y, and z is as follows:
y = (1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, ..., 1, 0, 1, ...), d(H) = 1
2
z = (1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, ..., 1, 1, 0, ...), d(H) = 2
3
Figure 16: Natural density of two utility streams
There are, however, some important limitations of natural densities. The first limitation is
that the natural density of any finite set in an infinite set is zero. So if we are to use natural
densities to compare infinite worlds, we will often end up being insensitive to increases in
94The upper natural density of G is the limit superior of |G∩ {l1, l2, ..., ln}|/n as n goes to infinity, while
the lower natural density G is the limit inferior of |G∩{l1, l2, ..., ln}|/n as n goes to infinity. A set may have
an upper or lower natural density without having annatural density: it only has the latter if the upper and
lower natural density exist and are equal. Since this limit does not always exist, natural densities are not
defined for all subsets of the natural numbers.
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utility at finitely many locations in a world.95
The more important limitation of natural densities is that they are order-dependent. The
utility stream y can result from an infinite permutation of z and yet the set of agents at
utility 1 in y and z have different natural densities.96 If the basic locations of value in set L
have no natural order then they can occur in any order σ ∈ SL. The natural density of a set
of locations G in L will therefore not be defined unless G has natural density zero (all but
finitely many locations in L are in G) or G has natural density one (at most finitely many
locations in L are in G). Remember that Liedkerke and Lauwers said that more people are
at utility 1 in stream z than they are in stream y. But agents come in no natural order and if
agents can appear in different generations then there could in fact be more agents at utility
1 in stream y than in stream z. Therefore theories that appeal to natural densities are only
useful if we assume that the basic locations of value have some natural or privileged order.97
Van Liedkerke and Lauwers develop a rule for comparing infinite utility streams based on the
‘medial limit’ or ‘generalized Cesaro limit’ of each stream. To define this, we first consider
the sequence of the average utility at the ordered locations of w1:












We are then asked to consider the accumulation points of the sequence Av1. Since the
components of Uσ∗(w1) are bounded, there exists a limit inferior and a limit superior of
these accumulation points. The medial limit of Av1 is a linear mapping F (Uσ∗(w1)) between
this limit inferior and limit superior.98 In particular, if the limit inferior and limit superior
95Van Liedkerke and Lauwers [237, p.169-170] accept this result and a weaker Sensitivity principle.
96Natural densities remain constant under what Van Liedkerke and Lauwers (p. 168, 1997) call ‘bounded
permutations’: a permutation σ such that liml→∞
σ(l)−l
l = 0.
97Or that they have a class of privileged orders that are all bounded permutations of one another.
98More precisely, limn inf(A1) ≤ F (Uσ∗(w1)) ≤ limn sup(A1), where linearity means that for all or-
dered utility sequences with bounded components U(wi), U(wj) and all real numbers n,m, F (n(U(wi)) +
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of Av1 both exist and are equal, then this is the medial limit of Uσ∗(w1) is equal to these
limits. For example, consider the utilities of worlds w1 and w2:
l1 l2 l3 l4 l5 l6 ... ln ln+1 ln+2 ...
w1 0 3 1 0 3 1 ... 0 3 1 ...
w2 2 2 1 2 2 1 ... 2 2 1 ...
Figure 17: Utility sequences with distinct medial limits
The accumulation points of w1 are 0, 1, and 3. The accumulation points of w2 are 1 and 2.
In w1 the natural density of each accumulation point is
1
3
, while in w2 the natural density of
2 is 2
3
and the natural density of 1 is 1
3

















So if w1 < w2 iff F (Uσ∗(w1)) ≥ F (Uσ∗(w2)) and w1  w2 iff F (Uσ∗(w1)) > F (Uσ∗(w2))
thenw1  w2 in this case, which is what we might expect from this sort of rule.
I have already noted two key problems with using natural densities to compare infinity utility
streams. The first is that they are insensitive to finite improvements and the second is that
they are highly order-dependent. A third problem is that if the limit inferior and limit
superior of Av1 don’t coincide, medial limits can only be defined non-constructively using
the Axiom of Choice or non-principal ultrafilters, which I discuss below.
1.5.3 Alternative Formalizations of Infinity
So far I have assumed that infinite worlds consist of countably infinitely many locations,
each with bounded utility. The utilities of these worlds have been represented as ordered
m(U(wj))) = nF (U(wi)) +mF (U(wj)).
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or unordered sequences of real numbers.99There are, however, alternative ways that we can
respresent the utility across locations at infinite worlds. In this section I will consider two
that have gained attention recently: the hyperreals and the surreals.
In ‘Infinite Ethics’, Nick Bostrom [42] argues that we could use ‘hyperreal numbers’ to
represent utilities in infinite worlds. The hyperreals are an extension of the real numbers
that let us represent different infinitesimal and infinite numbers. We can represent hyperreals
using sequences of real numbers.100 The hyperreal representation of a real number is just
an infinite sequence of that real number. For example, the hyperreal representation of
the real number 3 is < 3, 3, 3, ... >. Infinitesimal hyperreals are sequences that approach






, ... >.101 Infinite hyperreals are sequences that increase towards
infinity, such as < 1, 4, 8, 12, ... >. Addition, subtraction, division, and multiplication of
hyperreals are all pointwise operations. For example, < 3, 3, 3, ... > × < 1, 4, 8, 12, ... >=<
3, 12, 24, 36, ... >.102 If all of the components of one hyperreal are strictly greater than
all of the components of another hyperreal, then the first hyperreal is strictly larger than
the second. So the hyperreal < 3, 12, 24, 36, ... > is strictly larger than the hyperreal <
1, 4, 8, 12, ... >.
Suppose that basic locations of value of come in a natural order, and that the utility levels
of the locations of world w1 are (2, 3, 2, 3, 2, 3, ...). Bostrom [42] argues that we can represent
this world using the hyperreal representation of the sum of this sequence. So this world
can be represented by the hyperreal < 2, 5, 7, 10, 12, 15, ... >.103 We can use these hyperreal
99I also implicitly assume a cardinality-based account of size: i.e. that if the locations of two worlds can
be put in one-to-one correspondence then the two worlds are of equal size. For an alternative conception of
the size of infinite sets, see Benci and Di Nasso [29].
100This is known as the ‘ultrapower construction’ of the hyperreals (Hurd and Loeb [110, 1.1]).
101Similarly, hyperreals that are infinitesimally close to a given real number appraoch that real number.
102The fact that hyperreal multiplication is well-defined may appear to make them an attractive choice for
subjective ethical principles, where we need to multiply the value of the outcome of an act in a world state
by an agent’s credence that she is in that world state. At the end of this section, however, I will show that
we can just as easily construct subjective versions of principles like Ordered Overtaking.
103Bostrom uses the hyperreal representation of the sum of the sequence rather than the sequence itself
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representations to rank worlds: world w1 is strictly better than another world w2 if the
hyperreal representation of w1 is strictly larger than the hyperreal representation of w2, and
world w1 is equally as good as world w2 if their hyperreal representations are equal.
Crucial to this approach, then, is how we define ‘larger than’ and ‘equal to’ for hyperreal
numbers. Hyperreal numbers h1 and h2 are ‘equal to’ on another if and only if their compo-
nents are the same at some ‘large’ set of locations (which we will define in a moment). The
hyperreal h1 is larger than the hyperreal h2 if and only if the components of h1 are strictly
greater than the components of h2 at a ‘large’ set of locations.
What does it mean for a set of locations to be ‘large’? I will summarize the account given by
Arntzenius [6]. First, we can think of each hyperreal as a sequence with a first entry, second
entry, third entry and so on, so that each component of the hyperreal is associated with an
integer. For all hyperreal numbers, we can first say that no finite number of components is
large and that for any given set of components either that set or its compliment must be
large. In order to distinguish ‘large’ sets beyond this, we must use a non-principal ultrafilter.
A non-principal ultrafilter F is a set of the set of integers such that (i) if two sets of integers
are in F then their intersection is in F , (ii) if a set is in F then so are its subsets, (iii) for
any set, either that set or its complement is in F , and (iv) there is no set X such that F is
the set of all A such that X ⊆ A (i.e. F does not contain a least element).104 Finally, can
say that a set of integers is ‘large’ if that set is in our ultrafilter F .105
As Arntzenius points out, however, this means that the definition of ‘larger than’ is radically
dependent on our choice of ultrafilter. He demonstrates this with the following example:
because hyprreals are of the same size if they differ at only finitely many locations. So the hyperreal
< 2, 3, 2, 3, 2, 3, ... > is not larger than the hyperreal < 3, 3, 2, 3, 2, 3, ... >. Therefore if we were to compare
worlds using the hyperreal representation of their sequences and not their sums, we would violate Sensitivity.
104If an ultrafilter contains a least element then it is called a principal ultrafilter. All ultrafilters on finite
sets are principal. For an overview see Jech [113, Ch. 7].
105Using the axiom of choice, one can show that all infinite sets have a non-principal ultrafilter. This is
known as the ‘ultrafilter lemma’. See theorem 7.5 in Jech [113].
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Consider a world with hyperreal utility < 1,−2, 3,−4, 5,−6, ... >. How big or
small is this? Well, suppose that according to the ultrafilter in question the odd
numbered locations are a large set. Then the hyperreal< 1,−2, 3,−4, 5,−6, ... >
is the same hyperreal as < 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, ... >= α, since they agree on a large set
of locations. On the other hand suppose that according to our chosen ultrafilter
the even numbered locations are a large set. Then < 1,−2, 3,−4, 5,−6, ... > is
the same hyperreal as < −1,−2,−3,−4,−5,−6, ... >= −α. That is to say, the
hyperreal utility of a given world can depend wildly on the choice of ultrafilter.
And, either the evens or the odds have to be a large set, but there clearly is no
unique correct choice here. So we have a problem. (p. 51, Arntzenius, 2014)
Our choice of ultrafilter is arbitrary, and yet in this case an arbitrary choice will determine
whether a world is as good as the infinitely good world < 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, ... > or as good as
the infinitely bad world < 1,−2, 3,−4, 5,−6, ... >. This is an unacceptable result.
A further problem with the hyperreal approach that Arntzenius [6, p. 49] points out is
that hyperreals are highly order-dependent. If, according to our ultrafilter F , the set of
odd numbered locations is large, then the hyperreal < 3, 1, 3, 1, 3, ... > is not equal to the
hyperreal < 1, 3, 1, 3, 1, ... > even though the latter is just a permutation of the former.106
This obviously poses a problem if basic locations of value come in no natural order.107
An alternative to representing infinite worlds as hyperreal numbers is to represent them
using John Conway’s surreal numbers [60]. Surreal numbers are constructed in stages using
x = {L|R} notation. Here x is a surreal number and L and R are sets of numbers, where
L contains every value strictly less than N and R contains every value strictly greater than
106This is not merely an artifact of our choice of ultrafilter. There is no ultrafilter that can treat all possible
permutations of all uncountable sequences of real-numbers as equal.
107Artnzenius points out that the order-dependence of the hyperreals is worse than it is for other order-
dependent theories, since it also depends on how we carve up locations. For example, suppose that the
seconds of world w1 have utilities (1, 3, 1, 3, ...). Then the hyperreal of temporal locations 2 seconds in length
is < 4, 8, 12, 16, ... > while the hyperreal of temporal locations 3 seconds in length is < 5, 12, 17, 24, ... > and
the latter is strictly larger than the former. Arnzenius also notes that hyperreals are not countably additive,
which results in a ‘countable Dutch book’ problem (see p. 50, Arntzenius, 2014). A further argument against
the application of hyperreals and non-constructive objects is given in Litak [157].
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x. Following Conway’s conventions [60, p. 4], if x = {L|R} then we use xL to refer to the
typical member of L and xR to refer to the typical member of R, and we use {xL|xR} to
refer to x itself.
We construct all numbers sequentially using the following construction rule and definitions
of greater than or equal to (≥), equality (=), and strictly greater than (>):
Construction: If L and R are sets of numbers and no member L is less than or equal to
any member of R, then there is a number {L|R}
Definition (≥): x = {xL|xR} ≤ y = {yL|yR} iff there is no xR such that xR ≤ y and there
is no yL such that x ≤ yL
Definition (=): x = y iff x ≥ y and y ≥ x
Definition (>): x > y iff x ≥ y and y 6≥ x
On day one no numbers have been defined and so the first object we define must use the empty
set as its left set and it’s right set, written {|}. We call this number 0. On the second day we
use the number 0 to define 1 = {0|} and −1 = {|0}.108 On the third day we define 2 = {1|},
1
2
= {0|1}, −2 = {| − 1}, and −1
2
= {−1|0}, and so on.109 On the first countably infinite
day, ω, we define the first infinite ordinals −ω = {| − 1,−2,−3, ...} and ω = {1, 2, 3, ...|} as
















, ...|0} and all
of the real numbers e, π, and so on (p. 12-13, ibid.). In this way we can construct a totally
ordered class that contains all real numbers, infinite numbers, and infinitesimal numbers.
Conway ( [60, p. 11]) represents when the first ‘few’ numbers are born as follows:
108The definition of a negative number −x is {−xL| − xR} ( [60, p. 5]).
109We generally remove members of L and R that have no bearing on the value of the number in question,
i.e. 2 = {1|} = {−1, 0, 1|} and −2 = {| − 1} = {| − 1, 0, 1}.
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Figure 18: The surreal tree
One of the useful things about the surreal numbers is that the standard operations of addi-
tion, subtraction, multiplication, and division are all well-defined over all surreals and behave
in the transfinite case much as they do in the finite case. For example, x is strictly less than
x + 1 for all surreals, including infinite surreals.110 The surreals therefore form an ordered
field. In fact, they form the largest possible ordered field: the rationals, reals, hyperreals,
and so on can all be embedded as subfields of the surreals.
We might hope that surreal representations of infinite worlds could be highly useful in infinite
ethics. The surreals form an ordered field and therefore satisfy the completeness axiom (for
all surreal numbers x, y, x ≤ y or y ≤ x). If we could associate each infinite world with a
unique surreal representation, we could simply order worlds by their surreal representations.
The problem with this is that surreals are insufficiently fine-grained for this to result in an
ordering of worlds that is consistent with Sensitivity. Suppose that the basic locations of
value in w1 come in a natural order (1, 1, 2, 4, 8, ...) and that the surreal representation of a
world is just the surreal representation of the sum of this sequence, {1, 2, 4, 8, 16, ...|}. Com-
pare this with a world w2 that contains the same basic locations of value with utility levels
110For the definitions of surreal addition and multiplication, see Conway [60, p. 5].
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(0, 1, 1, 1, 1, ...) and its representation {1, 2, 4, 8, 16, ...|}. World w1 is strictly better than
world w2 by Sensitivity. As Conway [60, p. 12] notes, however, both {1, 2, 4, 8, 16, ...|} and
{1, 2, 4, 8, 16, ...|} are just different forms of the surreal number ω. Since {1, 2, 4, 8, 16, ...|} =
{1, 2, 4, 8, 16, ...|} = ω, any theory that identifies infinite worlds with their surreal represen-
tation and ranks infinite worlds using these surreal representations will violate Sensitivity.
An alternative strategy is to formulate existing principles for comparing infinite worlds within
the framework of the surreals. For example, Chen and Rubio [54] have recently proposed
using the surreal field in infinite decision theory with the decision rule from Colyvan’s ‘Rel-
ative Expectation Theory’.111 One can easily imagine a similar proposal being made within
infinite ethics. Appealing to surreals may offer modest extensions of principles in infinite
ethics. However, using the surreals does not help us to avoid the problems described in
this chapter. For example, if the basic locations of value come in no natural order then the
‘surreal approach’ must be supplemented with some further construct, such as limits (dis-
cussed above) or a numerosity function.112 If it is not supplemented in this way, it cannot
compare world pairs that are not already comparable by weaker utility difference principles
like Catching-Up and Overtaking principles. The surreal approach therefore inherits the
problems associated with whatever supplementation is used.
It is important that we do not unthinkingly default to one formal model of infinities when
alternatives are available. If we do so, we run the risk of trying to solve problems that
appear to arise from the phenomena we are exploring, but that disappear once a richer
formal framework has been introduced. The problems of infinite ethics do not seem to be
111This rule is a subjective analogue of an order-invariant version of the Overtaking principle discussed
above.
112Numerosities are measures for the size of infinite sets developed by Benci, Di Nasso, and Forti [32]
that satisfies certain properties of finite cardinals that are not satisfied by infinite cardinals if we equate size
with one-to-one mappings. In particular, the numerosity of a set is strictly greater than the numerosity of a
proper subset of that set. Benci and Di Nasso prove that ‘a numerosity function exists if and only if there
exists a selective ultrafilter’ [29, 51]. Since the existence of selective ultrafilters is independent of ZFC, the
existence of a numerosity function is also independent of ZFC.
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mere phantoms of an impoverished formal model, however, since they do not disappear if we
appeal to hyperreal or surreal representations of infinite worlds.
1.5.4 Discounting Principles
The final set of principles I will describe here are discounting principles. According to the
discounting approach to infinite ethics, the value of a world with the sum of the utility of its
basic locations (agents, times, etc.), discounted by some discount rate r that gives less weight
to basic locations that are more distant from the location of the ethical decision maker.
Koopmans [127] argues that five axioms characterize the discount utilitarian rule: Continuity,
Sensitivity, Independence, Stationarity, and a Sensitivity axiom. We have met some of these
axioms above, but can summarize them informally here. Continuity states that a sufficiently
small difference in the utility stream should not result in a large difference in the rankings
of those streams.113 Koopmans’ Sensitivity axiom (not to be confused with the Sensitivity
principles given above) states that you can make a stream worse by changing the utility of the
first period in the stream. Independence says that the parts of two utility streams that are
identical should not change the ranking of those utility streams.114 This is a weaker version
of an important property called ‘strong separability’. The relation < is strongly separable
if and only if the ranking of any subset of the locations of two worlds is independent of
the utilities at the remaining locations of those worlds.115 Stationarity states that if two
113As we noted above (54), the definition of continuity relies on a distance measure that is, in infinite
spaces, relative to our se lection of distance measure. This distance measure induces a topology on the
infinite space in question. See Lauwers [134] for further discussion of this and a defense of the sup and
product topologies.
114Koopmans (p. 292, 1960) calls this ‘Postulate 3 (3a and 3b)’ but it is now commonly referred to as
Indeprendence. We can summarize this postulate informally but in more detail. First, let b1, b2, b3, ... and
d1, d2, d3, ... be streams of utilities at infinitely many locations and let a and c both be utility levels at a single
location. (3a) states that if (a, b1, b2, b3, ..) < (c, b1, b2, b3, ...) then (a, d1, d2, d3, ...) < (c, d1, d2, d3, ...). (3b)
states that if (a, b1, b2, b3, ..) < (a, d1, d2, d3, ...) then (c, b1, b2, b3, ..) < (c, d1, d2, d3, ...). This is sometimes
called anti-complementarity (two factors are complementary if the value of one affects the value of the other).
115For a more precise treatment of Separability, see Broome [45, Ch. 4].
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streams have the same utility at the first location, then the first stream is better than
the second if and only if the first stream after the first location is better than the second
stream after the first location.116 This means that ‘postponing’ some utility gain should
make no difference to our preference over streams: i.e. if (3, 1, 1, 1, ...) < (2, 1, 1, 1, ...) then
(1, 1, 1, 3, 1, 1, 1, ...) < (1, 1, 1, 2, 1, 1, 1, ...). Finally, the Sensitivity axiom – Monotonicity –
says that if all locations in one infinite stream are at least as good as all locations in a
second infinite stream, then the first infinite stream is at least as good as the second. This
is equivalent to the < condition of Sensitivity.
Let the locations of w1 be ordered temporally and let the discount rate α be in the open
interval (0, 1). Koopmans [127] shows that if the at least as good as relation < satisfies the
five axioms above, then it can be represented by the following function:117




The discount utilitarian rule gives less weight to more temporally distant locations. For
example, if we suppose that σ∗(w1) = (1, 1, 1, ..) and that α is a steep discount rate of 0.5
then, since 0.50(1) + 0.51(1) + 0.52(1) + 0.53(1) = 1 + 0.5 + 0.25 + 0.125, ... and the sum of
this sequence is 2, d : σ∗(w1) 7→ 0.5 · 2 = 1. As long as the utility levels of αi−1u(li) do not
diverge, d will return a real-numbered value of world w1.
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One problem with Koopman’s discount utilitarian rule in particular is that, as Chichilnisky
[56] shows, the rule entails ‘Dictatorship of the Present’: if w1 is better than w2 then there is
some finite i such that what happens at locations after li makes no difference to the ranking
116In other words, (a, b1, b2, b3, ..) < (c, d1, d2, d3, ...) if and only if (b1, b2, b3, ...) < (d1, d2, d3, ...).
117I model this on the formulation given in Lauwers [146, p. 236].
118The utility levels will diverge if they grow faster than the discount rate. For example, if our discount
rate is 0.5 and our utility stream is (1, 2, 4, 8, ...) then d will diverge to positive infinity. See Dolmas [69] for
a discussion of utility streams that grow without bound.
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of w1 and w2. It seems implausible that we should ignore the utility at locations after some
finite time has passed, but this is entailed by the discount utilitarian rule.119 Consider the
following illustrative example given by Lauwers:120
Consider an economy in which trees are a necessary input to production or
consumption. The dynamics of tree reproduction are as follows. If n out of 2n
subsequent generations cut the forest at a maximal rate, the species become
extinct after the 2n’th generation, in which case there is zero utility at every
period from then on. Assume this strategy results in utility streams of the
form un = (0.1, 0.1, . . . , 0.1; 1, 1, . . . , 1; 0, 0, . . . ) with the first (resp. last) 1 at
the n + 1 (resp. 2n)’th place, in which generations n + 1, . . . , 2n cut at a full
capacity and exhaust the forest. When the consumption of the forest is delayed
and n becomes larger, the forest slightly expands and more generations can
bene- fit. Alternatively, generations can invest in the forest and only cut at an
equilibrium rate which allows the forest to survive. This strategy results in the
utility stream u∞ = (0.25, 0.25, . . . , 0.25, . . . ) in which each generation reaches
the same utility level. Optimization with respect to a discounted utilitarian rule
leads to the elimination of the forest. [146, 238]
In a case like this, discount utilitarianism says that we should prefer some finite number of
nearby generations to receive greater utility, even if they can only do so at the expense of
infinitely many future generations. This degree of ‘impatience’ seems ethically unjustifiable.
More generally, all discounting approaches to infinite ethics are committed to the claim that
we should give more ethical weight to the wellbeing of agents that are temporally closer
to us simply because they are not temporally close to us.121 This violates a core ethical
119In illustrative example of this is given in Lauwers [146, 237-8]. Chichilnisky proposes an alternative
discount rule that does not entail Dictatorship of the Present but, as Lauwers notes, Chichilnisky’s rule
violates Stationarity. In essence, we must choose whether to ignore the tail of the infinite stream (Koopmans’
discount utilitarianism) or the head of the infinite stream (Chichilnisky’s sustainable preferences).
120This kind of examples shows that the discount utilitarian rule violates the principle that Asheim [8, p.
215] calls ‘Hammond equity for the future’, which states that we should not be willing to sacrifice an infinite
gain in the future for some finite gain in the present.
121This kind of ‘pure temporal discounting’ can be contrasted with merely instrumental temporal discount-
ing. The latter discounts future consumption for instrumental reason.
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commitment to treating all agents’ utility as being of equal moral worth regardless of when
it occurs.122 Ethicists have generally found any violation of neutrality to be unacceptable, as
have many economists.123 Ramsey called temporal discounting ‘a practice which is ethically
indefensible and arises merely from the weakness of the imagination’ [188, p. 541], while
Sidgwick notes that ‘the time at which a man exists cannot affect the value of his happiness
from a universal point of view’ [208, p. 414]. The primary reasons for adopting temporal
discounting in cases that involve infinite populations is that the alternative is perceived to
be too demanding: we could require that present generations sacrifice n units of wellbeing so
that better off generations in the future can experience m units of wellbeing, where m n.124
As Cowen and Parfit [62] note, however, this is not a reason to discount utility to future
agents. Rather, it is only a reason to discount utility to better off agents.
This failing of the discount approach to infinite ethics is even worse than has been generally
acknowledged. Those who adopt the discounting approach have typically assumed that
agents or generations are given less weight the more temporally distant from the ethical
decision-maker but, as Bostrom [42] points out, if the world is temporally infinite then
the discounting approach must discount across both time and space. In other words, the
wellbeing of agents decreases in value the further away they are from us in space. Cowan
and Parfit use this kind of spatial discounting view as a reductio for temporal discounting:
Remoteness in time roughly correlates with a whole range of morally important
facts. So does remoteness in space. Those to whom we have the greatest obli-
gations, our own family, often live with us In the same building. We often live
close to those to whom we have other special obligations, such as our clients,
pupils, or patients. Most of our fellow citizens live closer to us than most aliens.
But no one suggests that, because there are such correlations, we should adopt
122The discounting approach fails to treat agents neutrally regardless of whether agents or times are taken
to the basic locations of value, since the utility at a given time is experienced by agents.
123See note 37 for references.
124See Rawls [189, p. 297].
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a spatial discount rate. No one thinks that we would be morally justified if we
cared less about the long-range effects of our acts, at some rate of n percent per
yard. The temporal discount rate is, we believe, as little justified. [62, p. 159]
Spatial discounting produces highly counterintuitive results. For example, if we spatially
discount utility then we can make the world better by clustering happy agents closer to us
or by moving unhappy agents further away from us without changing their utility levels.125
This seems absurd. Therefore even though the discounting approach allows for greater
comparability between infinite worlds than some of the other approaches mentioned thus
far, it is extremely difficult to motivate this view on independent grounds.126
Summary
According to some of the most successful theories in modern cosmology, we live in an infinite
world: a world that contains infinitely many agents whose lives may be of moral value.
There are various principles that we want to satisfy when we rank infinite worlds ethically:
Sensitivity, Equity, and completeness. None of the solutions that I considered – utility
difference principles, utility density principles, alternative formalizations of infinity, and
discounting principles – can satisfy all of these desiderata. In the next chapter I will defend
Pareto, the agent-based Sensitivity principle, and an equity principle that is distinct from
Anonymity. I show that these axioms, in combination with a Permutation Principle, jointly
entail that any transitive ethical ‘at least as good as’ relation must be incomplete.
125Temporal discounting must be relative to a moving present: i.e. the utility of agents becomes less
valuable the further they exist from us into both the future and the past relative to our present temporal
location. If we do not assume a moving present view then, even if we adopt a relatively modest temporal
discount rate, one of the most important actions that we could focus our energies on is to attempt to invent
some kind of time travel device, which seems absurd. Thanks to Carl Shulman for pointing this out.
126I have not offered a comprehensive survey of all discounting views here. For recent examples of dis-
counting views, see Jonsson and Voorneveld’s [115] ‘Limit Discount Utilitarianism’.
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Chapter 2
Pareto, the < Relation, and the Permutation Principle
In this chapter I will outline several core principles and show that they cannot be jointly
satisfied in infinite worlds. In section 2.1 I show that the ‘Expansionist’ view in infinite
ethics delivers intuitively correct verdicts about the ranking of many infinite world pairs. I
then show that this view violates the agent-based Pareto principle introduced in the previous
chapter. I argue that we should accept the Pareto principle and that we must therefore reject
Expansionism. In section 2.2 I defend two further axioms. First, I argue that the ‘at least
as good as’ relation (<) is transitive. Second, that it is a ‘necessary qualitative relation’. In
section 2.3 I argue that for any world pair we can find a qualitatively identical world pair
that contains entirely different agents. I call this the ‘Permutation Principle’ and compare
my axioms to the Anonymity principles introduced in the previous chapter. I show that
these principles jointly entail that certain world pairs are ethically incomparable.
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2.1 Pareto and Expansionism
In this section I will consider three different pairs of infinite worlds in which one world seems
clearly better than the other before offering an example of a theory that can vindicate these
intuitions. The world pairs are divided into three types: Archipelagos are worlds that are
spatially but not temporally infinite, Infinity Houses are worlds that are temporally but not
spatially infinite, and Cubelands are worlds that are both spatially and temporally infinite.
Case 1: Archipelagos
Archipelagos are worlds that contain infinitely many islands on an infinite sea. Four agents
live on each of the islands. All of them were born at exactly the same time, and they will all
live for exactly fifty years before dying. You have been offered a chance to decide what the
islands of an Archipelago are like. You can decide that the islands will be full of insects and
their weather will consist mostly of hurricanes and rain. If you do, then only one person on
each island will lead a happy life: the rest will all be miserable. This Archipelago is called
‘Stormy’. Alternatively, you can decide that each island will be full of fruit and its weather
will always be clement. If you do, then an entirely different population of agents will exist
on the islands of the Archipelago and only one person on each island will be miserable: the
rest will all be happy. This Archipelago is called ‘Clement’.
Let’s suppose that there are only two possible happiness levels for the agents of an Archipelago:
happy and miserable. I will use smiley faces - to represent happy agents and sad faces / to
represent miserable agents. The agents on the islands of Clement and Stormy are as follows:
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island1 island2 island3 island4 island5 island6 ...
Clement -- -- -- -- -- -- ...
-/ -/ -/ -/ -/ -/
Stormy // // // // // // ...
/- /- /- /- /- /-
Figure 19: Clement and Stormy
Every island of Stormy is made up of mostly miserable agents while every island of Clement
is made up of mostly happy agents. Given this, it seems like you should bring about Clement
rather than Stormy in this case. Indeed, bringing about Stormy when you can choose Clement
instead strikes many as morally impermissible.127
Case 2: Infinity House
Infinity Houses are worlds that contain only a single house in which one agent is born. This
agent lives in the house for fifty years and then they die. When they die they are replaced
by another agent who lives in the house for fifty years and then dies, and so on ad infinitum.
You have the choice about whether the world contains a house that is a mansion or a shack.
If the house is a mansion then it will contain two generations that are happy followed by
one generation of a sad agent. Call this world ‘Mansion’. If the house is a shack then it will
contain an entirely different set of agents consisting of two generations that are sad followed
by one generation that is happy. If we use ti to represent a fifty-year period, we can depict
the worlds Mansion and Shack as follows:
127One might worry that our intuition that Archipelago1 is better than Stormy is simply based on a poor
understanding of infinities. For example, one could object that any two worlds that both contain infinitely
many happy agents and infinitely many miserable agents must be equally good because they contain the
same amount of happy and miserable agents. But this kind of view overlooks important differences between
these worlds and, as we will see, there are theories that produce verdicts in line with our intuitions in these
cases. The defenders of these theories do not simply misunderstand infinities.
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t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 t6 t7 t8 t9 ...
Mansion - - / - - / - - / ...
Shack / / - / / - / / - ...
Figure 20: Mansion and Shack
In this case, it seems that we are morally required to bring about Mansion rather than Shack.
Case 3: Cubeland
Cubelands are worlds that contain infinitely many agents that each live forever. The spend
their whole lives within a 10m by 10m cube and these cubes are spread uniformly across
space. You have a choice to either bring about a world in which all agents are optimists
by default, but in which one agent is born a pessimist. This pessimist manages to convince
each agent agent adjacent to her along the x, y and z axes from her location l0 to become
pessimists too. These pessimists then convert a single agent adjacent to them along these
axes at a rate of one conversion per year. Call this world ‘Optimistic’ since the agents are
optimistic by default. Alternatively, you can bring about a world that contains an entirely
different set of agents exists. These agents are all pessimists by default but there is one
agent that is born an optimist. This optimist manage to convince each agent in a straight
line along the x, y and z axes from her location l0 to become optimists too at a rate of one
conversion per year. Call this world ‘Pessimistic’ since the agents are pessimistic by default.
If we assume that all optimistic agents are happy and that all pessimistic agents are sad, we
can represent Optimistic Cubeland and Pessimistic Cubeland as follows:
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Figure 21: Optimistic Cubeland and Pessimistic Cubeland
So if ti is an interval of a year then at t1 there is just one pessimistic agent in Optimistic
Cubeland and at t2 there are 7 pessimistic agents in Optimistic Cubeland and at t3 there
are 13 pessimistic agents in Optimistic Cubeland, and so on. We can represent the cubed
directly adjacent to location l0 at every time after t1 by first showing the cube itself and

























Figure 22: Segments of Optimistic Cubeland
In this case, it seems that we are required to bring about Optimistic Cubeland rather than
Pessimistic Cubeland, since the sad agents in Optimistic Cubeland make up a smaller and
smaller proportion of the agents we will encounter as we evaluate locations more distant from
l0. By contrast, the happy agents in Pessimistic Cubeland make up a smaller and smaller
proportion of the agents we will encounter as we evaluate locations more distant from l0.
So the Clement Archipelago seems better than the Stormy Archipelago, the Infinite Mansion
seems better than the Infinite Shack, and the Optimistic Cubeland seems better than the
Pessimistic Cubeland in the three cases above.
The most notable theory that vindicates all three of these intuitions is the ‘Expansionist’
theory defended initially by [233] and more recently by Arntzenius [6]. The key concept
we need to state this theory is that of an allowable expansion from a given spatiotemporal
location l.128 An allowable expansion is a sequence of spatiotemporal regions r1, r2, r3,...
in which (i) every spatiotemporal region in the sequence is finite in size, (ii) each region
128In the cases I consider, the starting point for the expansion can be arbitrary.
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is contained in the one that came before it: so r1 is a proper subregion of r2, which is a
proper subregion of r3 and so on, and (iii) the expansion expands at a uniform rate across
spacetime. We can follow Arntzenius’s (pg. 39, 2014) suggested interpretation of clause (iii):
to get a spatially uniform expansion of r we consider a band of width d from the edge of
region r (or location l if it is the first region in the sequence). Region r and this band are
the next region in the sequence. To get a temporally uniform expansion in a non-relativistic
setting, we consider a temporal length t from r, such as one minute. The minute before and
after r are then the next temporal region in the sequence. So in a non-relativistic setting,
a uniform temporal expansion is one that moves as fast into the future as it does into the
past.129 The union of these regions is the whole of spacetime.
By way of illustration, consider an allowable expansion r1, r2, r3,... of our two Archipelagos,






Figure 23: An allowable expansion
Assume that the sea between each island is of negligible size. This means that within region
r1 of the Clement Archipelago there is a single island containing three happy agents and one
sad agent, and within region r1 of Stormy Archipelago there is a single island containing three
sad agents and one happy agent. There will be more miserable agents in each subsequent
129Arntzenius extends the Expansionist theory to both relativistic worlds. For simplicity I will assume
that we can use the non-relativistic account of a temporally uniform expansion in the cases given above.
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Figure 24: Allowable expansions of Clement and Stormy
Therefore the following Expansionist principle can explain and generalize our intuition that
the Clement Archipelago is better than the Stormy Archipalgo:130
Expansionism
(<) If w1 and w2 share the same spacetime with the same metric, and for all allowable
expansions r1, r2, r3, . . . in this metric there exists an integer n such that for every k > n,
the total utility in rk at w1 is greater than or equal to the total utility in rk at w2 then w1 is
at least as good as w2
() And if there exists an integer n such that for every k > n, the total utility in rk at w1 is
strictly greater than the total utility in rk at w2 then w1 is strictly better than w2
Since the Clement Archipelago contains more happy agents than the Stormy Archipelago
does from the very first region r1 in each world and, in all allowable expansions of region
r1, the Clement Archipelago is better than the Stormy Archipelago according to Expansion-
ism.131 Expansionism therefore delivers the result that is in line with our intuitions in the
case of the Clement and Stormy Archipelagos.
130This principle is closely modeled on the principle defended by Arntzenius (p. 53, 2014). A key difference
is that Arntzenius’s principle ranks actions rather than worlds and replaces utility with expected utility.
131In this case this will be true even if we select different starting points in each world and even if the
regions were of different sized in each world, but in general we need to identify regions across worlds using
a counterpart relation (p. 53-5, Arntzenius, 2014).
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Expansionism also delivers the intuitively correct result in the Mansion and Shack case.
Suppose that our temporal distance is at least as great as a single temporal period t. Then
for any ti in the temporal sequence that we start our expansion, there is strictly greater
happiness in Mansion than in Shack at every time from ti+1 at the latest.
132
Finally, in the case of Optimistic and Pessimistic Cubeland suppose, for simplicity, that the
spatiotemporal region expands at a spatial rate of one cube in every direction and at a tem-
poral rate of one year from location l0.
133 Let’s suppose we can represent the utility of happy
agents with 1 and the utility of sad agents with 0. If we start our expansion from location l0
(the location containing the atypically optimistic or pessimistic agent) then the utility of each
new spatiotemporal band in Optimistic Cubeland is (0, 20, 51, 106, 191, ...). Meanwhile,the
utility of each new spatiotemporal band in Optimistic Cubeland is (1, 7, 13, 19, 25, ...). So
the difference in total of utility at each region of these worlds is as follows:134
r1 r2 r3 r4 r5 ...
Optimistic (O) 0 20 71 177 368 ...
Pessimistic (P) 1 8 21 40 65 ...
u(Ori)− u(Pri) -1 12 50 137 303 ...∑
u(Ori)− u(Pri) -1 11 61 198 501 ...
Figure 25: Utility difference of Cubeland regions
Since the total utility of Optimistic Cubeland is strictly greater than the total utility of
Pessimistic Cubeland at every region after region r1, and since there will exist such a re-
gion under all allowable expansions, Optimistic Cubeland is strictly better than Pessimistic
132If the expansion starts at a location containing a sad agent in Mansion and a happy agent in Shack, the
first region r1 may not be such that r1 of Mansion contains strictly more happiness than r1 of Shack.
133This is an idealization: a regional expansion growing a constant rate will generally not be cube shaped.
134Since regional expansions include the region before them, these bands are r1, r2-r1, r3-r2-r1, and so on.
The happiness at each region r1, r2, r3 and so in is the sum of the sequence of happiness at these bands.
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Cubeland according to Expansionism.135
Expansionism is reminiscent of the Ordered Overtaking principle from the last time. Unlike
that principle, however, Expansionism applies to spatiotemporal regions and not just to
ordered temporal sequences. This can make an important difference to how it ranks world
pairs. Consider Cain’s Sphere of Suffering case from the previous section. Suppose that the
number of agents that fall within the regions of our expansion – r1, r2, r3, ... – correspond
with the squares of odd numbers: (1, 9, 25, 49, 64, ...), and that our the expansion expands at
uniform rate in time, e.g. each region moves one year into the future.136 Let’s also suppose
that the sphere of suffering starts with the agent in r1 and takes two years to envelop the 8
agents around the central agent, two more years to envelop the 16 agents around those agents,
and so on. In other words, it can be represented using the following square of suffering:












↙ ↘ ↙ ↘ ↙ ↘
year 1 year 3 year 5
Figure 26: Squares of suffering across time
This means that spatiotemporal region r1 of the Sphere of Suffering world contains a single
agent who is sad for one year. Region r2 contains the original sad agent plus eight happy
135Note that in this case it doesn’t matter how positive utility happy agents compared with the negative
utility that sad agents receive, and that if we started at any region other than l0 then there would strictly
more utility in Optimistic Cubeland than in Pessimistic Cubeland from region r1 onwards.
136Since this world has a temporal starting point we don’t need to worry about the temporal expansion
moving into the past.
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agents for one year (since the sphere of suffering has not reached them yet). Region r3
contains the original 9 agents who are all now sad (since the sphere of suffering has now
reached them) plus 16 happy agents for one year, and so on. If we again assume that happy
agents have utility 1 and sad agents have utility 0, we can represent the cardinality and the
utility of the agents in this allowable expansion as follows:
y1 y2 y3 y4 y5 y6 ...
|a| in r 1 9 25 49 81 121 ...
u(a) in r 0 8 16 40 54 94 ...
Figure 27: Utilities in the regions of the sphere of suffering
By contrast, the spatiotemporal region r1 of the Sphere of Happiness world contains a single
agent who is happy for one year. Region r2 the original happy agent plus 8 sad agents for
one year (since the sphere of happiness has not reached them yet). Region r3 contains the
original 9 agents who are all now happy (since the sphere of happiness has now reached
them) plus 16 sad agents for one year, and so on, represented as follows:
y1 y2 y3 y4 y5 y6 ...
|a| in r 1 9 25 49 81 121 ...
u(a) in r 1 1 9 9 27 27 ...
Figure 28: Utilities in the regions of the sphere of happiness
The difference in total of utility at each region of these worlds is as follows:
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r1 r2 r3 r4 r5 r6 ...
Sphere of Suffering (S) 0 8 16 40 54 94 ...
Sphere of Happiness (H) 1 1 9 9 27 27 ...
u(Sri)− u(Hri) -1 7 7 31 27 67 ...∑
u(Sri)− u(Hri) -1 6 13 44 71 138 ...
Figure 29: Utility differences between sphere of suffering and sphere of happiness
Therefore the total utility in the Sphere of Suffering world is greater than the total utility
in the Sphere of Happiness in every region from r2 onwards. But now consider an allowable
expansion that expands at the same spatial rate as the previous expansion every two years
instead of every year.137 Then the amount of utility in each region of the expansion will
correspond with the amount of utility in the spheres, since both the expansion and the
spheres are ‘expanding’ at the same rate across spacetime:
r1 r2 r3 r4 r5 r6 ...
Sphere of Suffering (S) 0 0 0 0 0 0 ...
Sphere of Happiness (H) 1 9 25 49 81 121 ...
u(Sri)− u(Hri) -1 -9 -25 -49 -81 -121 ...∑
u(Sri)− u(Hri) -1 -10 -35 -84 -165 -286 ...
Figure 30: Utility differences between the spheres under a different allowable expansion
So for some allowable expansions that expand at a faster rate than the spheres do, there
is a region rk such that the Sphere of Suffering world has more utility than the Sphere of
Happiness world at every region after rk. But for some allowable expansions that expand
at a slower rate than the spheres do, there is a region rk such that the Sphere of Happiness
137Both of the expansions I have mentioned are allowable since an allowable expansion is just one that ‘at
each time expands at the same rate in each direction in space, and at each location in space expands at the
same rate in each direction of time’ (p. 53, Arntzenius, 2014).
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world has more utility than the Sphere of Suffering world at every region after rk. Therefore
Expansionism does not say that either world is better than or equal to the other. This at
least seems more plausible than the time-first Sensitivity principle or a similar ‘space-first’
Sensitivity principle, which both entail that the Sphere of Suffering world is better than the
Sphere of Happiness world, contrary to the agent-based Sensitivity principle.138
My principal objection to Expansionism is that, as Arntzenius himself notes (pg. 55-6, 2014),
it is inconsistent with the widely accepted Pareto principle.139 The Pareto principle is the
agent-based Sensitivity principle introduced in the previous chapter:
Pareto
(<) If w1 and w2 contain the same agents and every agent has at least as much utility in w1
as they do in w2, then w1 is at least as good as w2.
() If w1 and w2 contain the same agents and each agent has at least as much utility at w1
as they do at w2 and some agent has strictly greater utility in w1 than they do in w2, then
w1 is strictly better than w2.
Notice that Pareto can only rank worlds that contain exactly the same agents. Going forward,
I will distinguish between world pairs with identical populations, world pairs with disjoint
populations, and world pairs with overlapping populations, each defined as follows:
Identical Populations
A pair of worlds w1 and w2 have identical populations if and only if every agent in w1 is also
in w2 and every agent in w2 is also in w1
138Artnzenius (pg. 41, 2014) argues that if whether one world dominates the other depends on the speed
of the expansion then it is not so implausible to conclude that the utility of one world is not greater or
smaller than the other.
139Pareto entails what Arntzenius (p. 35-6, 2014) calls ‘Permutation of Times’ and ‘Dominance’. And
so it is inconsistent with the ‘Permutation of People’ principle that is entailed by Expansionism. Although
Expansionism does not deliver the same verdict as Pareto in the Sphere of Suffering case above, it does not
actually say that a world that is strictly worse by Pareto is better than a world that that is strictly better
by Pareto, which is a more troubling result.
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Disjoint Populations
A pair of worlds w1 and w2 have disjoint populations if and only if there is no agent in w1
that is also in w2 (i.e. w1 and w2 contain no shared agents)
Overlapping Populations140
A pair of worlds w1 and w2 have overlapping populations if and only if there is at least one
agent in w1 that is also in w2 and there is at least one agent that (i) is in w1 but not w2 or
(ii) is in w2 but not w1
We can show that Expansionism is inconsistent with Pareto by considering two Archipelago
worlds that are geographically identical to Clement and Stormy in structure but that contain
exactly the same agents (so that they can be compared by Pareto). I will call these worlds
‘Balmy’ and ‘Blustery’. To depict these Archipelagos it will be helpful to group the agents
of world pairs into sets of agents, X, Y , Z, and so on. In the diagrams below I will use X
to represent a happy agent in set X and x to represent a miserable agent in set X. And if
two worlds contain all and only agents in the same sets then those worlds contain identical
populations. We can now depict both the happiness levels and identities of the agents that
live on the islands of Balmy and Blustery as follows:
island1 island2 island3 island4 island5 island6 ...
Balmy X X X X X X X X X X X X ...
X Y X Z X Y X Z X Y X Z
Blustery Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z ...
Z X Z Y Z X Z Y Z X Z Y
Figure 31: Balmy and Blustery
Balmy is clearly better than Blustery according to Expansionism, since these worlds have
the same spatiotemporal distribution of happy and sad agents that Clement and Stormy do.
But, unlike Clement and Stormy, Balmy and Blustery are Pareto comparable. In Balmy
140Normally we would want to treat identical population worlds as a special case of overlapping worlds,
but it will be useful to keep the two kinds of populations distinct here.
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the agents in set X are all happy but the agents in Y and agents in Z are all miserable. In
Blustery the agents in X and agents in Y are all happy and the agents in Z are all miserable:
X Y Z
Balmy - / /
Blustery - - /
Figure 32: Agent happiness in Balmy and Blustery
Balmy is better than Blustery by Expansionism, but we can see that Blustery is better
than Balmy by Pareto. I take this as a convincing refutation of Expansionism. Ethics is
concerned with the wellbeing of people. It is not particularly concerned with the pattern of
utility across spacetime. The fact that the happy agents of Balmy come in one particular
spatiotemporal order rather than another is not a good reason to think that Balmy is better
than Blustery when we can see that infinitely many agents in Y are better off in Blustery
than in Balmy and no agent is better off in Balmy than in Blustery.
Although the Pareto principle has generally been taken to be one of the most fundamental
axioms in ethics, the fact that it conflicts with principles like Expansionism in infinite ethics
have caused some to question whether we really need to retain it.141 There are, however,
relatively few independent arguments against Pareto. And in order to weaken or reject the
Pareto principle in favor of some other axiom, we must try to establish that, despite its
prima facie plausibility, Pareto is less plausible than at least one of these axioms.
As I noted in the previous chapter, Hamkins and Montero [99] offer an argument against
the Weak Pareto principle, which is entailed by Pareto. In one example, they ask us to
consider two agents, Dan and Daniela, who both spend an eternity traveling from hell
to heaven. The sequence of daily utility that Dan and Daniela experience is identical:
141For example, Van Liedkerke and Lauwers (p. 169-170, 1997) propose a possible weakening of Pareto
that is consistent with their utility density principle. It is quite rare for people to reject or weaken the
principle on independent grounds. One exception are those who accept principles like Maximin, which is
inconsistent with the  condition of Pareto, but I believe this is a strong reason to reject such principles.
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(...,−3,−2,−1, 0, 1, 2, 3, ...). Hamkins and Montero argue that we should therefore be in-
different between whether we were to go through life as Dan or Daniela. We are asked to
suppose that Dan crosses the zero point one day before Daniela. Where ti is one day, we can
represent this as follows:
t−3 t−2 t−1 t0 t1 t2 t3 ...
Dan -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 ...
Daniela -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 ...
Figure 33: Utility streams of Dan and Daniela
Hamkins and Montero argue that a Paretian principle would require that we prefer Dan’s
life to Daniela’s because Dan’s life is one day ahead of Daniela’s and so on any given day
Dan’s life is better than Daniela’s. They argue that since we should be indifferent between
which of these two lives we live, we should reject Paretian principles in infinite cases.
Of course, the Pareto principle formulated above does not entail that Dan’s life is better than
Daniela’s, since it is a principle that compared worlds and not lives. Hamkins and Montero
respond to this by arguing that ‘if we assume that one life is better than another just in case
the world containing only that life is better than the world containing only the other life,
as it seems reasonable to suppose, then this distinction evaporates.’ (p. 234-5, 2000). But
it is only true that a world containing Dan’s life is better than a world containing Daniela’s
life if we adopt the time-based Sensitivity principle outlined in the previous chapter.142 The
Pareto principle does not entail that a world containing Dan is better than a world containing
142What about Expansionism? Expansionism does not commit to time-based Sensitivity (it commits to
Sensitivity about allowable spatiotemporal expansions). However, if we think that the counterpart relation
between worlds is such that t0 in Dan’s world must correspond with t0 in Daniela’s world, then Expansionism
entails that the world containing Dan is better than the world containing Daniela. Of course, if we think
that this need not be the relevant counterpart relation then Expansionism could entail that these two worlds
are equally good (if the relevant counterpart relation maps t0 in Dan’s world to t−1) in Daniela’s or that
neither is better than the other (if there are multiple admissible counterpart relations).
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Daniela since neither life has strictly more utility than the other.143
A very different objection to Pareto comes from those who believe that even if we care
about the utility being experienced by agents and not about the distribution of utility across
spacetime, agents and facts about agent identities should be irrelevant to the ethical ranking
of worlds. On this view, which was mentioned in Chapter 1, subjective experiences are
the basic locations of value, and both the identity of the agent experiencing them and the
spatiotemporal location at which they occur are ethically irrelevant.
The subjective experience view is inconsistent with Pareto. If w1 is better than w2 according
to Pareto then although w1 will not be worse than w2 according to the subjective experience
view, since improving agents’ wellbeing cannot reduce the utility of subjective experiences, it
may not be better either. We can make all agents in an infinite world better without changing
the sum of good and bad experiences happening in the world. Therefore, in whatever form
agents exist, it seems likely that the subjective experience view will fail to satisfy Pareto
with respect to these agents. The key problem for the subjective experiences view, which I
will discuss in chapter 5, is that it will be able to strictly rank almost no infinite worlds.
In this section I have argued that Expansionism conflicts with Pareto and that we therefore
ought to reject Expansionism, despite its initial plausibility. Indeed, we should be inclined
to reject any ethical axioms that violate Pareto. Of course, the falsity of the general Expan-
sionism principle does not by itself undermine the judgments that Clement is better than
Stormy, Mansion is better than Shack, and Optimistic Cubeland is better than Pessimistic
Cubeland. For example, we might think that if two worlds contain disjoint populations then
we can use a restricted version of Expansionism to compare them. Or we might think that
these world pairs can be ranked by some principle other than Expansionism. But in the next
143I will generally assume that the utility at a life is bounded. Extending these results to worlds that
include unbounded utilities and uncountably many agents will be the subject of future work.
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section I show that if we accept Pareto and a plausible account of <, then we must conclude
that none of these three world pairs are ethically comparable.
2.2 The < Relation
In this section I am going to argue that, along with Pareto, we should accept two claims
about the ethical at least as good as’ (<) relation: that it is transitive and that it is a
‘necessary qualitative relation’. I show that these principles entail that all three of the world
pairs discussed in the previous section are ethically incomparable: contrary to our initial
intuitions, neither world is better than or equally as good as the other.
We can begin with the claim that < is a transitive relation, since this is the least controversial
of the two. Transitivity is defined as follows:
Transitivity of < If w1 < w2 and w2 < w3 then w1 < w3
Transitivity prevents < from producing cyclic rankings of worlds, where w1 is better than
w2 and w2 is better than w3 and w3 is better than w1. Although transitivity was once an
entirely uncontroversial principle, it has come under some criticism in recent decades.144 It
is still widely accepted as a property of the < relation, however. I will therefore assume
transitivity here and will discuss objections to this principle in Chapter 5.
As is standard, I define ‘strictly better than’ as follows (I take this to be uncontroversial):
Strictly Better Than w1  w2 ≡ w1 < w2 and w2 6< w1
Note that Pareto entails that < is reflexive: for all worlds w1, w1 < w1. From the reflexivity
of < and this definition of strictly better than, it follows that the strict better than is
144See Rachels [187] and Temkin [226, Ch. 7-8]. For a critique of Temkin, see Voorhoeve [240].
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irreflexive: for all worlds w1, w1  w1.145 In addition, transitivity and this definition of 
entail that if w1 is strictly better than w2 and w2 is at least as good as w3 then w1 is strictly
better than w3 (if w1  w2 and w2 < w3 then w1  w3).146
The second claim I will make, in addition to transitivity, is that < is a necessary qualitative
relation. To say that a property or relation is qualitative is to say that it involves no specific
individuals. For example, the property ‘loving Obama’ and the binary relation ‘being closer
to Obama than’ are both non-qualitative since they involve the particular Obama. By
contrast, the property of ‘being happy’ and the relation of ‘being closer to some politician
than’ are both qualitative relations since they involve no particulars. This distinction extends
to properties of and relations among possible worlds. For example, the property of ‘being a
world in which Obama is happy’, and the relation ‘Obama is happier at w1 than at w2’ are
non-qualitative since they involve the particular Obama but the property of ‘being a world
in which every person is happy’, and the relation ‘everyone who exists at w1 also exists at w2
and is happier at w2 than at w1’ are qualitative relations since they involve no particulars.
To say that the < relation is to say that if the relation holds between two objects then it
holds necessarily. The numerical identity relation is a typical example of a necessary relation:
if x and y are numerically identical then there is no possible world in which x and y are
non-identical. We can contrast this with a contingent relation like ‘is to the left of’. An
object x may be to the left of an object y but it could have been the case that object x
was to the right of object y and so this relation is not a necessary relation. If one world is
at least as good as another then it seems that this cannot be only contingently true. If it’s
true that w1 is at least as good as w2 then even though a different world – a world like w1
but different in some small respect – may not be at least as good as w2, it does not seem
145If w1  w1 then w1 6< w1 but by reflexivity w1 < w1.
146Since w1  w2 and w2 < w3 it follows that w1 < w3 by transitivity. Suppose w3 < w1. Then, w2 < w3
and w3 < w1 and so w2 < w1 by transitivity. But since w1  w2 it follows from the definition of strictly
better than that w2 6< w1. Therefore w3 6< w1. Since w1 < w3 and w3 6< w1, it follows that w1  w3.
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possible that w1 could have not been at least as good as w2. I will discuss the domain of the
< relation in Chapter 5.
One world pair is a ‘qualitative duplicate’ of the other if and only if it has all of the same
qualitative properties and relations as the original world pair. If a relation R between a and
b is a necessary qualitative relation then whenever the pair 〈a, b〉 is a qualitative duplicate
of the pair 〈c, d〉, Rab if and only if Rcd. We can use this concept of a qualitative duplicate
of a world pair to formulate the qualitativeness of < axiom as follows:
Qualitativenesss of < If the pair 〈w3, w3〉 is a qualitative duplicate of the pair 〈w1, w2〉,
then w3 < w4 if and only if w1 < w2.
The claim that < is a necessary qualitative relation should strike us as highly plausible. The
alternative would be to allow that non-qualitative facts can make a difference to the ethical
ranking of two worlds. If this were true then I could describe every qualitative fact about
world w1 and w2: how many agents are in each world, how happy they are, how rich their
lives are, and so on. But I could not always tell you whether w1 is at least as good as w2 if I
don’t also know who the particular agents in w1 and w2 are: for example, that the president
in both worlds is Obama and not merely some agent that is qualitatively identical to Obama.
This seems wrong. Whether one world is ethically at least as good as another is not the sort
of thing that should depend on the identity of its agents.147
The claim that < is a qualitative relation should not be confused with the claim that < is
a qualitative internal relation. If relation R is a qualitative internal relation then if Rab
and c is a qualitative duplicate of a and d is a qualitative duplicate of b then Rcd. Not all
necessary qualitative relations are qualitative internal relations. For example, the relation
‘being adjacent to’ is qualitative but not qualitative internal: a world could contain objects
a, b, c such that a is adjacent to b, and b is a qualitative duplicate of c, but c is on the
147Relatedly, Hare (pg. 156-164, 2013) argues benevolence should not be sensitive to haecceities.
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other side of the universe from b and thus not adjacent to a. Similarly, the relation ‘every
person who exists at w1 also exists at w2’ is a necessary qualitative relation but it is not a
qualitative internal relation: this relation could hold between w1 and w2 while failing to hold
between w1 and a qualitative duplicate w2 at which a different collection of people exist.
148
The Pareto principle is inconsistent with the claim that < is a qualitative internal relation.
We can see this by considering the world Balmy from the previous section and a qualitative
duplicate of Balmy, aptly named ‘Duplicate Balmy’, which is as follows:
island1 island2 island3 island4 island5 island6 ...
Balmy X X X X X X X X X X X X ...
X Y X Z X Y X Z X Y X Z
Duplicate Balmy X X X X X X X X X X X X ...
Y Z Y Z Y Z Y Z Y Z Y Z
Figure 34: Balmy and Duplicate Balmy
Balmy is at least as good as itself by the Pareto principle. Duplicate Balmy is a qualitative
duplicate of Balmy: it has all of the same qualitative properties as Balmy, including – as
we can see above – the distribution of happy and sad agents on each island. So if < is a
qualitative internal relation then it follows that Balmy is at least as good as Duplicate Balmy.
But Pareto entails that Duplicate Balmy is strictly better than Balmy, since all agents in
Balmy are at least as happy in Duplicate Balmy, but infinitely many agents in set Y are
strictly happier in Duplicate Balmy than they are in Balmy. Therefore Pareto is inconsistent
with the claim that < is a qualitative internal relation.
This brings us to Hamkins and Montero’s [98] second argument against Paretian principles.
They argue that we should reject Pareto because it conflicts with what they call the ‘Iso-
morphism Principle’, which says any world is as good as an isomorphic copy of itself. An
‘isomorphic copy’ of a world is a copy that is preserves ‘the topological structure of locations
148I adopt a roughly Lewisian view of internal and external relations. See Lewis [152, p.62].
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and the amount of local goodness at those locations’ of a world (p. 235, ibid.). I disagree
with this objection to Pareto. Given transitivity, the Isomorphism Principle entails that <
(and hence  also) is a qualitative internal relation. To show this, suppose that w1 is at
least as good as w2 and w3 is a qualitative duplicate of w2. Then w3 is an isomorphic copy
of w2 so by the Isomorphism Principle, w3 is equally as good as w2 and therefore w2 is at
least as good as w3. So by transitivity, w1 is at least as good as w3. Similarly, if w4 is a
qualitative duplicate of w1 then w4 is an isomorphic copy of w1 and so is equally as good as
w1 by the Isomorphism Principle, and so w4 is at least as good as w2 by transitivity.
Although I believe it is highly plausible that < is a necessary qualitative relation for the
reasons given above, I see no reason to believe that it is a qualitative internal relation. The
very fact that the claim that < is a qualitative internal relation conflicts with Pareto in cases
like the one above gives us strong reasons to reject the claim that < is a qualitative internal
relation. After all, it seems plausible that if infinitely many agents are better off and no
agents are worse off in one world than in the other, then the two worlds are not equally
good.149 The claim that < is a necessary necessary qualitative relation but not a qualitative
internal relation is consistent with Pareto but also does not commit us to the implausible
view that whether one world is better than another can depend on non-necessary necessary
qualitative relations at or between those worlds.
Pareto is not consistent with the claim that < is a qualitative internal relation. But Pareto
is consistent with the claim that < is a necessary qualitative relation: the claim that if one
world pair 〈w1, w2〉 is a qualitative duplicate of another world pair 〈w3, w4〉, then w1 < w2 if
and only if w3 < w4. In the case above, Balmy is at least as good as itself by Pareto. Let us
149An additional argument against the claim that better than is a qualitative internal relation comes from
Hare (p. 184-6, 2013). Suppose in world w1 each agent has a neighbor that has more utility than she does.
Consider a sequence of worlds in which each agent becomes more qualitatively like her original neighbor.
Eventually we will reach a world in which each agent is qualitatively identical to her neighbor. This world
is qualitatively identical to the original world but is strictly better than w1 by Pareto and transitivity.
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use w1 ∼ w2 to mean w1 < w2 and w2 < w1. It follows that Balmy ∼ Balmy. Therefore if
< is a qualitative relation then the ∼ relation must hold between any qualitative duplicate
of the pair 〈Balmy, Balmy〉. But the pair 〈Balmy, Duplicate Balmy〉 is not a qualitative
duplicate of the pair 〈Balmy, Balmy〉. For example, the necessary qualitative relation ‘has
no shared agents that are worse off in’ holds between Balmy and itself but does not hold
between Balmy and Duplicate Balmy because they have disjoint populations, and so the
claim that < is a necessary qualitative relation does not entail that Balmy is at least as good
as Duplicate Balmy.150 I will therefore assume that < is a necessary qualitative relation but
not that it is a qualitative internal relation.
I will call worlds w1 and w2 ‘ethically incomparable’ (or just ‘incomparable’) if w1 is not at
least as good as w2 and w2 is not at least as good as w1. Therefore if world w1 is not better
than or equal to or worse than world w2 then the two worlds are incomparable.
151 I am
going to demonstrate that if < is transitive and qualitative, then Clement and Stormy are
ethically incomparable. To show this, suppose that we group the agents of Clement into sets
A, B, and C, and we group the agents of Stormy into sets D, E, and F , where the agents
in each of these sets come in the following patterns:
island1 island2 island3 island4 island5 island6 ...
Clement A A A A A A A A A A A A ...
A B A C A B A C A B A C
Stormy F F F F F F F F F F F F ...
F D F E F D F E F D F E
Figure 35: Sets of agents in Clement and Stormy
Set A comprises agents a1, a2, a3 on island1, agents a4, a5, a6 on island2, and so on. Set B
150The claim that < is a necessary qualitative relation does entail that the ‘at least as good as’ relation
holds between 〈Duplicate Balmy, Duplicate Balmy〉, but this is consistent with Pareto.
151Those who accept the fourth relation ‘on a par’ (Chang, 2002) may wish to contend that Archipelago1
and Stormy could be on a par rather than incomparable. But this case has none of the usual features of
parity such as different evaluative considerations and so I won’t discuss the parity relation here.
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comprises agent b1 on island1, agent b2 on island 3, agent b3 on island5, and so on. Suppose
for reductio that Clement is at least as good as Stormy. Consider a world pair 〈 Duplicate
Clement, Duplicate Stormy〉 that is a qualitative duplicate of the pair 〈Clement, Stormy〉:
island1 island2 island3 island4 island5 island6 ...
Duplicate Clement D D D D D D D D D D D D ...
D E D F D E D F D E D F
Duplicate Stormy C C C C C C C C C C C C ...
C A C B C A C B C A C B
Figure 36: Sets of agents in Duplicate Clement and Duplicate Stormy
All of the qualitative roles that agents play in 〈Clement, Stormy〉 are played by different
agents in 〈Duplicate Clement, Duplicate Stormy〉. The qualitative roles played by the agents
in set A in Clement – agents a1, a2, a3, ... – are played by agents from set D in Duplicate
Clement – agents d1, d2, d3, ... (these are the very same agents in set A that exist in Clement
and the very same agents in set D that exist in Stormy).
The agents of 〈Clement, Stormy〉 have been permuted. A permutation g of the population of
the pair 〈Clement, Stormy〉 is a bijection of the joint populations of Clement and Stormy onto
itself. Consider the set of numbers {1, 3, 5} and the set of numbers {2, 4, 6}. A permutation
of the union of these sets – like a permutation of the population of a world pair rather than
a permutation of the populations of the individual worlds – is a bijection from the union of
these sets onto itself. We can use Cauchy’s two-line notation, which lists the original items
on the top line and their image on the second line below, to illustrate a permutation h:
h({1, 3, 5} ∪ {2, 4, 6}) =
1 3 5 2 4 6
3 6 4 1 5 2

If the agents of 〈Clement, Stormy〉 have been permuted by some g then if a1 plays a given
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qualitative role in the pair 〈Clement, Stormy〉 then an agent g(a1) plays that qualitative role
in 〈Duplicate Clement, Duplicate Stormy〉. In this case, we can construct the permutation
g of the population of 〈Clement, Stormy〉 onto itself from a bijection f from the population





















Duplicate Stormy contains all of the same agents as Clement, but each agent ai, bi; ci in
Duplicate Stormy plays the role that the agent f(ai), f(bi); f(ci) plays at Stormy respectively.
Duplicate Clement contains all of the same agents as Stormy, but each agent di, ei; fi in
Duplicate Clement plays the role that the agent f−1(di), f
−1(ei); f
−1(fi) plays in Clement
respectively. Let g be a bijection from the population of 〈Clement, Stormy〉 onto itself such
that for all agents that exist in Clement, g(pl(A1)) = f(pl(A1)) and for all agents that exist
in Stormy, g(pl(A2)) = f
−1(pl(A2)). The world pair 〈Duplicate Clement, Duplicate Stormy〉
is the result of permuting the agents of 〈Clement, Stormy〉 by g.
Duplicate Clement is a qualitative duplicate of Clement but it has a population that is
identical to that of Stormy (the agents in sets D, E and F ). Duplicate Stormy is a qualitative
duplicate of Stormy but it has a population that is identical to that of Clement (the agents
in sets A, B and C). We can see above that the happiness levels of each of the agents in sets
A – G in the four Archipelagos are as follows, where – denotes non-existence:
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A B C D E G
Clement - / / — — —
Stormy — — — - - /
Duplicate Clement — — — - / /
Duplicate Stormy - - / — — —
Figure 37: Happiness levels of Clement, Stormy, and duplicates
Since all of the agents in set E are better off in Stormy than in Duplicate Clement and
no agent is worse off in Stormy than they are in Duplicate Clement, Stormy is better than
Duplicate Clement by Pareto. Since all of the agents in set B are better off in Duplicate
Stormy than in Clement and no agent is worse off in Duplicate Stormy than in Clement,
Duplicate Stormy is better than Clement by Pareto.
We assumed that Clement is at least as good as Stormy. We have shown that Stormy is
strictly better than Duplicate Clement by Pareto. But since < is a necessary qualitative
relation and 〈Duplicate Clement, Duplicate Stormy〉 is a qualitative duplicate of 〈Clement,
Stormy〉, it follows that Duplicate Clement is at least as good as Duplicate Stormy. We
have shown that Duplicate Stormy is strictly better than Clement by Pareto. This violates
transitivity. To show this, let w1
Pareto====⇒ w2 mean that w1 is strictly better than w2 by
Pareto, let w1 −−→ w2 mean that w1 is at least as good as w2 by hypothesis (hyp.), by the
qualitativeness of the ‘at least as good as’ relation < (q<.) or by Pareto (Pareto) and let w1
- - - w2 mean that w1 and w2 are qualitative duplicates. If we use C to denote Clement, S
to denote Stormy, DC to denote Duplicate Clement, and DS to denote Duplicate Stormy,








Figure 38: Transitivity violation showing Clement 6< Stormy
Therefore, if we accept the Pareto principle and that < is transitive and qualitative, then
Clement cannot be at least as good as Stormy.
Note that Clement and Stormy have entirely disjoint populations. This means that we
can rule out the possibility, hinted at in the last section, of using some kind of restricted
Expansionist principle – for example, an Expansionist principle that only compare worlds
that are not Pareto-comparable – to conclude that Clement is better than Stormy. Even
though Clement and Stormy are not Pareto comparable, if < is transitive and qualitative
then the claim that Clement is better than Stormy is inconsistent with Pareto.
Of course, in order to show that Clement and Stormy are incomparable – the neither world
is better than or equal to the other – we also need to show that Stormy is not at least as
good as Clement. We have no reason to believe that Stormy is at least as good as Clement,
but we can also show that Stormy 6< Clement by the same reasoning.
Last time I grouped the agents of Clement and Stormy into the sets A−G. This time I will
group the same agents of Clement and Stormy into the sets U − Z:
island1 island2 island3 island4 island5 island6 ...
Clement U U U U U U U U U U U U ...
V W V W V W V W V W V W
Stormy Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y ...
Z X Z X Z X Z X Z X Z X
Figure 39: Alternative groupings of the agents of Clement and Stormy
96
This time, suppose for reductio that Stormy is at least as good as Clement. Consider a
world pair 〈New Duplicate Clement, New Duplicate Stormy〉 that is a qualitative duplicate
of 〈Clement, Stormy〉 and whose populations are as follows:
island1 island2 island3 island4 island5 island6 ...
New Duplicate Clement X X X X X X X X X X X X ...
Y Z Y Z Y Z Y Z Y Z Y Z
New Duplicate Stormy V V V V V V V V V V V V ...
W U W U W U W U W U w U
Figure 40: New Duplicate Clement and New Duplicate Stormy
As before, the agents of 〈Clement, Stormy〉 have been permuted. This time, the bijection f





















New Duplicate Stormy contains all of the same agents as Clement, but each agent ui, vi;wi in
New Duplicate Stormy plays the role that f(ui), f(vi); f(wi) plays at Stormy respectively. Let
g be a bijection from the population of 〈Clement, Stormy〉 onto itself such that g(pl(A1)) =
f(pl(A1)) and g(pl(A2) = f
−1(pl(A2)). 〈New Duplicate Clement, New Duplicate Stormy〉 is
the result of permuting the agents of 〈Clement, Stormy〉 by g. The happiness levels of each
of the agents in U – Z in these four worlds are as follows:
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U V W X Y Z
Clement - - / — — —
Stormy — — — - / /
New Duplicate Clement — — — - - /
New Duplicate Stormy - / / — — —
Figure 41: Happiness levels of Clement, Stormy, and new duplicates
We assumed that Stormy is at least as good as Clement. But we can see that Clement is
strictly better than New Duplicate Stormy by Pareto. New Duplicate Stormy is at least as
good as New Duplicate Clement by the qualitativeness of <. And New Duplicate Clement







Figure 42: Transitivity violation showing Stormy 6< Clement
Therefore if we accept the Pareto principle and that < is transitive and qualitative, then
Clement is not at least as good as Stormy and Stormy is not at least as good as Clement.
These two worlds are ethically incomparable. It is easy to see that we can find duplicate
world pairs that will show that if we accept the Pareto principle and that < is transitive
and qualitative, then Mansion and Shack are incomparable, as are Optimistic Cube and
Pessimistic Cube, contrary to our initial intuitions about these three cases.
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2.3 The Permutation Principle
In the argument of the previous section I simply assumed that there exist world pairs
like 〈Duplicate Clement, Duplicate Stormy〉 and 〈New Duplicate Clement, New Duplicate
Stormy〉 that we can use to show that Clement and Stormy are incomparable. However,
one might think that this assumption was questionable. Perhaps we won’t always be able
to find a pair of worlds 〈w3, w4〉 that is a qualitative duplicate of 〈w1, w2〉 such that w3
contains the same agents as w2 and w4 contains the same agents as w1. In this section I
will outline and defend the Permutation Principle. This principle entails that for any world
pair 〈Clement, Stormy〉, world pairs like 〈Duplicate Clement, Duplicate Stormy〉 and 〈New
Duplicate Clement, New Duplicate Stormy〉 exist.
As I noted above, a permutation of the population of a pair of worlds is a bijection from the
population of that world pair to itself. For each agent x in 〈w1, w2〉, a permutation g maps
each agent x in 〈w1, w2〉 onto some agent g(x) in 〈w1, w2〉. Suppose that we permute the
agents of a world pair 〈w1, w2〉 by some g such that the qualitative role of every agent x in
〈w1, w2〉 is played by the agent g(x) in 〈w3, w4〉. This means that every qualitative property
that an agent x has in w1, g(x) has this property in w3. And every necessary qualitative
relation that agents x1, ..., xn have in w1, agents g(x1), ..., g(xn) have this relation in w3.
Therefore the pair 〈w3, w4〉 is a qualitative duplicate of the pair 〈w1, w2〉. In such cases I will
say that the world pair 〈w3, w4〉 is a ‘qualitative duplicate of 〈w1, w2〉 under g’:
Qualitative Duplication Under a Bijection (world pairs)
A pair of worlds 〈w3, w4〉 is a qualitative duplicate of a pair of worlds 〈w1, w2〉 under bijec-
tion f iff for any necessary qualitative relation R, if relation R(x1, ..., xn) holds at w1 then
relation R(f(x1), ..., f(xn)) holds at w3, and if relation R(x1, ..., xn) holds at w2 then relation
R(f(x1), ..., f(xn)) holds at w4, and if R(w1, w2) then R(w3, w4)
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The domain of the bijection f does not have to be restricted to agents. We can permute
any object x in w1 so that in world w2, the qualitative role that x plays in w1 – all of the
necessary qualitative relations that x has in w1, denoted by R(x) – are played by f(x), such
that R(x) at w1 and R(f(x)) at w2. Moreover, the necessary qualitative relations preserved
by f include all of the qualitative properties of objects at w1, since these properties are 1-ary
necessary qualitative relations.
It is worth emphasizing that permuting the population of a world pair will preserve all
necessary qualitative relations that exist both within and between the two worlds of the
original pair. For example, there will never be an agent a that exists in w1 but not w2 such
that g(a) exists in both w3 and w4. This is because for all agents x, the qualitative role that
x plays in w1 is played by g(x) in w3 and the qualitative role that x plays in w2 is played by
the same g(x) in w4. So if x exists in w1 but not in w2, then g(x) exists in w3 but not in w4.
The claim that I will defend here is that for any world pair and any permutation of its
population, we can find a world pair that is a qualitative duplicate of the original world pair
under that permutation. I call this the Permutation Principle:152
Permutation Principle
For any world pair 〈w1, w2〉 and any bijection g from the population of 〈w1, w2〉 onto any
population, there exists a world pair 〈w3, w4〉 that is a qualitative duplicate of 〈w1, w2〉 under
bijection g.
The Permutation Principle is clearly true if we believe that an agent can have completely
different qualitative properties while still remaining the same agent. For example, if we think
152The cases I consider in this chapter will all involve a bijection from the population of 〈w1, w2〉 onto itself,
but in the next chapter I will consider bijections from the population of 〈w1, w2〉 onto a distinct equinumerous
population. It is worth noting that we can establish a great deal of incomparability even if we assume more
restricted versions of this principle, since all we really need is that there are qualitative duplicate worlds for
permutations of the right kind. I see no reason to favor such restrictions, however.
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that Bill Clinton can have the non-qualitative property ‘being Bill Clinton’ even if all of his
qualitative properties change – he could be a different height and weight, he could have been
a gardener instead of president, and so on – then we can clearly replace any agent in a world
pair with Bill Clinton without making a qualitative change to that world pair.
It is perhaps worth pointing out that the kind of essentialism that one would need to accept
in order to claim that worlds like Clement and Stormy are comparable is of a particularly
strange variety. In this case we only permuted the agents so that their image had different
spatial locations and different happiness levels. As I will argue in Chapter 5, it seems
implausible that many ethically-relevant qualitative properties will be essential to identity.
The claim that we could permute the identities of agents without altering any of the qual-
itative properties of a world might nonetheless seem too strong, metaphysically speaking.
Anti-haecceitists who believe that it is not possible for two worlds to be qualitatively identi-
cal but to differ non-qualitatively will clearly reject the Permutation Principle.153 But even
those with less extreme anti-haecceitist leanings may think that the principle is too strong.
Suppose we are ancestor essentialists – we believe that certain necessary qualitative rela-
tions like ‘being the son of’ or ‘being the granddaughter of’ are essential to identity.154 For
example, Bill Clinton could not exist without being the son of William Jefferson Blythe Jr.
Now consider a world w1 that contains only Bill Clinton and William Jefferson Blythe Jr.
and another world w2 that contains only Abraham Lincoln and his father Thomas Lincoln.
Consider permutation g of the population of this world pair:
153Here I adopt the definition of anti-haecceitism given in Skow (§2, 2008). Note that anti-haecceitists
hold that all relations between worlds are qualitative internal relations. So anti-haecceitist will already have
rejected my earlier claim that the better than relation is a qualitative but not a qualitative internal relation.










William Jefferson Blythe Jr.
Figure 43: Permutation of worlds each containing two agents
If we are ancestor essentialists, however, then there is no possible world pair 〈w3, w4〉 that is
a qualitative duplicate of 〈w1, w2〉 under g. The permutation g would result in a world w3
in which Thomas Lincoln is the father of Abraham Lincoln, and a world w4 in which Bill
Clinton is the father of William Jefferson Blythe Jr. But if we are ancestor essentialists then
w3 and w4 are clearly not metaphysically possible worlds.
My response to this objection is that the world pair that exists and is a qualitative duplicate
of 〈w1, w2〉 under g need not be a metaphysically possible world pair. We can appeal to a
broader form of logical possibility in which it is possible for agents to have completely different
qualitative properties while remaining the same agent. After all, even if it is metaphysically
impossible for Bill Clinton to be the father of William Jefferson Blythe Jr., it is not logically
impossible for Bill Clinton to be the father of William Jefferson Blythe Jr.
One might worry, however, that any results that rely on a notion of possibility that is
narrower than metaphysical possibility will not be the sort of results that we can derive
ethical conclusions from. I believe this worry is unfounded. To see why, consider the set of
worlds such that for any bijection g from the population of 〈w1, w2〉 onto itself, there exists
metaphysically possible world-pair 〈w3, w4〉 that is a qualitative duplicate of 〈w1, w2〉 under
g. Contrast this with the set of worlds such that for any bijection g from the population of
〈w1, w2〉 onto itself, there exists a logically possible world-pair 〈w3, w4〉 that is a qualitative
duplicate of 〈w1, w2〉 under g. The first set might include all of the worlds in which agents
lack ancestors while the latter set includes all of the worlds in which agents have ancestors.
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Suppose that one world pair in the first set contains two agents that bear no relation to one
another: one that was born at t1 and another that was born at t2. Suppose that another
world pair in the second set contains two agents: one that was born at t1 that is the mother
of the agent born at t2. The two world pairs are identical in all other respects. If we believe
that we cannot derive ethical conclusions from logical possibility then we must conclude
that, even if we can show that the first pair of worlds are incomparable, we cannot conclude
from this that the second pair of worlds is incomparable. But it seems implausible that the
latter pair of worlds can be shielded from this conclusion unless essential relations are also
morally relevant. I discuss this more in Chapter 5.
It seems far more plausible to me that the ethical better than relation must hold between
worlds that are logically possible even if those worlds are metaphysically impossible.155 If
this is the case then in order to show that w1 and w2 are incomparable it is sufficient to show
that, if we accept Pareto and that < is qualitative, then the assumption that w1 and w2 are
comparable results in a transitivity violation across logically possible world pairs.
The Permutation Principle and the qualitativeness of < might look superficially similar
to the Anonymity principles of the previous section, but they are quite different. The
Permutation Principle and the qualitativeness of < jointly prevent us from using facts about
the particulars of a world to produce an ethical ranking of worlds. But the two axioms do
not, by themselves, entail even the most basic forms of equity.
We remember from the last chapter that a theory is equitable if it does not prefer one
distribution over another if the two distributions are identical but differ only in terms of who
has a given utility level. This was supposedly captured by ‘Anonymity’ principles, which
were formulated as follows:
155This notion of logical possibility must be narrower than metaphysical possibility but could be broader
than‘narrow logical possibility’ under which any world that is logically consistent is possible.
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Anonymity (locations)
If the utility of each basic location of value in w2 is a (finite/fixed-step/infinite) permutation
of the utility of the basic locations of value in w1, then world w1 and w2 are equally good.
The weakest of these equity constraints is Finite Anonymity, which states that if the utility
of each basic location of value in w2 is a finite permutation of the utility of the basic locations
of value in w1, then world w1 and w2 are equally good. Consider, for example, the following
world pair 〈w1, w2〉 in which an agent a1 is born on day 1, an agent a2 is born on day 2,
and so on. World w2 is identical to w1, except that in world w2 the utilities of the first two
agents – agents a1 and a2 – have been switched:
a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 a6 ... an an+1 ...
w1 1 0 1 0 1 0 ... 1 0 ...
w2 0 1 1 0 1 0 ... 1 0 ...
Figure 44: Switching the utilities of two agents
The Finite Anonymity principle entails that w1 and w2 are equally good: switching the
utilities of agents a1 and a2 should not result in one world being ranked over the other. But
the Permutation Principle and the qualitativeness of < are consistent with the claim that
w1 is strictly better than w2 or vice versa. These axioms jointly require that if w1 is strictly
better than w2, and 〈w3, w4〉 is a qualitative duplicate of 〈w1, w2〉, then w3 is strictly better
than w4. To show that this does not entail Finite Anonymity suppose that the world pair
〈w3, w4〉 is a qualitative duplicate of world pair 〈w1, w2〉 under g, where g(a1) = a2, g(a2) = a1
and for all other agents in the population of 〈w1, w2〉, g(a) = a:
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a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 a6 ... an an+1 ...
w3 0 1 1 0 1 0 ... 1 0 ...
w4 1 0 1 0 1 0 ... 1 0 ...
Figure 45: Permuting the agents whose utilities have been switched
Suppose we believed that w1 is strictly better than w2 whenever the agent born on day 1 in
w1 is happier than the agent born on day 1 in w2. This means that we would rank w1 strictly
better than w2. But we would also rank w3 strictly better than w4. This is consistent with
the Permutation Principle and the qualitativeness of <. So the requirement that our ethical
rankings are not sensitive to what particular agents exist in a world does not entail equity:
it is consistent with a denial of even the weakest anonymity principles.
Interestingly, adding Pareto to these axioms does entail something in the spirit of equity. In
the case above, for example, these three axioms jointly entail that worlds w1  w2 and that
w2  w1. Suppose that w1  w2 and so, by the qualitativeness axiom, w3  w4. We can
see that w2 < w3 by Pareto and w4 < w1 by Pareto. This violates transitivity. Therefore
neither of these worlds is strictly better than the other if we accept these three axioms.156
We can establish a more general result: namely that Pareto, the qualitativeness of <, and
the Permutation Principle entail that if the utility of each agents in w2 is a finite permutation
of the utility of each agent in w1 then w1  w2 and w2  w1. To show this, suppose that
the utility of each agents at w2 is a finite permutation of the utility of each agent in w1.
This means that there are infinitely many (shared or unshared) agents in w1 and w2 with
identical utility levels in w1 and w2. Let A = {a1, ...an} denote this set of agents. And let
f be a bijection from each agent in A in w1 to a unique agent in A in w2 such that there
156Since we reject completeness, the fact that w1  w2 and w2  w1 does not entail that w1 and w2 are
equally good: we cannot conclude that w1 ∼ w2 from these three axioms alone. In the next chapter I will
defend a plausible extension of Pareto that does entail that these two worlds are equally good.
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are no agents in A in w2 that are not the image of some agent in A in w1 and for all a ∈ A,
u(ai) in w1 = u(f(ai)) in w2.
There are also finitely many (shared or unshared) agents in w1 and w2 that have distinct
utility levels in w1 and w2. Let B = {b1, ...bn} denote this set of agents. Since the utility of
each agents at w2 is a finite permutation of the utility of each agent in w1, it follows that
there exists a bijection h from the agents in B in w1 to the same set of agents in w2 such
that u(bi) in w1 = u(h(bi)) in w2 for all agents in B. Let the permutation g of the population
of 〈w1, w2〉 onto itself be such that, for all agents in A, g(ai) = f(ai) and g(f(ai)) = f−1(ai)
and for all agents in B, g(bi) = h(bi) and g(h(bi)) = h
−1(bi).
Let 〈w3, w4〉 be a qualitative duplicate of 〈w1, w2〉 under permutation g. Since g maps all
agents in w1 to an agent in w2, world w3 contains the same agents as world w2 and since g
maps all agents in w2 to an agent in w1, world w4 contains the same agents as world w1. And
for all agents x in 〈w1, w2〉, u(x) = u(g(x)). Therefore w2 and w3 are equally good by Pareto
and w4 and w1 are equally good by Pareto. Therefore w1  w2 and w2  w1 by transitivity.
This establishes that Pareto, the qualitativeness of <, and the Permutation Principle entail
a weak equity principle: if we can permute the utility levels of finitely many agents in w1
and this finite permutation results in world w2, then this finite permutation does not result
in a world that is strictly better than or strictly worse than the original world.
What about stronger equity principles involving more than just finite permutations? We can
use the same method above to show that if we can perform any finite-length permutation
(including a fixed-step permutation) on the utility levels of the agents in w1 and this finite-
length permutation results in world w2, then world w1  w2 and w2  w1.157 To show this,
157We can use this argument strategy to show that all ‘permissible extensions’ of Finite Anonymity, as
defined in Basu and Mitra [?, 24], are such that Pareto plus the qualitativeness of < entail that permuting
the utilities of one world by such a permutation results in a world that is neither strictly better than nor
strictly worse than the original.
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we can use fixed-step permutations as an example. Suppose that the utilities of w2 can be
derived from the utilities of w1 by means of a fixed-step permutation. From the definition
of fixed-step permutations it follows that there exists a bijection f from the population of
w1 to the population of w2 such that f maps each agent in w1 to a unique agent in w2 and
all agents in w1 are the image of an agent in w1 under f and for all agents x in w1, u(x) in
w1 = u(f(x)) in w2. Let the permutation g of the population of 〈w1, w2〉 onto itself be such
that, for all agents x in w1, g(x) = f(x) and for all agents f(x) in w2, g(f(x)) = f
−1(x). Let
〈w3, w4〉 be a qualitative duplicate of 〈w1, w2〉 under permutation g. It follows that w2 ∼ w3
by Pareto and w4 ∼ w1 by Pareto. Therefore w1  w2 and w2  w1 by transitivity.
Let us turn, however, to infinite permutations. In the previous chapter we considered the
Strong Anonymity principle, which says that if the utility of each basic location of value in
w2 is a (possibly infinite) permutation of the utility of finitely many or infinitely many basic
location of value in w1, then world w1 and w2 are equally good. It was shown that Pareto
is inconsistent with Strong Anonymity using cases like the following, which involve variable
step permutations (here using agents rather than times are basic locations of value):
a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 a6 ... an an+1 ...
w1 1 0 1 0 1 0 ... 1 0 ...
w2 1 1 1 0 1 0 ... 1 0 ...
Figure 46: An identical population world pair with variable step permuted utilities
As before, we can turn the first utility stream w1 into the second utility stream w2 if we
permute the utility levels of w1 by moving utility 1 from a3 to a2, utility 1 from a5 to a3,
utility 1 from a7 to a5, and so on, and keep the same utility levels at all other agents agents.
But the Pareto principle says that w2  w1. Since the Permutation Principle permutes
the populations of world pairs and not of individual worlds, it follows that if 〈w3, w4〉 is a
qualitative duplicate of 〈w1, w2〉 then w4 will be strictly better than w3 by Pareto. The three
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axioms I have defended are therefore inconsistent with the Strong Anonymity principle.
These three axioms do, however, entail a new form of equity under infinite permutations.
Consider a world pair that is just like the one above, except that the agents of the second
world are entirely different from the agents of the first world:
a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 a6 ... an an+1 ...
w1 1 0 1 0 1 0 ... 1 0 ...
b1 b2 b3 b4 b5 b6 ... bn bn+1 ...
w2 1 1 1 0 1 0 ... 1 0 ...
Figure 47: A disjoint population world pair with variable step permuted utilities
The utility of the agents of world w2 is an infinite permutation of the utility of the agents of
world w1. Therefore the finite and fixed-step Anonymity principles are both unable to rule
out the claim that w1  w2 or that w1  w2. But Pareto, the qualitativeness of <, and the
Permutation Principle jointly entail that w1  w2 and w2  w1. To show this, consider a
bijection f from the population of w1 to the population of w2 that maps all agents in w1 to
an agent in w2 with the same utility level (e.g. f(a1) = b1, f(a2) = b4, f(a3) = b2, f(a4) = b6,
and so on). Let g be a permutation of the population of 〈w1, w2〉 such that for all agents x,
g(x) = f(x) and g(f(x)) = f−1(x). If 〈w3, w4〉 is a qualitative duplicate of 〈w1, w2〉 under g
then w2 ∼ w3 by Pareto and w3 ∼ w4 by Pareto. So w1  w2 and w2  w1 by transitivity.
The difference between this case and the previous one is that in the case above there exists an
infinite permutation of the agents of the pair of worlds 〈w1, w2〉 that results in a qualitative
duplicate pair 〈w3, w4〉 such that w2 ∼ w3 and w3 ∼ w4. This is no such infinite permutation
in the previous case, nor in any cases in which one world is better than another by Pareto.
I believe that the standard formulations of the Anonymity principles, including Strong
Anonymity, rest on the same confusion that underlies Hamkins and Montero’s second objec-
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tion to Pareto: namely, they assume that the < relation is equitable only if it is a necessary
qualitative relation, which seems correct, but they assume that if the < relation is a neces-
sary qualitative relation then it must be a qualitative internal relation, which is incorrect.
But Pareto is inconsistent with the claim that if the < is a qualitative internal relation, and
so we should not be surprised that the Strong Anonymity principle conflicts with Pareto.
This confusion also means that Anonymity principles clearly fail to capture what they were
intended to capture: whether an ethical ranking is equitable or not. If w2 is better than
w1 by Pareto, then no equity principle should entail that w1 and w2 are equally good, as
Strong Anonymity does. But Finite Anonymity and Fixed-Step Anonymity seem to be too
weak to capture what we mean by equity. Permuting the utility levels of infinitely many
agents should not result in a world that is strictly better if it does not result in a Pareto
improvement. This is entailed by Pareto and the qualitativeness of <.
The qualitativeness of < says that we should not favor agents based solely on who they
are. This seems like a key component of our concept of an equitable ethical theory. When
we combine this axiom with Pareto, it follows that we must not give different weight to
utility that agents have based solely on qualitative properties like where they are located
in spacetime. If we do give more weight to utility based on such properties then, since we
can find a world pair in which different agents play those qualitative roles, our theory will
come into conflict with Pareto. The idea that we should not give more weight to someone’s
utility on the basis of qualitative properties like where they are located in spacetime is also
a key component of our concept of an equitable theory.158 And, as I have shown, these two
principles jointly entail that if the utility levels of w2 is a finite, fixed-step, or – in some cases
– an infinite permutation of the utility of w1, then w2 is not strictly better or worse than w1.
158One might object that Pareto is itself an inequitable principle because it can give extra weight to the
utility of agents on the basis of the qualitative property ‘being a shared agent’ even if it is not consistent
with giving extra weight to other qualitative properties. The results of Chapter 3 entail that Pareto and the
qualitativeness of < are jointly inconsistent with giving extra weight to the utility of shared agents.
109
I therefore believe that the qualitativeness of < and Pareto jointly constitute a novel kind
of equity that is superior to the anonymity axioms outlined in the previous chapter:159
Paretian Equity
If (i) it’s not the case that w1  w2 or w2  w1 by Pareto and (ii) the utility levels of the
agents at w1 is a (finite, fixed step, or variable step) permutation of the utility levels of the
agents at w2, then w1 is not strictly better than w2 and w2 is not strictly better than w1.
Consider a view like limit discounted utilitarianism [114]. This view satisfies Pareto and
Fixed-Step Anonymity because any fixed-step permutations of utility will have no effect
on the the limit of a sequence of discounted utility.160 I contend that it is inequitable to
spatiotemporally discount agents’ utilities even if doing so is consistent with Finite and
Fixed-Step Anonymity. Suppose that there are infinitely many agents with utility 1 lives
and infinitely many agents with utility 2 lives in both w1 and w2. The agents in w1 come
in the temporal order (2, 1, 2, 1, 2, 1, ...) while the utilities in w2 come in the temporal order
(1, 1, 2, 1, 1, 2, ...). For any choice of discount rate, limit discount utilitarianism will rank
w1 over w2. But w1 and w2 could contain exactly the same agents with exactly the same
utility levels. The agents might simply appear in a different temporal order. Given this, any
theory that says one of these worlds is strictly better than the other seems inequitable, since
it gives more weight to agents’ utility levels depending on when they occur. The verdict of
limit discounted utilitarianism is consistent with finite and fixed-step anonymity, however,
since the first world can only be derived from the second by means of an infinite variable
step permutation of utilities. The verdict of limit discounted utilitarianism is inconsistent
with Pareto and the qualitativeness of <, however. This suggests that Pareto and the
qualitativeness of < jointly place more plausible equity constraints on theories than finite or
159As we adopt extensions of Pareto, the qualitativeness of < will guarantee that our concept of equitable-
ness will also be extended.
160For example, the limit of the sequence (2, 1, 1, 1, 1, ....) is equal to the limit of the sequence
(1, 2, 1, 1, 1, 1...) regardless of our choice of discount rate.
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fixed-step anonymity.
In this section I have argued that Pareto and the qualitativeness of < jointly entail a more
plausible account of equity than either finite or fixed-step anonymity that is more in line
with our intuitions.161 The key reason that has been given for rejecting equity principles
that are stricter than finite or fixed-step anonymity is that they conflict with Pareto. I have
shown that this is only true of Strong Anonymity because it assumes that < is a qualitative
internal relation. If we reject the assumption that < is a qualitative internal relation but
maintain that < is a necessary qualitative relation, we can maintain that if the utility levels
of agents at w1 are a variable step permutation of the utility levels of agents at w2 and neither
of these worlds is strictly better than the other by Pareto, then neither of these worlds is
strictly better than the other.
Summary
In this chapter I have shown that if we accept four axioms – Pareto, transitivity, the quali-
tativeness of <, and the Permutation Principle, we must reject the completeness axiom: we
must accept that some world pairs are such that w1 6< w2 and w2 6< w1. If we want to retain
completeness then we must reject one of the four axioms I have formulated.
We could reject Pareto, but Pareto is a fairly fundamental ethical principle. If we are forced
to choose between completeness and the claim that if no agents are better off in w1 than
they are in w2 and some agents are strictly worse off in w1 than they are in w2 then w1 is
worse than w2, we seem to be justified in choosing to reject completeness.
I believe that rejecting transitivity will be of little help in the cases I discuss since, as I show in
Chapter 5, retaining completeness at the cost of transitivity requires accepting implausible
161For principles that satisfy Pareto and fixed-step Anonymity if basic locations of value come in a nat-
ural order, see the fixed-step anonymous overtaking and catching-up principles formulated by Asheim and
Banerjee [9]. We can use the same argument to show that these are inconsistent with Pareto and Equity.
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cyclic rankings of infinite worlds. Not only do such cycles create problems for subjective
ethical decision making, but they also lack any independent motivation. I will argue that
incompleteness generates similar difficulties for subjective ethical decision making but the
verdict that Clement and Stormy are incomparable seems more independently motivated.
If we reject the Permutation Principle then we must claim that it is not always logically
possible to find a qualitative duplicate of a world pair under a given permutation, which
is highly implausible. Not only this, but we would still be able to generate incompleteness
among at least some of the world pairs of the kind that I discuss above, unless we make the
even stronger claim that it is never possible to find such qualitative duplicates of these pairs.
Finally, if we reject the claim that the < relation is a necessary qualitative relation, then we
must conclude that haecceitistic facts – facts about whether Obama is in a given world or
not, for example – can determine the ethical ranking of worlds. The idea that haecceitistic
facts could play this kind of role in ethics seems highly objectionable. Even if it were to be
adopted, however, it is not clear how much good it would do us. Suppose we were to claim
that haecceitistic facts are essential for the ethical ranking of worlds. This would prevent us
from claiming that if 〈w3, w4〉 is qualitatively identical to 〈w1, w2〉 then w1 < w2 if and only
if w3 < w4. But it is not clear how we could use haecceitistic facts to construct a positive
ethical theory that would allow us to rank infinite worlds like Clement and Stormy.
In light of this, I believe that we must retain all four of the axioms I have formulated and
reject the completeness axiom. This means that we must accept that infinite world pairs like
Clement and Stormy, Mansion and Shack, and Optimistic Cube and Pessimistic cube are
genuinely incomparable. In this chapter I have used just a few illustrative examples of world
pairs that are incomparable if we accept Pareto, the qualitativeness of <, the Permutation
Principle, and transitivity. In the next chapter I will generalize these results. I show that




In this chapter I formulate the general conditions that entail two worlds are incomparable by
the kind of ‘four world’ argument given in the previous chapter. I in section 3.1 I demonstrate
that many classes of world pairs with disjoint populations are incomparable by four world
arguments. In section 3.2 I extend these results to world pairs with identical populations.
In section 3.3 I offer a general four world result that applies to world pairs with disjoint,
identical, and overlapping populations. In section 3.4 I show that certain world pairs cannot
be shown to be incomparable by a four world argument but their incomparability is entailed
by the axioms of the previous chapter via what I call a ‘cyclic argument’. I then formulate
the general conditions that entail two worlds are incomparable by a cyclic argument.
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3.1 Incomparability in Disjoint Population Pairs
In the previous chapter I focused on world pairs in which agents had only two utility levels:
happy or miserable. This is clearly an idealization since agents can be happy or sad to
varying degrees. In this chapter I will assume that agents can have any real-valued level of
utility and that we can measure agents’ utility levels on a common interval scale.162 I will
focus on total lifetime utility levels rather than utility levels at a time. So an agent whose
entire life comprises three days at utility 2 in world w1 has a lifetime utility level of 6.
To begin with, we can continue to focus on infinite world pairs that have disjoint populations.
Consider the following disjoint population world pair. World w1 contains infinitely many
agents in A at utility level 1 and infinitely many agents in C at utility 2, while w2 contains
infinitely many agents in B at utility level 3 and infinitely many agents in D at utility 2:
A B C D
w1 1 – 2 –
w2 – 3 – 2
Figure 48: Disjoint worlds with utilities outside the [0,1] interval
It will be helpful for us to introduce the concept of a bijection that is a ‘strict upgrade’ of
the population of world w1. Let pl(w1) denote the population of world w1 and let uw1(x)
denote the utility that agent x has in world w1. A strict upgrade from the population of one
world to the population of another world can be defined as follows:
Strict Upgrade
A bijection g from pl(w1) to pl(w2) is a strict upgrade from pl(w1) to pl(w2) iff for all agents
x in w1, uw1(x) ≤ uw2(g(x)) and for some agent x in w1, uw1(x) < uw2(g(x))
162Here I will not assume that utility has a privileged zero point but I will return to this issue in the next
chapter where I defend the existence of a privileged zero point for utility. Although I am most sympathetic to
a welfarist account of utility in line with that defended by Ng [171] and others, I will try to remain agnostic
about what grounds utilities, as long as it is consistent with the properties I ascribe to utilities here.
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We can perform a strict upgrade of the population of w1 above by mapping every agent in
set A that has utility 1 in w1 onto an agent in set B that has utility 3 in w2 and mapping
every agent in set C that has utility 2 in w1 onto an agent in set D that has utility 2 in w2.
Let g be a bijection from the population of w1 to the population of w2 such that g(ai) = bi,
so that g is a strict upgrade of the population of w1. Let f be a permutation of the agents
of 〈w1, w2〉 such that f(x) = g(x) if x exists at w1 and f(x) = g−1(x) if x exists at w2. By
the Permutation Principle, we can find a world pair 〈w3, w4〉 that is a qualitative duplicate
of 〈w1, w2〉 under the permutation f . We can depict this permutation as follows:
A B C D
w1 1 – 2 –
w2 – 3 – 2
w3 – 1 – 2
w4 3 – 2 –
Figure 49: A strict upgrade from w1 to w2
Notice that world w2 is strictly better than world w3 by Pareto and world w4 is strictly
better than world w1 by Pareto. If w1 < w2 then w3 < w4 by the qualitativeness of <. So
w1 6< w2 by transitivity.
I will show that this generalizes: if w1 and w2 have disjoint populations and there is a strict
upgrade from the population of w1 to the population of w2 then we can show that w1 6< w2.163
Result 1: Disjoint Pair 6< by a Four World Argument
If w1 and w2 have disjoint populations and there is a strict upgrade from pl(w1) to pl(w2)
then w1 6< w2.
To show this, suppose that w1 and w2 have disjoint populations and there exists a strict
upgrade g from the population of w1 to the population of w2. Since such a bijection exists, the
163These conditions are in fact necessary and sufficient for there to be a four world argument showing that
w1 6< w2, but I will only establish sufficiency here.
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populations of w1 and w2 must be equinumerous. Define a permutation f of the populations
of w1 and w2 as follows: f(x) = g(x) if x exists at w1 and f(x) = g
−1(x) if x exists
at w2. Since the populations of w1 and w2 are disjoint, this results in a permutation of
pl(〈w1, w2〉). By the Permutation Principle, we can find a pair of worlds 〈w3, w4〉 that is a
qualitative duplicate under f . But it follows from Pareto that w2  w3 and w4  w1. Given







Figure 50: Transitivity violation in disjoint world pairs with a strict upgrade
To show that world w2 is strictly better than w3 by Pareto, note that for all agents x that
exist in w1, agent g(x) exists at w3 and so worlds w2 and w3 have identical populations.
Since 〈w3, w4〉 is a qualitative duplicate of 〈w1, w2〉 under f , the qualitative properties of
each agent x in w1 are the same as the qualitative properties of f(x) in w3. In particular,
the utility of agent x in w1 is the same as the utility of f(x) at w3. Since there is some agent
x in w1 such that u(x) < u(g(x)) there will be some agent g(x) in w3 that contains strictly
less utility than agent g(x) in w2 does. And since all other agents x in w1 are such that
u(x) ≤ u(g(x)), there will be no agent g(x) in w3 that contains strictly greater utility than
any agent g(x) in w2 does. Therefore world w2 is strictly better than w3 by Pareto.
To show that w4  w1 by Pareto, note that for all agents x that exist in w2, agent g−1(x)
exists at w4 and so worlds w4 and w1 have identical populations. Since 〈w3, w4〉 is a qualitative
duplicate of 〈w1, w2〉 under f , the qualitative properties of each agent x in w2 are the same as
the qualitative properties of f(x) at w4. In particular, the utility of agent x in w2 is the same
as the utility of f(x) in w4. Since there is some agent x in w2 such that u(x) > u(g
−1(x))
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there will be some agent g−1(x) in w1 that contains strictly less utility than agent x in w4
does. And since all other agents x in w2 are such that u(x) ≥ u(g−1(x)), there will be
no agent g−1(x) in w4 that contains strictly less utility than any agent g
−1(x) in w1 does.
Therefore world w4 is strictly better than w1 by Pareto.
This establishes Result 1. Given this, it is easy to show the following:
Result 2: Disjoint Pair Incomparability by a Four World Argument
If w1 and w2 have disjoint populations and there is a strict upgrade from pl(w1) to pl(w2) and
there is a strict upgrade from pl(w2) to pl(w1) then w1 and w2 are incomparable (w1 4
< w2).
If w1 and w2 have disjoint populations and there is a strict upgrade from pl(w1) to pl(w2)
and there is a strict upgrade from pl(w2) to pl(w1) then w1 6< w2 by Result 1 and w2 6< w1
by Result 1. Therefore w1 and w2 are incomparable (w1 4
< w2).
I have now established that if w1 and w2 have disjoint populations and there exists a strict
upgrade from the population of w1 to the population of w2 and there exists a strict upgrade
from the population of w2 to the population of w1 then w1 and w2 are incomparable.
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Next I will show that certain properties are sufficient for there to exist both a strict upgrade
from pl(w1) to pl(w2) and a strict upgrade from pl(w2) to pl(w1).
Result 3: A Sufficient Condition for Disjoint Pair Incomparability
If w1 and w2 have countable disjoint populations and both worlds have infinitely many agents
at utility level n and infinitely many agents at utility level m, where n < m and no agents
with utility levels less than n or greater than m then w1 and w2 are incomparable.
To establish Result 3, it is sufficient to show that if w1 and w2 have countable disjoint
populations and both worlds have infinitely many agents at utility level n and infinitely
164It should be clear from the argument above that if there is a weak but not a strict upgrade from the
population of w1 to the population of w2 – i.e. there is no agent x that has strictly less utility in w1 than
f(x) is in w2 – then we can show by a four world argument that w1  w2.
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many agents at utility level m, where n < m and no agents with utility levels less than
n or greater than m, then there exists a strict upgrade g from the population of w1 to
the population of w2 and there exists a strict upgrade h from the population of w2 to the
population of w1.
To show that there will exist a strict upgrade g from the population of w1 to the population
of w2, we’re first going to split the lowest utility agents in w1 into two infinite sets – A1 and
A2. We’re also going to split the highest utility agents in w2 into two infinite sets – B1 and
B2. Let g be a mapping from all of the agents in A1 in w1 onto all of the agents in B1 in w2.
So g(A1) = B1 where, for all agents in a ∈ A1 and b ∈ B1, u(a) < u(b).
Let C1 be the remaining agents that are in w1 that are not in A1 or A2. There are countably
infinitely many agents in C1 and their utilities are all strictly greater than the lowest level
and less than or equal to the highest utility level. Let C2 be the remaining agents that are
in w2 that are not in B2. Their utilities are strictly less than the utility highest level and
less than or equal to the lowest utility level. Let g map all of the agents in A2 in w1 onto
all of the agents in C2 in w2. Let g map all of the agents in C1 in w1 onto all of the agents
in B2 in w2. So g(A2) = C2 where, for all agents in a ∈ A2 and c ∈ C2, u(a) ≤ u(c). And
g(C1) = B2 where, for all agents in c ∈ C1 and b ∈ B2, u(c) ≤ u(b).
Each agent in w1 is now mapped onto an agent in w2 by g and each agent in w2 is mapped by
g−1 onto an agent in w1. Therefore g is a bijection from pl(w1) to pl(w2) such that for some
agent x, uw1(x) < uw2(g(x)) and for all agents y, uw1(y) ≤ uw2(g(y)). This shows that if w1
and w2 have countable disjoint populations and both worlds have infinitely many agents at
utility level n and infinitely many agents at utility level m, where n < m and no agents with
utility levels less than n or greater than m, then there will exist a strict upgrade g from w1
to w2. Therefore w1 6< w2.
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We can use the same method to find a strict upgrade h from the population of w2 to the
population of w1. It follows that w2 6< w1. Therefore w1 and w2 are ethically incomparable.
This establishes Result 3. All disjoint population worlds in which infinitely many agents
have the same upper level of utility and infinitely many agents have the same lower level
of utility are incomparable. This includes disjoint population world pairs like Clement and
Stormy that have two utility levels and infinitely many agent at each utility level. But it
also includes world pairs in which agents have more than one utility level. Consider worlds
w1 and w2 that both contain infinitely many agents at utility levels 1 and 5, and infinitely
many agents with utility levels between 1 and 5 in the following infinite sets:
A B C X Y Z
w1 1 4 5 – – –
w2 – – – 1 3 5
Figure 51: A world pair with distinct ‘inner’ utility levels
There is a strict upgrade g from the population of w1 to the population of w2 and there is a
strict upgrade h from the population of w2 to the population of w1. To construct g we need
to split the agents in A into two infinite sets of agents, A1 and A2 and we need to split the
agents in Z into two infinite sets of agents Z1 and Z2. We can depict bijections g and h as
follows, where an arrow between sets A and X means that each agent ai in set A is mapped
by bijection g onto an agent xi in set X, such that all agents in A in w1 are mapped to an
agent in X in w2 by g and all agents in X in w2 are mapped to an agent (the same agent)



















Define a permutation f1 of the populations of w1 and w2 as follows: f1(x) = g(x) if x exists
at w1 and f(x) = g
−1(x) if x exists at w2. Define a permutation f2 of the populations of
w1 and w2 as follows: f2(x) = h(x) if x exists at w2 and f(x) = h
−1(x) if x exists at w1.
Let 〈w3, w4〉 be a qualitative duplicate of 〈w1, w2〉 under f1 and let 〈w5, w6〉 be a qualitative
duplicate of 〈w1, w2〉 under f2. These word pairs are as follows:
A1 A2 B C X Y Z1 Z2
w1 1 1 4 5 – – – –
w2 – – – – 1 3 5 5
w3 – – – – 1 1 4 5
w4 1 3 5 5 – – – –
A B C X Y Z
w1 1 4 5 – – –
w2 – – – 1 3 5
w5 – – – 1 4 5
w6 1 3 5 – – –
Figure 52: Permutations showing that world pairs with distinct inner utility levels are in-
comparable
We can see that 〈w3, w4〉 shows that w1 6< w2 given our auxiliary premises and 〈w5, w6〉
shows that w2 6< w1 given our auxiliary premises, as expected.
Result 3 is limited in various respects. It does not apply to world pairs in which all agents
have the same utility levels, or pairs that don’t contain infinitely many agents with utilities
equal to the upper and lower utility level, or pairs in which there are agents at utility levels
strictly less than or strictly greater than these endpoints.165 It also does not apply to world
165We can offer a modest extension of Result 3 in such cases. If w1 and w2 have finitely many agents
strictly less than n and strictly greater than m and there still exists a bijection g from w1 to w2 that satisfies
(a) and (b) then w1 6< w2. This means that if, for every agent at utility level i outside of the interval [n,m] in
w1 there is an agent with utility i in w2 and vice versa, then we can show that these worlds are incomparable.
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pairs with uncountable populations, unbounded utilities, or non-equinumerous populations.
However, the goal is not to establish all of the conditions that are sufficient for disjoint worlds
to be incomparable by a four world argument, but to show that many disjoint world pairs
can be shown to be incomparable by a four world argument. Result 3 shows this.
3.2 Incomparability in Identical Population Pairs
So far I have only considered world pairs with disjoint populations. We can also show that
many pairs of worlds with identical populations – worlds that contain exactly the same
agents – are incomparable by a four world argument. Consider the worlds w1 and w2 that
contain the same infinite sets of agents with the following utility levels:
A B C
w1 1 3 7
w2 7 4 1
Figure 53: An identical population world pair with distinct inner utility levels
We can show that w1 and w2 are incomparable by a four world argument. Let us split the
agents in set A into infinitely many A1 agents and infinitely many A2 agents, and let us split
the agents in set C into infinitely many C1 agents and infinitely many C2 agents. Consider
bijections g and h on A ∪ B ∪ C as follows, where an arrow between sets X and Y means




















Let 〈w3, w4〉 be a qualitative duplicate of 〈w1, w2〉 under g and let 〈w5, w6〉 be a qualitative
duplicate of 〈w1, w2〉 under h. These world pairs are as follows:
A1 A2 B C
w1 1 1 3 7
w2 7 7 4 1
w3 1 7 3 1
w4 7 1 4 7
A B C1 C2
w1 1 3 7 7
w2 7 4 1 1
w5 7 7 3 1
w6 1 1 4 7
Figure 54: Permutations showing that identical population pairs with distinct inner utility
levels are incomparable
We can see that 〈w3, w4〉 shows that w1 6< w2 given our auxiliary premises. For assume
w1 < w2. Then w2  w3 by Pareto, w3 < w4 by the qualitativeness of <, and w4  w1
by Pareto, violating transitivity. We can also see that 〈w5, w6〉 shows that w2 6< w1 by
our auxiliary premises. For assume w2 < w1. Then w1  w6 by Pareto, w6 < w5 by the
qualitativeness of <, and w5  w2 by Pareto, violating transitivity.
If w1 and w2 have identical populations then in order to show that world w1 is not at least
as good as w2 by a four world argument, it must be the case that these exists a bijection
g on the relevant set of agents such that (i) for all agents x, uw1(x) is less than or equal
to uw2(g(x)) for all x in w1 and all g(x) in w2 and (ii) for some agent x, uw1(x) is strictly
less than uw2(g(x)). To see why we need (i), suppose that in the case above each agent in
A had utility 2 in w1 instead of utility 1. If this were the case then we would be unable to
show that w1 is not at least as good as w2 by a four world argument because it would not
be possible for w2 to better than any qualitative duplicate of w1 by Pareto since w2 contains
some agents at utility 1 (the agents in C) while duplicates of w1 would contain only agents
with utility strictly greater than 1. And we need (ii) to guarantee that w3 can be strictly
rather than just weakly better than w2 by Pareto.
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If w1 and w2 have identical populations then this is not all we need to show that world w1
is not at least as good as w2 by a four world argument, however. To see why, consider the
following identical population pair of infinite worlds 〈w1, w2〉:
X1 X2 Y Z1 Z2
w1 0 0 1 1 1
w2 0 0 1 1 1
Figure 55: Identical population world pair with identical utilities










A bijection that maps an infinite subset of the agents in X in w1 onto all the agents in X in
w2 and that maps all the agents in Z in w1 onto an infinite subset of the agents in Z in w2 is
possible because infinite sets can be equinumerous with their proper subsets. For example,
the set of all even numbers can be mapped one-to-one onto the set of all natural numbers.
Bijection g is a strict upgrade from pl(w1) to pl(w2), i.e. for some x, uw1(x) < uw2(g(x)) –
since for all x in X2 and all y in Y , uw1(x) < uw2(y) – and for all x, uw1(x) ≤ uw2(g(x)). But
consider the world pair 〈w3, w3〉 that is a qualitative duplicate of 〈w1, w2〉 under f :
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X1 X2 Y Z1 Z2
w1 0 0 1 1 1
w2 0 0 1 1 1
w3 0 0 0 1 1
w4 0 0 0 1 1
Figure 56: Permuting the populations of an identical population, identical utility world pair
We can see that w2  w3 by Pareto. But Pareto does not entail that w4  w1. In fact,
it entails that w1  w4! World w4 is not better than w1 by Pareto because there is some
agent x in w1 such that uw1(x) > uw2(f
−1(x)). Specifically, for all y in Y and for all x in
X2, uw1(y) is strictly greater than uw2(x). This means that if w4 is a qualitative duplicate
of w2 under g then because uw2(f
−1(x)) is strictly less than uw1(x), it must be the case that
uw4(f(f
−1(x)) is strictly less than uw1(x). But since u(f(f
−1(x)) = x, this means uw4(x) is
strictly less than uw1(x), which entails that w4 cannot be at least as good as w1 by Pareto.
So if w1 and w2 have identical populations then in order to show that w1 is not at least
as good as w2 by a four world argument, we must supplement (i) and (ii) with a further
condition: for all agents x, the utility that x has in w1 is less than or equal to the utility that
g−1(x) has in w2. It is easy to see that this condition is satisfied by the bijections g and h
in the case above this one. In fact, in that case there was nothing to stop us from choosing
both of these function in such a way that they were their own inverses.
In this case, however, it is not possible to find a bijection from the population of w1 to the
population of w2 that satisfies all three of these conditions. Because the agents of 〈w1, w2〉
have the same utility at w1 and w2, and bijection such that uw1(x) < uw2(g(x)) must also be
such that uw1(g(x)) > uw2(g
−1(g(x))). Therefore we cannot show that w1 is not at least as
good as w2 by a four world argument. This is what we would expect since if we could find
such a bijection from the population of w1 to the population of w2, we would be able to use
124
such a bijection to show that w1 is not at least as good as itself by a four world argument.
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In light of this, it will be helpful to define a strengthened notion of a strict upgrade. We can
define a ‘bidirectional upgrade’ from pl(w1) to pl(w2) as follows:
Bidirectional Upgrade
A bijection g from pl(w1) to pl(w2) is a bidirectional upgrade from pl(w1) to pl(w2) iff (i) for
all agents x ∈ pl(w1), uw1(x) ≤ uw2(g(x)), (ii) for all agents x ∈ pl(w2), uw1(x) ≤ uw2(g−1(x)),
and (iii) for some agent x in w1, uw1(x) < uw2(g(x))
I will now show that if w1 and w2 have identical populations and there is a bidirectional
upgrade from pl(w1) to pl(w2) then w1 6< w2 by a four world argument.
Result 4: Identical Pair 6< by a Four World Argument
If w1 and w2 have identical populations and there is a bidirectional upgrade from pl(w1) to
pl(w2) then w1 6< w2.
To establish result 4 we employ a line of argument that is now familiar. Suppose that w1 and
w2 have identical populations and there exists a bidirectional upgrade g from the population
of w1 to the population of w2. Since g is a bijection from the population of w1 to the
population of w2 and the populations of w1 and w2 are identical, g is a permutation the
populations of 〈w1, w2〉. By the Permutation Principle, we can find a pair of worlds 〈w3, w4〉
that is a qualitative duplicate of 〈w1, w2〉 under g, such that w2  w3 and w4 < w1 by Pareto.
To show that world w2 is strictly better than w3 by Pareto, note that since g is a bijection from
the population of w1 to the population of w2, worlds w2 and w3 have identical populations.
Since 〈w3, w4〉 is a qualitative duplicate of 〈w1, w2〉 under g, the qualitative properties of
166This is exactly the sort of case that shows that, if we accept the Permutation Principle, Pareto is not
consistent with the claim that < is an internal relation. However, w1 ∼ w1 by Pareto and so any qualitative
duplicate of the pair 〈w1, w1〉 will also be equally good by Pareto. So if < is not internal, it doesn’t matter
if both members of the qualitative duplicate pair are strictly worse (or better) than w1 by Pareto.
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each agent x in w1 are the same as the qualitative properties of g(x) in w3. In particular,
the utility of agent x in w1 is the same as the utility of g(x) at w3. Since there is some
agent x such that uw1(x) < uw2(g(x)) there will be some agent g(x) in w3 that contains
strictly less utility than the agent g(x) in w2 does. Since all agents x in w1 are such that
uw1(x) ≤ uw2(g(x)) there will be no agent g(x) in w3 that contains strictly greater utility
than any agent g(x) in w2 does. Therefore world w2 is strictly better than w3 by Pareto.
To show that w4 < w1 by Pareto, note that since g is a bijection from the population of
w1 to the population of w2, worlds w4 and w1 have identical populations. Since 〈w3, w4〉 is
a qualitative duplicate of 〈w1, w2〉 under g, the qualitative properties of each agent x in w2
are the same as the qualitative properties of g(x) in w4. In particular, the utility of agent
x in w2 is the same as the utility of g(x) at w4. Since every agent x in w2 are such that
uw2(g
−1(x)) ≥ uw1(x), every agent g(g−1(x)) in w4 also has at least as much utility as agent
x in w1 has. Since g(g
−1(x)) = x, it follows that w4 is at least as good as w1 by Pareto.
We assumed that w1 < w2. Since 〈w3, w4〉 is a qualitative duplicate of 〈w1, w2〉 under g, it
follows that w3 < w4 by the qualitativeness of <. But w2  w3 and w4 < w1 by Pareto.







Figure 57: Transitivity violation in identical population world pair with a bidirectional
upgrade
It follows that identical population worlds are ethically incomparable – w1 4
< w2 – if there
exists a bidirectional upgrade from the agents of w1 to the agents of w2 and there exists a
bidirectional upgrade from the agents of w2 to the agents of w1.
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Result 5: Identical Pair Incomparability by a Four World Argument
If w1 and w2 have identical populations and there is a bidirectional upgrade from pl(w1)
to pl(w2) and there is a bidirectional upgrade from pl(w2) to pl(w1) then w1 and w2 are
incomparable (w1 4
< w2).
If w1 and w2 have identical populations and there is a bidirectional upgrade from pl(w1) to
pl(w2) and there is a bidirectional upgrade from pl(w2) to pl(w1) then w1 6< w2 by Result 4
and w2 6< w1 by Result 4. Therefore w1 and w2 are incomparable (w1 4< w2).
Notice that we do not require that both w2  w3 and w4  w1 by Pareto to show that
w1 6< w2 by a four world argument in the claims above – it is sufficient to show that w2  w3
and w4 < w1. For example, consider the following two worlds w1 and w2:
A B C D
w1 0 2 0 0
w2 0 0 2 2
Figure 58: A further example of an identical population world pair












Let 〈w3, w4〉 be a qualitative duplicate of 〈w1, w2〉 under g. The utilities of the agents of the
pair 〈w3, w4〉 are as follows:
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A1 A2 B1 B2 C D
w1 0 0 2 2 0 0
w2 0 0 0 0 2 2
w3 0 0 0 0 2 0
w4 0 0 2 2 0 0
Figure 59: A permutation showing that w1 6< w2
In this case w1 < w2 by hypothesis, w2  w3 by Pareto, w3 < w4 by the qualitativeness of
< and w4 < w1 by Pareto. This violates transitivity and so w1 6< w2.
As with disjoint population worlds, I will not formulate further conditions that are necessary
and sufficient for there to be a strict upgrade from w1 to w2 and a strict upgrade from w2
to w1 in identical population cases. But I will, as an example, show that a class of identical
population world pairs are incomparable. Let us say that there is a ‘utility isomorphism’
between a set of agents in w1 and a set of agents in w2 if and only if there exists a bijection
g from the set of agents in w1 to the set of agents in w2 such that, for all agents x, iff g(x)
exists in w1 and uw1(x) = uw2(g(x)) and uw2(x) = uw1(g(x)).
167 Given this, we can show
that the following identical population world pairs are incomparable:
Result 6: A Sufficient Condition for Identical Population Pair Incomparability
If w1 and w2 have countable identical populations and there is an infinite set of agents x
in 〈w1, w2〉 such that uw1(x) = n and uw2(x) = m and there is an infinite set of agents
y in 〈w1, w2〉 such that uw2(y) = n and uw1(y) = m, where n < m, and there is a utility
isomorphism between the remaining agents of w1 and w2, then w1 and w2 are incomparable.
To establish Result 6, we use the same familiar reasoning employed in the results above to
show that if w1 and w2 have countable identical populations and there is an infinite set of
167If we assume that an existing agent cannot have the same utility as a non-existing agent, this entails
that x exists in w1 iff g(x) exists in w2 and x exists in w2. In the next chapter, however, I consider the view
that we should treat non-existing agents as we would treat agents with utility zero lives.
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agents x in 〈w1, w2〉 such that uw1(x) = n and uw2(x) = m and there is an infinite set of agents
y in 〈w1, w2〉 such that uw2(y) = n and uw1(y) = m, where n > m, and there is a utility
isomorphism between the remaining agents of w1 or w2, then there exists a bidirectional
upgrade g from the population of w1 to the population of w2 an there exists a bidirectional
upgrade h from the population of w2 to the population of w1.
To show that there will exist a bidirectional upgrade g from the population of w1 to the
population of w2, let X be the set of agents at utility n in w1 and utility m in w2 and let Y
be the set of agents at utility m in w1 and utility n in w2 and let Z be the set of all remaining
agents in w1. We split the Y -agents into two infinite sets – Y1 and Y2. Next, for all x ∈ X
and for all y ∈ Y2, let g(x) = y, for all y ∈ Y1, let g(y) = y. For all y ∈ Y2 and for all x ∈ X,
let g(y) = x. And for all zi ∈ Z, let g(zi) = zj for some zj ∈ Z such that uw1(zi) = uw2(zj).
Since the agents in X, Y1, Y2 and Z comprise all of the agents in 〈w1, w2〉, g is a bijection from
the population of 〈w1, w2〉 onto itself. Since uw1(y ∈ Y1) = m < uw2(y ∈ Y1) = n, bijection g
is such that for some agent x, uw1(x) < uw2(g(x)). Since uw1(x ∈ X) = n ≤ uw2(y ∈ Y2) = n,
uw1(y ∈ Y1) = m ≤ uw2(y ∈ Y1) = n, uw1(y ∈ Y2) = m ≤ uw2(x ∈ X) = m, and
uw1(z ∈ Z) = uw2(z ∈ Z), bijection g is such that uw2(x) ≤ uw2(g(x)) for all agents x.
Since for all x, g−1(x) = g(x), uw1(x) ≤ uw2(g−1(x)) for all x. Therefore bijection g is a
bidirectional upgrade from pl(w1) to pl(w2). This entails that w1 6< w2.
Since worlds w2 and w1 have the same properties that let us find a bidirectional upgrade g
from the population of w1 to the population of w2, we can use the same method to find a
bidirectional upgrade h from the population of w2 to the population of w1. It follows that
w2 6< w1. Therefore w1 and w2 are ethically incomparable.
This establishes Result 6. If w1 and w2 have countable identical populations and there is
an infinite set of agents x in 〈w1, w2〉 such that uw1(x) = n and uw2(x) = m and there is an
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infinite set of agents y in 〈w1, w2〉 such that uw2(y) = n and uw1(y) = m, where n < m, and
there are no other agents in w1 or w2, then w1 and w2 are incomparable.
Result 6 does not pick out all of the identical population world pairs that are incomparable
by a four world argument. However, it is sufficient to show that if we accept Pareto, the
qualitativeness of <, the Permutation Principle and transitivity, then many infinite world
pairs with identical populations are ethically incomparable.
3.3 The General Four World Result
In the previous two sections I offered sufficient conditions for w1 and w2 to be incomparable
by a four world argument if they have disjoint or identical populations. In this section I will
formulate general conditions that entail that w1 and w2 can be shown to be incomparable
by a four world argument, regardless of whether their populations are identical, disjoint, or
overlapping. I will focus primarily on world pairs with overlapping populations (with shared
and unshared agents) in this section, since these have yet to be discussed.
Overlapping world pairs contain some shared and some unshared agents. If the population of
w1 is a proper subset of the population of w2 then w1 and w2 have overlapping populations.
If w1 and w2 both contain some shared and some unshared agents then w1 and w2 are also
overlapping populations. The following worlds are an overlapping population of the latter
sort, where a dash (–) indicates that an agent does not exist:
A B C D
w1 4 2 1 –
w2 2 4 – 1
Figure 60: A world pair with overlapping populations
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We can show that w1 4
< w2 by a four world argument in the case above because there is a
strict upgrade from the shared agents of 〈w1, w2〉 in w1 to the shared agents of 〈w1, w2〉 in
w1, and there is a utility isomorphism between the unshared agents of 〈w1, w2〉 in w1 and
the unshared agents of 〈w1, w2〉 in w1. Consider the bijection g from the agents of world w1
to the agents of world w2 and the bijection h from the agents of world w2 to the agents of
world w1, where we divide the agents in set A into the infinite sets A1 and A2 and we divide























Let 〈w3, w4〉 be a qualitative duplicate of 〈w1, w2〉 under bijection g and let 〈w5, w6〉 be a
qualitative duplicate of 〈w1, w2〉 under bijection h. The utilities of the agents of the pairs
〈w3, w4〉 and 〈w5, w6〉 are as follows:
A B1 B2 C D
w1 4 2 2 1 –
w2 2 4 4 – 1
w3 2 2 4 – 1
w4 4 4 2 1 –
A1 A2 B C D
w1 4 4 2 1 –
w2 2 2 4 – 1
w5 2 4 4 – 1
w6 4 2 2 1 –
Figure 61: Permutations showing that the overlapping population world pair is incomparable
We can see that 〈w3, w4〉 shows that w1 6< w2 by a four world argument and 〈w5, w6〉 shows
that w2 6< w1 by a four world argument. Therefore we can show that overlapping population
pairs of worlds like w1 and w2 are incomparable by a four world argument.
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We can now show the conditions that are sufficient to show that w1 and w2 are incomparable
by a four world argument, whether their populations are identical, disjoint, or overlapping.168
Result 7: Four World w1 6< w2 (FW6<)
If there exists a bidirectional upgrade g from from pl(w1) to pl(w2) then w1 6< w2.
To establish Result 7, we once again suppose that there exists a bidirectional upgrade g
from the population of w1 to the population of w2. Since g is such that x ∈ pl(w1) iff
g(x) ∈ pl(w2) and x ∈ pl(w2) iff g(x) ∈ pl(w1), it follows that the shared populations of
w1 and w2 are equinumerous and the unshared populations of w1 and w2 are equinumerous.
Define a permutation f of the populations of w1 and w2 as follows: f(x) = g(x) if x exists
at w1 and f(x) = g
−1(x) if x exists at w2 but does not exist at w1. Since f(x) = g(x) for
all shared agents of w1 and w2, f(x) = g(x) for all agents that exist in w1 but not w2 and
f(x) = g−1(x) for all agents that exist in w2 but not w1, this results in a permutation the
populations of 〈w1, w2〉. By the Permutation Principle, we can find a pair of worlds 〈w3, w4〉
that is a qualitative duplicate of 〈w1, w2〉 under g such that w2  w3 and w4 < w1 by Pareto.
To show that world w2 is strictly better than w3 by Pareto, note that since x ∈ pl(w1) iff
g(x) ∈ pl(w2), worlds w2 and w3 have identical populations (g(x) exists in w2 iff g(x) exists
in w3). Since 〈w3, w4〉 is a qualitative duplicate of 〈w1, w2〉 under g, the qualitative properties
of each agent x in w1 are the same as the qualitative properties of g(x) in w3. In particular,
the utility of agent x in w1 is the same as the utility of g(x) at w3. Since there is some
agent x such that uw1(x) < uw2(g(x)) there will be some agent g(x) in w3 that contains
strictly less utility than the agent g(x) in w2 does. Since all agents x in w1 are such that
uw1(x) ≤ uw2(g(x)) there will be no agent g(x) in w3 that contains strictly greater utility
than any agent g(x) in w2 does. Therefore world w2 is strictly better than w3 by Pareto.
168If w1 and w2 are disjoint then if there exists a g satisfying (d), there exists a g satisfying (e).
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To show that w4 < w1 by Pareto, note that since x ∈ pl(w2) iff g(x) ∈ pl(w1), worlds w4
and w1 have identical populations (g(x) exists in w4 iff g(x) exists in w1). Since 〈w3, w4〉 is
a qualitative duplicate of 〈w1, w2〉 under g, the qualitative properties of each agent x in w2
are the same as the qualitative properties of g(x) in w4. In particular, the utility of agent
x in w2 is the same as the utility of g(x) at w4. Since every agent x in w2 are such that
uw2(g
−1(x)) ≥ uw1(x), every agent g(g−1(x)) in w4 also has at least as much utility as agent
x in w1 has. Since g(g
−1(x)) = x, it follows that w4 is at least as good as w1 by Pareto.







Figure 62: Transitivity violation in a world pair with a bidirectional upgrade
Therefore w1 6< w2, contrary to our assumption.
We can now summarize the general incomparability result as follows:
Result 8: Four World Incomparability (FW 4
< )
If there exists a bidirectional upgrade g from pl(w1) to pl(w2) and there exists a bidirectional
upgrade g from pl(w2) to pl(w1) then w1 4
< w2
If there exists a bidirectional upgrade g from pl(w1) to pl(w2) then w1 6< w2 by Result 7.
If there exists a bidirectional upgrade g from pl(w2) to pl(w1) then w2 6< w1 by Result 7.
Therefore if there exists a bidirectional upgrade g from pl(w1) to pl(w2) and there exists a
bidirectional upgrade g from pl(w2) to pl(w1) then w1 and w2 are ethically incomparable.
It follows from this that the following overlapping population pairs can be shown to be
incomparable by a four world argument:
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Result 9: A Sufficient Condition for Overlapping Pair Incomparability
If w1 and w2 have countable, non-empty populations and the unshared population of 〈w1, w2〉
meet the conditions of Result 3 and the shared population of 〈w1, w2〉 meet the conditions of
Result 6 then w1 and w2 are incomparable.
To show this, let g be a bijection from the shared agents of 〈w1, w2〉 that exist in w1 to
the shared agents of 〈w1, w2〉 that exist in w2 that has the same properties as the bijection
between identical populations in Result 6. Let h be a bijection from the unshared agents of
〈w1, w2〉 that exist in w1 to the shared agents of 〈w1, w2〉 that exist in w2 that has the same
properties as the bijection between identical populations in Result 3 (note that if w1 and
w2 contain no shared agents then g is just the empty function). And let h
−1 be a bijection
from the unshared agents of 〈w1, w2〉 that exist in w2 to the shared agents of 〈w1, w2〉 that
exist in w2 that is the inverse of h (note that if w1 and w2 contain no unshared agents then
h and h−1 are just the empty function). Let f be the composite bijection g ◦ h ◦ h−1. The
bijection f is a permutation of the population of 〈w1, w2〉. By Result 3 and Result 6, a
qualitative duplicate of 〈w1, w2〉 under f – 〈w3, w4〉 – will be such that w2  w3 by Pareto
and w4  w1 by Pareto. Therefore w1 6< w2 by transitivity. We can use the same method to
find a permutation of 〈w1, w2〉 to show that w2 6< w1. Therefore w1 and w2 are incomparable.
We can also extend Result 9 to world pairs that have countable, non-empty populations
whose shared population meets the conditions of Result 6 or whose unshared population
meets the conditions of Result 9 as long as there is a utility isomorphism between the
remaining agents of world w1 and world w2. If this is the case then if the shared population
of 〈w1, w2〉 meet the conditions of Result 6 we can define g as above and if the unshared
population of 〈w1, w2〉 meet the conditions of Result 3 then we can define h and h−1 as above,
and all remaining agents x in w1 are mapped by g2 to agents with isomorphic utility in w2
and all remaining agents x in w2 are mapped by g
−1
2 to an agent with isomorphic utility in
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w1.
169 This is exactly what we did in the case of w1 and w2 at the beginning of this section.
I have now formulated conditions that are sufficient for there to be a four world argument
showing that w1 4
<w2, regardless of whether w1 and w2 have identical, disjoint, or overlapping
populations. I have also shown that many identical, disjoint, and overlapping population
pairs are incomparable by a four world argument. In the next section, however, I will show
that not all worlds that are incomparable by Pareto, transitivity, the qualitativeness of <,
and the Permutation Principle are incomparable by a four world argument. I introduce a
new argument – the cyclic argument – that can be used to show that an even broader class
of world pairs whose incomparability is entailed by these four axioms.
3.4 The Cyclic Result
Not all world pairs that are incomparable by Pareto, transitivity, the qualitativeness of <,
and the Permutation Principle are incomparable by a four world argument. It is easiest to
show this by working through an example. Suppose that the agents in w1 and w2 have the
following utility levels, where the utility levels of shared agents are in bold:
A B C D E
w1 1 1 0 – –
w2 0 – – 1 0
Figure 63: Overlapping world pair with distinct utilities at shared population
It is possible to find a bidirectional upgrade from pl(w2) to pl(w1). We divide the set B
into two infinite sets of agents, B1 and B2, and we divide the set E into two infinite sets of
agents, E1 and E2. We then permute the population of 〈w1, w2〉 by the following bijection:
169This means that all overlapping world pairs like the pair 〈w1, w2〉 discussed at the beginning of this
section, which had a shared population that met the conditions of Result 2 and an isomorphic unshared
population, are ethically incomparable.
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Let 〈w3, w4〉 be a qualitative duplicate of 〈w1, w2〉 under f .170 These pairs are as follows:
A B1 B2 C D E1 E2
w1 1 1 1 0 - - -
w2 0 - - - 1 0 0
w3 1 - - - 1 1 0
w4 0 1 0 0 - - -
Figure 64: Permutation showing that w2 6< w2 in pair with distinct utilities at shared
population
We can see that w3  w2 by Pareto and w1  w4 by Pareto. Since 〈w3, w4〉 is a qualitative
duplicate of 〈w1, w2〉 under f , w2 < w1 iff w4 < w3. Therefore w2 6< w1 by transitivity.
It is not possible to find a bidirectional upgrade from pl(w1) to pl(w2), however. To see why,
let g be a bijection that satisfies conditions (a) and (b) of FW6<, which state that x ∈ pl(w1)
iff g(x) ∈ pl(w2) and x ∈ pl(w2) iff g(x) ∈ pl(w1). This means that g must map all agents in
set a onto another agent in set a. But since the agents in set a all have strictly greater utility
in w1 than in w2, we cannot find a qualitative duplicate of 〈w1, w2〉 under any bijection that
satisfies conditions (a) and (b) that is such that w2  w3 by Pareto and w4  w1 by Pareto.
Since agents in A must be mapped onto agents in A by such a bijection, all agents in A will
170For every agent x in w1, f(x) exists in w2. Therefore w2 and w3 will have identical populations. For
every agent x in w2, f(x) exists in w1. Therefore w4 and w1 will have identical populations.
136
have utility 1 in w3 and utility 0 in w4. Therefore w2 cannot be strictly better than w3 by
Pareto and w4 cannot be strictly better than w1 by Pareto. So we cannot show that these
two worlds are incomparable with Pareto using a four-world argument.
This shows that we cannot always find a single permutation of the population of 〈w1, w2〉
that can be used to show that w1 6< w2 by a four world argument. If we use the full strength
of the Permutation Principle, however, we can sometimes find a sequence of qualitative
duplicate pairs 〈w3, w4〉 and 〈w5, w6〉 such that w2 and w3 have identical populations and w4
and w5 have identical populations, and w6 and w1 have identical populations, even though
w1 and w4 have distinct populations. And if there is some sequence of qualitative duplicate
pairs 〈w1, w2〉, 〈w3, w4〉, 〈w5, w6〉, ..., 〈wn−1, wn〉 such that w2  w3 by Pareto, w4  w5 by
Pareto, ..., wn  w1 by Pareto, then it follows that w1 6< w2.
We can illustrate how this kind of ‘cyclic argument’ works using the example above. First,
note that w2 6< w1 by a four world argument. This follows from Result 9, since there is a
bidirectional upgrade from the shared agents of w2 to the shared agents of w1 and there is
a strict upgrade from the unshared agents of w2 to the unshared agents of w1. However,
Result 9 does not entail that w1 6< w2, since there is no bidirectional upgrade from the shared
population of w1 to the shared population of w2 in this example.
To construct a cyclic argument showing that w1 6< w2, we first divide the agents in C in
〈w1, w2〉 into three infinite sets C1, C2, and C3 and the agents in D in 〈w1, w2〉 into three
infinite sets D1, D2, and D3. Let J1, J2, and J3 be three countably infinite sets of agents that
don’t exist in either w1 or w2. The Permutation Principle states that for any bijection f from
the population of 〈w1, w2〉 onto any other population, there exists a world pair 〈w3, w4〉 that
is a qualitative duplicate of 〈w1, w2〉 under f . We can find a bijection from the population of
a world pair that contains the agents of 〈w1, w2〉 plus countably infinitely many J1, J2, and
J3 agents that do not exist in 〈w1, w2〉. Therefore if f is a permutation of the population of
137
〈w1, w2〉 plus infinitely many J1, J2, and J3 agents then, by the Permutation Principle, we
can find a qualitative duplicate of 〈w1, w2〉 under f .
As I stated above, a cyclic argument permutes the population of 〈w1, w2〉 in stages. To show
that w1 6< w2 we need to find a permutation sequence such that 〈w1, w2〉, 〈w3, w4〉, ..., 〈wn−1, wn〉
are qualitative duplicates such that w2  w3, w4  w5, ..., wn−2  wn−1;wn  w1 by Pareto.
In this case, the following bijections f from the agents of 〈w1, w2〉 plus J1, J2, and J3 agents


























As before, the use of set notation here is just a notational convenience. If f maps set X
onto set Y this means that for all x ∈ X and for all y ∈ Y , f(xi) = yi and f−1(yi) = xi.
Let fn be the reapplication of f n-many times, so that f 3(x) = f(f(f(x))) and f 0(x) = x.
In the case of cyclic arguments we add a further stipulation, namely that if for some n, the
the composite bijection fn maps set X back onto itself, then for all x ∈ X, fn(xi) = xi. In
other words, fn maps all of the individual agents in x back onto themselves.
To help keep track of which worlds are qualitative duplicates of which, I will stop using terms
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like w3 and w4 to refer to qualitative duplicates of w1 and w2. Instead I will use f(wi) to refer
to a world that is a qualitative duplicate of wi but whose population has been permuted by
f . I will also use f(〈wi, wj〉) to refer to a world pair that is a qualitative duplicate of 〈wi, wj〉
but whose population has been permuted by f .
Consider permutation f given above. For all agents x, if x exists in fn(w1), then f(x) exists
at fn(w2) under this permutation. Therefore for all applications of f , f
n+1(w1) will have a
population that is identical to fn−1(w2). The permutation f given above and the utility of
the agents at world pairs f(〈w1, w2〉) and f(f(〈w1, w2〉)) are as follows:
A B C1 C2 C3 D1 D2 D3 E J1 J2 J3
Figure 65: Permutations f(〈w1, w2〉) and f(f(〈w1, w2〉))
A B C1 C2 C3 D1 D2 D3 E J1 J2 J3
w1 1 1 0 0 0 – – – – – –
w2 0 – – – – 1 1 1 0 – – –
f(w1) 0 – – – – 1 0 1 0 – – –
f(w2) – – 1 – – 0 – – – 1 0 1
f(f(w1)) – – 1 – – 0 – – – 0 0 1
f(f(w2)) 1 1 0 1 0 – – – – – – –
Figure 66: Agent utilities in f(〈w1, w2〉) and f(f(〈w1, w2〉))
Suppose, for reductio, that w1 < w2. Since < is a necessary qualitative relation and
f(〈w1, w2〉) is a qualitative duplicate of 〈w1, w2〉 under f , it follows that f(w1) < f(w2).
And since f(f(〈w1, w2〉)) is a qualitative duplicate of 〈w1, w2〉 under f 2 (under f ◦ f) it fol-
lows that f(f(w1)) < f(f(w2). But w2  f(w1) by Pareto and f(w2)  f(f(w1)) by Pareto
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Figure 67: Transitivity violation in a pair with distinct utilities at shared population
Therefore if we accept Pareto, the Permutation Principle, the qualitativeness of < and
transitivity, then w1 6< w2. And since world w2 6< w1 by a four world argument, it follows
that world w1 and world w2 are ethically incomparable (w1 4
< w2).
Let P denote the set of all possible people. We can now formulate conditions that are
sufficient to show w1 6< w2 by a cyclic argument.
Result 10: Cyclic Permutation w1 6< w2 (CP6<)
If there exists an n-cyclic permutation of P that is a strict upgrade from the population of
w1 to the population of w2 and is such that, for all x in w1, f
n+1(x) = x, then w1 6< w2
Claim: If there is an n-cyclic permutation of P that satisfies these conditions then w1 6< w2.
To show this, suppose for reductio that w1 < w2 and there is an n-cyclic permutation f of
P that is a strict upgrade from the population of w1 to the population of w2 and is such
that, for all x in w1, f
n+1(x) = x. By the Permutation Principle, there exists a world pair
f(〈w1, w2〉)) that is a qualitative duplicate of 〈w1, w2〉 under f , and there exists a world
pair f(f(〈w1, w2〉)) that is a qualitative duplicate of f(〈w1, w2〉) under f and so on for any
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iteration of f . Since w1 < w2, it follows from the qualitativeness of < that f(w1) < f(w2),
and f(f(w1)) < f(f(w2)), and so on for any iteration of f .
Since f is a strict upgrade from w1 to w2 it follows that for all agents x, x exists in w1 if and
only if f(x) exists in w2, and f(x) exists in f(w1) if and only if f(f(x)) exists in f(w2), and
so on. Therefore w2 and f(w1) have identical populations, f(w2) and f(f(w1)) have identical
populations, and so on for each qualitative duplicate of 〈w1, w2〉 under an iterate of f .
Since f is a strict upgrade from the population of w1 to the population of w2 it follows
that for all agents f(x) in w2, uw2(f(x)) ≥ uf(w1)(f(x)) and for all agents f(f(x)) in f(w2),
uf(w2)(f(f(x))) ≥ uf(f(w1))(f(f(x))) and so on for each qualitative duplicate of 〈w1, w2〉 under
an iterate of f . In addition, for some agent f(x) in w2, uw2(f(x)) > uf(w1)(f(x)) and
for some agent f(f(x)) in f(w2), uf(w2)(f(f(x))) > uf(f(w1))(f(f(x))) and so on for each
qualitative duplicate of 〈w1, w2〉 under an iterate of f . Therefore w2  f(w1) by Pareto,
f(w2)  f(f(w1)) by Pareto, f(f(w2))  f(f(f(w1))) by Pareto, and so on for each qualitative
duplicate of 〈w1, w2〉 under an iterate of f .
Finally, since there is some n such that fn+1(x) = x, and x exists in w1 iff f(x) exists in
w2 it follows that the population of f
n(w2) is identical to the population of w1. Since for
each iterate of f , fn(w2)  fn+1(w1) by Pareto, it follows that fn(w2)  w1 by Pareto. This
results in the following violation of transitivity, where there may exist any finite number of
iterations of f between f 2 and fn such that f i(w1) < f i(w2) by the qualitativeness of < and

















Figure 68: Cyclic transitivity violation
Since this violates transitivity, w1 6< w2, contrary to our assumption. Therefore if there
exists an n-cyclic permutation of P that is a strict upgrade from the population of w1 to the
population of w2 and is such that, for all x in w1, f
n+1(x) = x, then w1 6< w2
For completeness, we can state the cyclic incomparability result.
Result 11: Cyclic Permutation Incomparability (CP 4
< )
If (i) there exists an n-cyclic permutation of P that is a strict upgrade from the population of
w1 to the population of w2 and is such that, for all x in w1, f
n+1(x) = x, then w1 6< w2, and
(ii) there exists an n-cyclic permutation of P that is a strict upgrade from the population of
w2 to the population of w1 and is such that, for all x in w2, f
n+1(x) = x, then w2 6< w1.
If (i) holds then w1 6< w2 by Result 10 and if (ii) holds then w2 6< w1 by Result 10. Therefore
w1 and w2 are incomparable (w1 4
< w2).
Notice that both of the conditions of Result 10 hold in the example of a cyclic argument
offered earlier. In that case, f was a strict upgrade from the population of w1 to the
population of w2, since f mapped all agents in w1 onto an agent in w2 with at least as
much utility, and f mapped the agents in C2 to agents in D2, and all of the agents in C1
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in w1 have strictly less utility than all of the agents in D1 in w2. Moreover, for all x in w1,
f 4(x) = f(f(f(f(x))) = x. Therefore w1 6< w2 by a 3-cyclic permutation, as we saw.
Before offering an example of a sufficient condition for cyclic incomparability, we can illus-
trate how we construct a 3-cycle permutation that satisfies the conditions of Result 10 using
a simple example. Consider a pair of worlds 〈w1, w2〉 that are as follows:
A B C
w1 4 2 –
w2 2 – 4
Figure 69: World pair requiring a 3-cycle permutation
We cannot show that w1 6< w2 or that w2 6< w1 by a four world argument because there is no
bidirectional upgrade from the agents of w1 to the agents of w2 or from the agents of w2 to
the agents of w1. But we can show that these worlds are incomparable by a cyclic argument.
To show that w1 6< w2 by a cyclic argument, we have to find a strict upgrade from the
population of w1 to the population of w2. In this case, we divide the agents in set B into
two infinite sets, B1 and B2, and we can divide the agents in set C into two infinite sets, C1
and C2. We can construct a strict upgrade from the population of w1 to the population of
w2 by mapping the agents in A (at utility 4 in w1) onto agents in C1 (at utility 4 in w2), all
of the agents in B1 (at utility 2 in w1) onto agents in A (at utility 2 in w2), and all of the







We now need to map C1 agents and C2 agents. Since we are looking for a cycle such that
for some n, fn(x) = x, we can map C1 agents onto B1 agents to complete the cycle above:
A→ C1 → B1 → A. We could map C2 agents onto B2 agents, but this would result in one
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even-numbered cycle (the previous one) and one odd-numbered cycle: C2 → B2 → C2. As
a result, the smallest n such that fn(x) = x is 6, and so we would require six sets of worlds
(five iterations of f) to show that w1 6< w2. Instead, we can introduce a set of agents D1
that don’t exist in w1 or w2 and cycle the C2 agents through these agents, resulting in the







Using the permutation above will show that w1 6< w2 by a cyclic argument using only three
pairs of worlds. We can depict the permutation above and the world pairs f(〈w1, w2〉) and
f(f(〈w1, w2〉)) as follows:
A B1 B2 C1 C2 D1
Figure 70: A 3-cycle upgrade permutation
A B1 B2 C1 C2 D1
w1 4 2 2 – – –
w2 2 – – 4 4 –
f(w1) 2 – – 4 2 –
f(w2) – 4 – 2 – 4
f(f(w1)) – 4 – 2 – 2
f(f(w2)) 4 2 4 – – –
Figure 71: Agent utilities under the 3-cycle upgrade permutation
We can see that if w1 < w2 then by the qualitativeness of < and Pareto it follows that
w1 < w2  f(w1) < f(w2)  f(f(w1)) < f(f(w2))  w1, which violates transitivity.
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We can also show that w2 6< w1 by a cyclic argument. One way to do this is to find a ‘strict
downgrade’ from the population of world w1 to the population of world w2 – a bijection g
from pl(w1) to pl(w2) such that for all agents x in w1, uw1(x) ≥ uw2(g(x)) and for some agent
x in w1, uw1(x) > uw2(g(x)). In this case we can do this without having to go through any
agents that don’t exist in w1 or w2. First we divide the set of agents A into two infinite sets
A1 and A2. Given this, the following is a strict downgrade from pl(w1) to pl(w2):
A1 A2 B C
Figure 72: A 3-cycle downgrade permutation
We can depict the world pairs f(〈w1, w2〉) and f(f(〈w1, w2〉)) as follows:
A1 A2 B C
w1 4 4 2 –
w2 2 2 – 4
f(w1) 4 2 – 4
f(w2) 2 – 4 2
f(f(w1)) 4 – 4 2
f(f(w2)) 2 4 2 –
Figure 73: Agent utilities under the 3-cycle downgrade permutation
We can see that if w2 < w1 then by the qualiativeness of < and Pareto it follows that
w2 < w1  f(f(w2)) < f(f(w1))  f(w2) < f(w1)  w2, which violates transitivity.
In all of the examples of cyclic arguments I have considered thus far, it has been possible to
find a single function f such that for some n, fn(x) = x. It is worth noting, however, that
it is not necessary that we use the same function in a cyclic argument: we could instead
use a sequence of entirely distinct functions f1, f2,..., fn. Since ‘is a qualitative duplicate
of’ is a transitive relation, if f1(〈w1, w2〉) is a qualitative duplicate of 〈w1, w2〉 under f1
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and f2(f1(〈w1, w2〉)) is a qualitative duplicate of f1(〈w1, w2〉) under f2, then f2(f1(〈w1, w2〉))
is a qualitative duplicate of 〈w1, w2〉 (it is a duplicate under the composite function f1 ◦
f2). It remains an open question whether there are any cases in which a cyclic proof of
incomparability requires the use of distinct functions rather than a single iterated function.
But if there are a sequence of distinct functions f1, f2,..., fn such that f1 ◦ f2◦, ..., ◦fn = n
and some function fi in the sequence is a strict upgrade from the population of fi−1(w1) to
the population of fi−1(w2) and all functions fi in the sequence are a weak upgrade from the
population of fi−1(w1) to the population of fi−1(w2), then w1 6< w2 by a cyclic argument.
Summary
In this chapter I have shown that if we accept Pareto, the qualitativeness of <, the Permu-
tation Principle, and transitivity, then many classes of worlds are ethically incomparable.
These results do not show that all infinite world pairs that are not comparable by Pareto are
ethically incomparable. They do not entail that world w1 containing infinitely many agents
at utility level 4 and infinitely many agents at utility level 1 is incomparable with a world
containing infinitely many agents at utility 3 and infinitely many agents at utility 2. They
also do not extend to world pairs in which there is a finite population of agents in w1 with
utility strictly greater than or strictly less than the utility of any agent in w2. Nor do they
apply to world pairs with uncountable populations or with non-equinumerous populations.
In the next chapter, I will offer a modest extension of Pareto and will use this to extend the
results of this chapter. I then present problems for more ambitious extensions of Pareto.
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Chapter 4
Extending the Incomparability Results
In the previous chapter I showed that many infinite world pairs are incomparable. Although
some world pairs can be shown to be comparable or incomparable, there are still ‘open
question’ world pairs: world pairs that are not comparable by the principles that we endorse
but are also not demonstrably incomparable. Ideally, we eventually reach a point at which
no open question world pairs remain. In this chapter, I explore some possible extensions of
the results of this chapter that could reduce the number of open question world pairs. In
section 4.1 I offer a modest extension of Pareto. In section 4.2 I show that this extension
can be made stronger if we supplement it with addition principles, resulting in the Weak
People Criterion and argue that adopting the Weak People Criterion entails that a larger
class of worlds can be shown to be incomparable by four world and cyclic arguments than
in the previous chapter. Finally, in section 4.3 I consider alternatives to the Weak People
Criterion that are intuitively plausible and argue that these have unacceptable consequences
and therefore ought to be rejected.
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4.1 Weak Catching-Up
In the previous chapters I showed that if we accept Pareto, transitivity, the Permutation
Principle, and the qualitativeness of <, then we can show that many infinite worlds are eth-
ically incomparable. Pareto is a relatively limited ethical principle, however. The principle
can only rank world pairs that have shared populations and they cannot rank any worlds
pairs 〈w1, w2〉 if there is at least one agent with lower utility in w1 than in w2 and there is
at least one agent with lower utility in w2 than in w1.
It seems clear that some world pairs that fail to meet the conditions for Pareto comparability
are not ethically incomparable. Consider an identical population world pair 〈w1, w2〉 in which
infinitely many agents are better off in w1 than in w2 by an infinite amount of utility and
only finitely many agents are better off in w2 than in w1 by a finite amount of utility. We
can give an example of such a world pair, where # is used to indicate the cardinality of the





Figure 74: Identical population world pair with distinct upper utility levels
World w1 contains infinitely many agents in set A at utility level 2 and a single agent in set
B at utility level 0. World w2 contains infinitely many agents in set A at utility level 0 and
a single agents in set B at utility level 1. It seems clear that world w1 is strictly better than
world w2. The sum of utility at world w1 is positively infinite and infinitely many agents
are better off in w1 than they are in w2. But because there is a single agent that has lower
utility in w1 than in w2, these two worlds are not Pareto comparable.
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Pareto also cannot compare identical population world pairs 〈w1, w2〉 in which the total
utility of both worlds is finite if at least one agent has more utility in w1 than in w2 and at
least one agent has more utility in w2 than in w1. Worlds may have finite total utility either
because they contain finitely many agents or because they contain infinitely many agents
and the series of utility of these agents converges absolutely on some finite value (such that
the sequence of agent utilities converges on zero). For example, suppose that w1 and w2




many agents at utility 0. World w2 contains infinitely many agents that have utility levels














)n = 1. It therefore seems that world w1 is strictly better
than world w2 but these two worlds are not Pareto comparable. Ideally we would want our
preferred principles for ranking infinite worlds to entail our preferred principles for ranking
finite worlds we prefer whenever two worlds contain finite utility.
We can formulate a modest extension of the Pareto principle which entails that if 〈w1, w2〉 is
an identical population world pair and the agents of w1 are better off by a finite or infinite
amount of utility than the agents in w2, then w1 is strictly better than w2. In order to do
this, it will be helpful to introduce a new concept of ‘extended convergence’: an extension of
the usual concept of absolute convergence introduced by Artnzenius [6, p. 54]. If a sequence
extendedly converges then it either converges absolutely on some finite value or it diverges to
positive infinity or to negative infinity (but not both) under any ordering of its terms. Given
this, we can first extend Pareto by endorsing the Weak Catching-Up principle defended by
Lauwers and Vallentyne [148, p. 322], which I formulate as follows:
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Weak Catching-Up
(<) If w1 and w2 contain the same agents and for all possible enumerations of the agents
of w1 and w2, the lower limit as J approaches infinity, of the sum of uw1(xj) − uw2(xj) for
agents 1 to J (i.e. limJ→∞
∑
j=1,...,J(uw1(xj) − uw2(xj))) is extendedly convergent and ≥ 0
then w1 < w2
() If w1 and w2 contain the same agents and for all possible enumerations of the agents
of w1 and w2, the lower limit as J approaches infinity, of the sum of uw1(xj) − uw2(xj) for
agents 1 to J (i.e. limJ→∞
∑
j=1,...,J(uw1(xj) − uw2(xj))) is extendedly convergent and > 0
then w1  w2
Weak Catching-Up satisfies both of the desiderata outlined above. If w1 and w2 contain the
same agents and in w1 infinitely many agents have utility 2 and all remaining agents have
utility 0, and in w2 finitely many agents have utility 1 and all remaining agents have utility
0, then the difference in utilities across the agents of w1 and w2 extendedly converges on ∞.
Therefore w1  w2 by Weak Catching-Up. And if w1 and w2 contain the same agents and
in w1 there is a single agent with utility
3
4
and infinitely many agents with utility 0 and in







, ... then the difference in utilities across the
agents of w1 and w2 extendedly converges on −14 . Therefore w2  w1 by Weak Catching-Up.
If we endorse a principle that is stronger than Pareto then we increase the number of infinite
world pairs that we are able to compare. At the same time, endorsing stronger principles
often increases the number of world pairs that can be shown to be incomparable by a four
world or cyclic argument. If we accept the Weak Catching-Up principle then we can extend
the incomparability results of the previous chapter to world pairs that would meet the
conditions of Result 8 or Result 11 were it not for the fact that there exists a finite population
of agents in w1 with utility strictly greater than or strictly less than the utility of any agent
in w2 or there exists a finite population of agents in w2 with utility strictly greater than or
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strictly less than the utility of any agent in w1. Consider the following world pair:
A B C D E
# ℵ0 ℵ0 1 1 1
w1 2 1 4 -1 -1
w2 1 2 -2 6 6
Figure 75: A pair with finitely many agents with utilities outside the accumulation interval
There is a bidirectional upgrade from the agents in w1 to the agents in in w2 and there is a
bidirectional upgrade from the agents in w2 to the agents in w1 in this case. But we cannot
find a bidirectional upgrade from w1 to w2 because there is no agent with utility less than
or equal to −2 in w1. And we cannot find a bidirectional upgrade from the population of w2
to the population of w1 because there is no agent with utility greater than or equal to 6 in
w1. So we cannot show that w1 4
< w2 by a four world argument using Pareto.
If we accept Weak Catching-Up, however, then we can show that w1 and w2 are incompa-
rable by a four world argument. To do this, we just need to find a bijection g that is a
bidirectional upgrade from w1 to w2 such that, for infinitely many agents x, uw1(x) < uw2(x)
and
∑
x(uw1(x) − uw2(x)) is negatively infinite, and for all remaining agents only finitely
many are such that uw2(x) < uw1(x).
171 To find such a bijection from pl(w1) to pl(w2) we
divide the agents in set B into the infinite sets B1 and B2. A bijection from pl(w1) to pl(w2)
that satisfies the conditions above is as follows:
171These conditions are stronger than what we need. All we actually require is that the total utility of the
agents x in w1 such that uw1(x) < uw2(x) is less than or equal to the total utility of the agents x in w2 such
that uw2(x) < uw1(x). But, as I will show, if there is a bidirectional upgrade from pl(w1) to pl(w2) and there
is a bidirectional upgrade from pl(w2) to pl(w1) then we can find a bijection that satisfies these conditions.
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A B1 B2 C D E
# ℵ0 ℵ0 ℵ0 1 1 1
w1 2 1 1 4 -1 -1
w2 1 2 2 -2 6 6
w3 1 2 1 4 -1 -1
w4 2 1 2 -2 6 6
Figure 76: A permutation showing w1 6< w2 by Weak Catching-Up
Suppose that w1 < w2. Let the world pair 〈w3, w4〉 be a qualitative duplicates of 〈w1, w2〉
under the bijection above. Infinitely many agents in B2 ∪D ∪ E have greater utility in w2
than they do w3 such that the total difference in utility between the agents in B2∪D∪E in w2
and the agents in B2∪D∪E in w3 is infinite. Finitely many agents in C have greater utility
in w3 than they do in w2 and the total difference in utility between the agents in C in w2 and
the agents in C in w3 is finite (6 utils). All remaining agents in w2 – the agents in A – have
the same utility levels in w2 and w3. Therefore
∑
x(uw2(x)−uw3(x)) extendedly converges to
a positive value – since it diverges to ∞ – and so w2  w3 by Weak Catching-Up. It is easy
to see that
∑
x(uw4(x)− uw1(x)) also diverges to ∞ and so w4  w1 by Weak Catching-Up.
By the qualitativeness of the < relation, w3 < w4. Therefore w1 < w2  w3 < w4  w1.
This violates transitivity and so w1 6< w2, contrary to our assumption.
It should be easy to see that we can find a bijection from pl(w2) to pl(w1) that also satisfies
the conditions above. For completeness, this bijection is as follows:
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A1 A2 B C D E
# ℵ0 ℵ0 ℵ0 1 1 1
w1 2 2 1 4 -1 -1
w2 1 1 2 -2 6 6
w5 2 1 2 4 -1 -1
w6 1 2 1 -2 6 6
Figure 77: A permutation showing w2 6< w1 by Weak Catching-Up
Suppose that w2 < w1. Let the world pair 〈w5, w6〉 be a qualitative duplicates of 〈w1, w2〉
under the bijection above. Since
∑
x(uw5(x) − uw2(x)) diverges to ∞, w5  w2 by Weak
Catching-Up. Since
∑
x(uw1(x) − uw6(x)) diverges to ∞, w6  w1 by Weak Catching-Up.
By the qualitativeness of the < relation, w5 < w6. Therefore w2 < w1  w6 < w5  w2.
This violates transitivity and so w2 6< w1, contrary to our assumption.
Weak Catching-Up lets us extend the comparability results to all world pairs 〈w1, w2〉 such
that infinitely many agents have greater utility in w1 than in w2 and infinitely many agents
have greater utility in w2 than in w1 and there are finitely many agents in w1 with utility
strictly greater than or less than that of any agent in w2 and/or there are are finitely many
agents in w2 with utility strictly greater than that of any agent in w1.
172 In order to do this,
let us define a ‘subpopulation bidirectional upgrade’. There is a subpopulation bidirectional
upgrade from w1 to w2 if there is bidirectional upgrade from a subset of the agents of w1 to
a subset of the population of w2.
173
172In this chapter I continue to assume that agents have finite utility. This result does not hold if we
believe that individual agents can have lives that contain infinite positive or negative utility (or both).
173By this definition, a bidirectional upgrade from the whole population of w1 to the whole population of
w2 (rather than from or to a proper subset of the population) is also a subpopulation bidirectional upgrade.
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Result 12: Cofinite Subset Incomparability
If there us a cofinite subset of the population of w1 and there is a cofinite subset of the
population of w2 such that these cofinite subsets of w1 and w2 satisfy the conditions that the
entire populations of w1 and w2 satisfy in Result 8 or Result 11 then world w1 and w2 are
ethically incomparable (w1 4
< w2).
To show that if a cofinite subset of the population of 〈w1, w2〉 satisfies the conditions of
Result 8 then w1 4
<w2, let X be a cofinite subset of the population of 〈w1, w2〉 such that there
is a subpopulation bidirectional upgrade from the agents in X in w1 to the agents in X in
w2 and there is an subpopulation bidirectional upgrade from the agents in X in w2 to the
agents in X w1. Therefore X is a cofinite subset of the population of 〈w1, w2〉 that satisfies
the conditions that the entire population of a world pair satisfies in Result 8.
Let Y1 be the set of finitely many agents that are not in X in w1. Let Y2 by the set of
finitely many agents that are not in X in w2. The populations of Y1 and Y2 may be identical,
overlapping, or disjoint and so they may have different cardinalities. Let n = |Y1| − |Y2| be
the cardinality of the agents in Y1 minus the cardinality of the agents in Y2, such that n may
be any finite (positive or negative) integer. If n < 0 then let Z1 be a subset of the agents in
X in w1 such that |Z1| = n, otherwise let Z1 be empty. If n > 0 then let Z2 be a subset of
the agents in X in w2 such that |Z2| = n, otherwise let Z2 be empty.
If there is a subpopulation bidirectional (or strict) upgrade from the agents in X in w1 to
the agents in X in w2 and there is a subpopulation bidirectional upgrade from the agents in
X in w2 to the agents in X in w1 then there exists a bijection g from the agents x in X \Z1
in w1 to the agents x in X \ Z2 in w2 such that
∑
(uw1(x)− uw2(g(x))) diverges to ∞. We
can show this by contradiction. Suppose there is a subpopulation bidirectional (or strict)
upgrade from pl(w1) to pl(w2) and from pl(w2) to pl(w1) that does not satisfy this condition.
It follows that finitely many agents in w1 such that uw1(x) < uw2(g(x)) and the remaining
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agents in w1 are such that uw1(x) = uw2(g(x)). But if this is the case then there cannot be
a subpopulation bidirectional (or strict) upgrade from pl(w2) to pl(w1) because there are no
agents g(x) in w2 such that uw2(g(x)) < uw1(g(g(x))). This contradicts our assumption that
there is a subpopulation bidirectional (or strict) upgrade from pl(w1) to pl(w2) and from
pl(w2) to pl(w1) such that
∑
(uw1(x)− uw2(g(x))) does not diverge to ∞.
We now construct a bijection g from pl(w1) to pl(w2) as follows. First, let g map the agents
in Z1 ∪ Y1 in w1 onto the agents in Z2 ∪ Y2 in w2. Let g map the agents in X \ Z1 in w1
onto the agents in X \ Z2 in w2 such that
∑
(uw1(x) − uw2(g(x))) diverges to ∞. Then
any qualitative duplicate of 〈w1, w2〉 under g will be such that gn(w2)  gn+1(w1) by Weak
Catching-Up. Therefore if there exists a bijection from the agents in X \Z1 in w1 to X \Z2
in w2 that satisfies the conditions of Result 8 or Result 11 and there exists a bijection from
the agents X \ Z2 in w2 to the agents in X \ Z1 in w1 that satisfies the conditions of Result
8 or Result 11, then it follows that w1 4
< w2 by Weak Catching-Up.
We can offer an example of a condition that is sufficient for a world pair to be incomparable
by this result. Let the ‘accumulation interval’ of world w1 be the interval between the
lowest accumulation point of the utility levels of w1 and the highest accumulation point of
the utility levels of world w1.
174 So if w1 has only a single accumulation point n, then its
accumulation interval is the degenerate interval [n, n].175 And if w1 contains infinitely many
agents at utility level n and infinitely many agents at utility level m and there are finitely
many agents with utility greater than m and less than n, then the accumulation interval of
w1 is the non-degenerate interval [n,m]. If w1 contains infinitely many agents approaching
174The Bolzano–Weierstrass theorem entails that if utilities are bounded then infinite worlds have at
least one accumulation point. See [20, p. 78]. If utilities are not bounded then a world may not have an
accumulation interval. For example if, for each natural number, there are finitely many agents in w1 with
utility equal to that natural number, then w1 has no accumulation interval since w1 has no accumulation
points.
175If a world contains infinitely many agents and has finite total utility then its accumulation set must be
the degenerate set [0,0] since the only possible accumulation point for such a world to have is 0.
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utility n from above and infinitely many agents approaching utility m from below and w1 has
no other accumulation points, then the accumulation interval of w1 is also [n,m]. I will focus
on world pairs that contain infinitely many agents at each upper and lower accumulation
point, however. When I refer to accumulation intervals in this chapter, I assume that there
are infinitely many agents at each upper and lower accumulation point.
In this section I introduced the Weak Catching-Up rule and I have shown that if we accept the
Weak Catching-Up rule, which is stronger than the Pareto principle,176 then we can compare
more world pairs as well as extend the incomparability results of the previous chapter. In the
next section I will introduce a new set of principles that let us further extend these results.
4.2 Addition Principles and the Weak People Criterion
Until this point I have assumed that agents can have lives that contain different finite amounts
of utility, but I have not assumed that there is a meaningful zero point of utility. However,
many ethicists accept that there is an important point at which a life goes from being ‘a
life worth living’ to ‘a life not worth living’.177 If a life is worth living then the life is good
for the agent and contributes value to the world.178 If a life is not worth living then it is
bad for the agent and detracts value from the world. And if a life is neither worth living
nor not worth living – it is neither bad for the agent nor good for the agent and it neither
contributes nor detracts value from the world – I will say that it is a neutral life.179 For the
176Weak Catching-Up entails Pareto but Pareto does not entail Weak Catching-Up.
177See, for example, Parfit [179] and Broome [44].
178We may believe that bringing people with lives worth living into existence is not only better for the
world but better for the person in question. There is, however, great controversy about whether we can make
comparisons between existence and non-existence – whether the < relation can hold between two relata if
one of them exists and the other does not. I will not take a stance on this issue here. For discussion see, for
example, Broome [44] and McMahan [162].
179The possibility of morally neutral lives or lives with zero welfare is fairly widely accepted. See, for
example, Broome [44, Ch. 10].
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remainder of this thesis I will set the zero level of lifetime utility at the point at which a life
is a neutral. Lives that are worth living have lifetime utility strictly greater than zero and
lives that are not worth living have lifetime utility that is strictly less than zero.
A fairly ubiquitous axiom among population ethicists is that if we add agents with lives
worth living to a world without reducing the utility of any other agents that exist at that
world, then we have not made the world worse and that if we add agents with lives not
worth living to a world without increasing the utility of any other agents, then we have not
made the more world better. We can also accept stronger versions of these axioms, which
state that adding people with positive welfare to a world always makes the world better and,
less controversially, that adding agents with negative welfare to a world makes the world
worse.180 A further axiom that we can accept is that adding neutral lives to a world neither
makes a world better nor makes a world worse. This axiom is less widely adopted than the
first two181 but has been defended in the literature on infinite ethics. For example, Fishkind,
Hamkins, and Montero [85] defend both standard addition principles and neutral addition
in infinite worlds. For the sake of the present discussion I will accept both neutral addition
and the stronger addition axioms. We can formulate these as the following three principles:
Benevolent Addition
If w2 contains all of the agents of w1 with at least at much utility as they have in w1 plus
some positive number of agents with lives worth living, then w2  w1
180The claim that adding people with positive to a welfare necessarily makes a world better is controversial
because many people will reject that it is better to bring into existence happy children than to fail to do so.
This principle can also be used to generate the repugnant conclusion although, as Arrhenius [?] shows, we
can generate the repugnant and very repugnant conclusions with a much weaker and more plausible addition
axiom, namely the ‘Dominance Addition Condition’.
181See Broome [44, p. 143-5] for a discussion of neutral addition in finite population ethics. Neutral
addition may be controversial because we believe that there is some value to existing even if one has zero
welfare. But if this is the case then we can simply incorporate this value into our utilities so that a neutral
life is in fact a life with slightly negative welfare (to compensate for the value of existence).
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Malevolent Addition
If w2 contains all of the agents of w1 with at most at much utility as they have in w1 plus
some positive number of agents with lives not worth living, then w1  w2
Neutral Addition
If w1 contains all of the agents of w2 with at least at much utility as they have in w2 plus
some positive number of agents with neutral lives, then w1 < w2
These addition principles allow us to compare various overlapping infinite world pairs that
are not comparable by Weak Catching-Up. For example, if w1 and w2 both contain infinitely
many agents with positive utility but the population of w1 is a proper subset of the population
of w2 then w2  w1 by Benevolent Addition. And if w1 and w2 both contain infinitely many
agents with negative utility but the population of w1 is a proper subset of the population
of w2 then w1  w2 by Malevolent Addition. For example, in the cases below w1  w2 and









Figure 78: Examples of Benevolent Addition and Malevolent Addition
The most important of these principles for our purposes, however, is the neutral addition
principle. For example, consider the following two worlds, which are not incomparable by a
four world or cyclic argument by Pareto or Weak Catching-Up:
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A B C
# ℵ0 ℵ0 ℵ0
w1 3 0 –
w2 – – 3
Figure 79: Worlds accumulation intervals [0,3] and [3]
Now consider world w3, which contains the same agents as world w2 at the same utility levels




Figure 80: Adding infinitely many utility 0 lives
By Neutral Addition, w2 ∼ w3. So if w1 < w2 then w1 < w3 and if w2 < w1 then w3 < w1.
But, by Result 2, world w1 is incomparable with world w3. Therefore world w1 and world
w2 must also be ethically incomparable (w1 4
< w2).
I will show that the Weak Catching-Up rule and Neutral Addition are jointly equivalent to
an objective variant of the principle for comparing infinite world pairs that Arntzenius [6, p.
55] calls the ‘Weak People Criterion’. Following Artnzenius, we can suppose that the utility
of a person at a world in which they do not exist is zero. This supposition is justified by
Neutral Addition since Neutral Addition entails that if the population of w1′ contains all
of the agents of w1 at the same utility levels plus any number of agents with neutral lives,
then w1 ∼ w1′ . Therefore if w2 < w1′ it follows from transitivity that w2 < w1. So if there
are some agents that exist in w1 but not w2 or there are some agents that exist in w2 but
no w1, we can find a world w1′ that contains all of the agents of w1 plus any agents that
are in w2 but not w1 at utility zero and we can find a world w2′ that contains all of the
agents of w2 plus any agents that are in w1 but not w2 at utility zero. Therefore w1′ and w2′
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contain identical populations. And if w1′ < w2′ then, by transitivity, w1 < w2. Therefore we
can suppose that the utility of a person in a world in which they do not exist is zero since
any relations that hold between worlds in which these agents exist at utility zero also hold
between worlds in which these agents do not exist at all by transitivity.
We can now formulate the Weak People Criterion as follows:
Weak People Criterion
(<) If, summing over all possible agents x,
∑
x(uw1(x) − uw2(x)) is extendedly convergent
and ≥ 0 then w1 < w2
() If, summing over all possible agents x,
∑
x(uw1(x) − uw2(x)) is extendedly convergent
and > 0 then w1  w2
Arntzenius calls the principle ‘weak’ because it fails to rank worlds if the expected utility
differences between their populations do not extendedly converge. The Weak People Crite-
rion is equivalent to the Weak Catching-Up rule plus Neutral Addition. This is because the
Weak People Criterion is just the Weak Catching-Up rule over world pairs in which agents
that do not exist are treated as though they have utility zero. We have already shown that
these are equivalent to worlds in which the agents do not exist by Neutral Addition.
Weak Catching-Up is silent about world pairs that have disjoint or overlapping populations,
but Neutral Addition lets us extend Weak Catching-Up to the Weak People Criterion. This
allows us to compare disjoint and overlapping world pairs 〈w1, w2〉 by comparing an identical
population pair 〈w3, w4〉 in which all agents that exist only in w1 in 〈w1, w2〉 exist in both
w3 and w4 but have a utility zero life in world w3 and all agents that exist only in w2 in
〈w1, w2〉 exist in both w3 and w4 but have a utility zero life in world w4.
I have shown that accepting addition principles and the Weak People Criterion lets us com-
pare more worlds than we could using the Weak Catching-Up rule alone. To show that
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accepting these principles also extends the incomparability results, let us define a ‘neutral
expansion’ of a world w1 as any world that contains the same agents as world w1 at the
same utility levels plus any number of agents with neutral lives. Let us also define a ‘neutral
contraction’ of a world w1 as any world that contains the same agents as world w1 at the
same utility levels minus any number of agents with neutral lives. (This means that each
world is a neutral expansion and contraction of itself, since w1 plus zero agents with neutral
lives is just w1). We can expand the incomparability results to world pairs that are not
directly incomparable by a four world or cyclic argument if there are neutral expansions or
contractions of the worlds in the pair that are incomparable.
Result 14: Neutral Expansion/Contraction Incomparability
If there is a neutral expansion [contraction] of w1 that is is incomparable with a neutral
expansion [contraction] of w2, then w1 and w2 are ethically incomparable (w1 4
< w2)
Let w1′ be a neutral expansion of w1 and let w2′ be a neutral expansion of w2 such that
w1′ 4
< w2′ . Since w1′ is a neutral expansion of w1, w1 ∼ w1′ by Neutral Addition. Therefore
w1 4
<w2′ . Since w2′ is a neutral expansion of w2, w2 ∼ w2′ by Neutral Addition. Since w1 4<w2′
it follows that w1 4
< w2. And if w1 4
< w2 then w1′ 4
< w2′ by the same reasoning.
I won’t attempt to formulate sufficient conditions for incomparability by neutral expansion
here but we can explore some of the consequences of this result. For example, we can show
that a weaker condition than the condition of Result 13 is sufficient for incomparability.
Result 15: Disjoint Incomparability by Neutral Expansion
If w1 and w2 have disjoint populations and the lower endpoint of the accumulation interval of
w1 is non-negative and the lower endpoint of the accumulation interval of w2 is non-negative
and the the upper endpoint of both intervals are identical and strictly positive then w1 4
< w2
Let the upper endpoint of the accumulation intervals of w1 and w2 be n. Since the lower
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endpoint of the accumulation intervals of w1 and w2 are non-negative, there is a neutral
expansion of w1 with the accumulation interval [0, n] and there is a neutral expansion of w2
with the accumulation interval [0, n]. Since n is strictly positive, w1 and w2 are incomparable
by Result 12.
By the same reasoning we can show that if w1 and w2 have disjoint populations and the
upper endpoint of the accumulation interval of w1 is non-positive and the upper endpoint of
the accumulation interval of w2 is non-positive and the lower endpoint of both intervals are
identical and strictly negative then world w1 and world w2 are ethically incomparable.
We can further extend the incomparability results of this chapter if we accept one further
claim – that what matters for the ranking of worlds is the pattern of difference in the utility
that agents have in one world rather than the other and not the absolute level of utility they
have at each world. We can capture this in the following principle:182
Transformation Indifference
If (i) w1 and w2 have identical populations, and (ii) 〈w1′ , w2′〉 and 〈w1, w2〉 have identical
populations, and (iii) there exists a positive affine function f such that for all agents x, if x
has utility u(x) in 〈w1, w2〉 then x has utility f(u(x)) in 〈w1′ , w1′〉 and if x has utility u(x)
in 〈w1′ , w1′〉 then x has utility f−1(u(x)) in 〈w1, w2〉, then w1 < w2 if and only if w1′ < w2′.
Transformation indifference says that if w1 < w2 and f is a positive affine function – one that
preserves addition and scalar multiplication but not the zero point – then if w1 < w2 and
we transform the utilities of the shared agents of 〈w1, w2〉 by f then < relation is preserved
under this transformation. For example, if w1 contains infinitely many agents at utility level
2 and w2 contains infinitely many agents at utility level 3 and f = 2y+ 1 then the agents of
182This should not be confused with the claim that utility functions are unique up to a positive affine
transformation. The utility function over world pairs may be unique up to a positive affine transformation,
but Transformation Indifference concerns alterations to the utilities of individual agents in these world pairs.
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w1′ all have utility level 5 and the agents of w2 all have utility level 7. By Transformation
Indifference, w1′ < w2′ .183 Since we are using positive affine transformations, if, for any
agent x in 〈w1, w2〉, the difference between u(x) in w1 and u(x) in w2 is n then the difference
between u(x) in w1′ and u(x) in w2′ is also n. Transformation Indifference is therefore
equivalent to the claim that it is the profile of the differences in agent utilities and not the
profile of the absolute values of agent utilities that matters for the ethical ranking of worlds.
Transformation Indifference is restricted to identical population world pairs but if w1 and
w2 contain disjoint or overlapping populations then we can use Neutral Addition to consider
positive affine transformations of the utilities of a pair of worlds 〈w3, w4〉 such that (i) w3
contains all of the agents that exist in w1 with the same utility levels they have in w1 but
the agents that exist in w2 but not w1 exist with neutral lives in w3, and (ii) w4 contains
all of the agents that exist in w2 with the same utility levels they have in w2 but the agents
that exist in w1 but not w2 exist with neutral lives in w4. Transformation Indifference is
also more plausible if we try to preserve as many qualitative properties and relations of the
original pair as possible while transforming the utilities of its population.
Transformation Indifference is not an uncontroversial principle and not all population ethi-
cists will accept it. The principle is, however, consistent with many theories within pop-
ulation ethics because it is a principle restricted to the ranking of worlds: it does not say
anything about how much better one world is than another. Consider prioritarianism, which
says that the goodness of a world is a function of the wellbeing of the agents of that world
but with greater weight being given to agents with lower utility lives. If the function that
the prioritarian uses to weight increases in wellbeing is a monotonically increasing function,
which seems plausible, then the prioritarian ranking will satisfy Transformation Indiffer-
183Here we can see why Translation Indifference is restricted to positive affine transformations. If it
extended to non-positive affine transformations then the scale factor could be non-positive. If the scale
factor were zero, the utilities of the agents of w1′ and w2′ would be identical. If the scale factor were
negative, the utilities of the agents of w1′ would be strictly greater than the utilities of the agents of w2′ .
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ence.184 However, any population ethics that attaches significance to absolute utility levels
or weighs the utility of agents using a function that is not monotonically increasing will
violate Transformation Indifference. For example, if a theory that says that there is some
utility level such that increasing the lifetime utility of agents above that level do not make
the world better, then that theory will be inconsistent with Transformation Indifference.185
Vallentyne and Lauwers [148] endorse a principle called ‘Zero Independence’ that is similar
in spirit to Transformation Indifference in that it entails that it is formulated to capture the
idea that it is differences in utility and not absolute utility levels that matter. Let w1 and
w2 have identical populations. Zero Independence says that w1 < w2 if and only if w3 – a
world with the same population of 〈w1, w2〉 but where each agent has utility equal to their
utility in w1 minus their utility in w2 – is at least as good as w4 – a world a world with
the same population of 〈w1, w2〉 but where each agent has utility zero. For example, if w1
contains agents all with utility 3 lives and w2 contains the same agents all with utility 2
lives then w3 contains agents all with utility 1 lives and w4 contains the same agents all with
utility 0 lives. By Zero Independence, w1 < w2 if and only if w3 < w4. In support of Zero
Independence, Vallentyne and Lauwers point out that in finite worlds the total value of a
world is greater if and only if the sum of the differences in value is greater than zero. This
means that finitely additive theories will entail the finite equivalent of both Zero Indifference
and Transformation Indifference in these worlds.
A more controversial principle than Transformation Indifference is what I will call Subpopula-
184Otsuka states that ‘The priority-weighted utility of any given outcome is the sum of everyone’s utility in
that outcome, after each person’s utility has been assigned the relevant positive but decreasing marginal moral
importance in prioritarian fashion.’ [178, p. 3]. The claim that each person’s utility is assigned positive but
decreasing marginal importance supports the claim that the prioritarian function is monotonically increasing.
185Transformation Indifference is consistent with views that don’t treat all increases in wellbeing as equally
valuable. If we favor egalitarian principles, for example, then we may believe that a world pair in which
there is greater variance in lifetime utility is worse than a world pair in which there is lower lifetime utility
variance, all else being equal. But we might nonetheless accept that the pattern of differences in utility
between worlds determines whether one world is at least as good as another, even if it doesn’t determine
whether one pair of worlds is better than another pair of worlds.
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tion Transformation Indifference. According to Subpopulation Transformation Indifference,
if we transform the utilities of a subpopulation of a world pair by some positive affine function
then if < holds between the original world pair, it also holds between the new pair:
Subpopulation Transformation Indifference
If (i) w1 and w2 have identical populations, and (ii) 〈w1′ , w2′〉 and 〈w1, w2〉 have identical
populations, and (iii) for all agents x, there exists a positive affine function f such that if x
has utility u(x) in 〈w1, w2〉 then x has utility f(u(x)) in 〈w1′ , w1′〉 and if x has utility u(x)
in 〈w1′ , w1′〉 then x has utility f−1(u(x)) in 〈w1, w2〉, then w1 < w2 if and only if w1′ < w2′.
Subpopulation Transformation Indifference says that if w1 < w2 and we transform some
agent utilities by a positive affine function f and we transform other agent utilities by a
different positive affine function g, resulting in 〈w1′ , w1′〉, then w1′ < w2′ . For example,
suppose w1 and w2 contain infinitely many agents that are at utility 3 in w1 and utility 1 in
w2. Let X denote this set of agents. Suppose w1 and w2 also contain infinitely many agents
that are at utility 2 in w1 and utility 4 in w2. Let Y denote this set of agents. Suppose
w1 and w2 contain no other agents. We can transform the utilities of the agents in X by
f = y − 2 so that they have utility 1 in w1′ and utility -1 in w2′ . We can transform the
utilities of the agents in Y by g = y − 3 so that they have utility -1 in w1′ and utility 1 in
w2′ . By Subpopulation Transformation Indifference, w1 < w2 if and only if w1′ < w2′ . Such
a transformation is not possible if we must use the same function, however.
Subpopulation Transformation Indifference is much more controversial than Transformation
Indifference. It entails that ethical rankings depend on the differences in utility that agents
experience in w1 and w2 but are not sensitive to whether the differences in utility are expe-
rienced by high or low utility agents. It is therefore not likely to be endorsed by egalitarians
or prioritarians since, according to these theories, whether and to what extent improving the
lives of agents improves the world is in part a function of the absolute level of utility that
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those agents would have had otherwise. For example, suppose that w1 and w2 both are both
finite worlds containing two agents – x and y – and that x has utility 0 in w1 and utility 1 in
w2 while y has utility 100 in w1 and utility 99 in w2. Suppose that 〈w1′ , w2′〉 have the same
population as 〈w1, w2〉 but x has utility 50 in w1 and utility 51 in w2 and y has utility 51 in
w1 and utility 50 in w2. By Subpopulation Transformation Indifference, w1 < w2 if and only
if w1′ < w2′ . But egalitarians may argue that w1 6< w2 and w1′ < w2′ because w2 has a more
equal distribution of utility than w1 and w1′ and w2′ have equal utility distributions.
I acknowledge that Subpopulation Transformation Indifference will therefore not be attrac-
tive to those who believe that the distribution of utilities between agents matters. Let us
assume, however, that we are attempting to find extensions of aggregative ethical princi-
ples to infinite worlds. For those that are indifferent to the distribution of utilities between
agents in finite worlds, Subpopulation Transformation Indifference will seem like a much
more reasonable principle. If we accept Subpopulation Transformation Indifference then we
are able to show that many disjoint worlds with distinct accumulation intervals are ethically
incomparable. For example, consider the following pair of worlds:
A B C D
# ℵ0 ℵ0 ℵ0 ℵ0
w1 -1 0 2 –
w2 -3 -2 – 4
Figure 81: Worlds with accumulation intervals [-1, 2] and [-3, 4]
Worlds w1 and w2 are not comparable by the Weak People Criterion. But we have not shown
that world pairs like this – pairs that have distinct accumulation intervals186 – are ethically
incomparable. If we accept Neutral Addition then we can infer what relation holds between
w1 and w2 from what relation holds between the neutral expansions w1′ and w2′ :
186The accumulation interval of w1 is [−1, 2] and the accumulation interval of w2 is [−3, 4].
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A B C D
# ℵ0 ℵ0 ℵ0 ℵ0
w1′ -1 0 2 0
w2′ -3 -2 0 4
Figure 82: The neutral expansion of this world pair
If we accept Subpopulation Transformation Indifference, we can infer what relation holds
between w1′ and w2′ from what relation holds between utility transformations w1′′ and w2′′ :
A B C D
# ℵ0 ℵ0 ℵ0 ℵ0
w1′′ 4 4 2 0
w2′′ 2 2 0 4
Figure 83: A subpopulation transformation of the neutral expansion pair
By neutral contraction, we can infer what relation holds between w1′ and w2′ from what
relation holds between w1′′′ and w2′′′ , which are neutral contractions of w1′′ and w2′′ :
187
A B C D
# ℵ0 ℵ0 ℵ0 ℵ0
w1′′′ 4 4 2 -
w2′′′ 2 2 - 4
Figure 84: A neutral contraction of the subpopulation transformation
In Chapter 3 we showed that world pairs in which agents have the utilities of w1′′′ and w2′′′
are incomparable by a cyclic argument. Therefore w1 and w2 are ethically incomparable.
One final set of principles that we may wish to consider are ‘transfer principles’. In finite
worlds, the total utility of a world remains the same regardless of how we distribute utility
across agents, since transferring utility from one agent to another can never change the total.
187Alternatively, we could simply show that w1′′ and w2′′ are incomparable directly.
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In infinite worlds, transfers are more complicated. We might think that if one world can be
obtained from another by transferring utility between the agents of the world, then those
worlds must be equally good. But in infinite worlds we cannot endorse such a principle
without violating the principles outlined above. To see why, suppose that we give each
agents of world w1 a name corresponding with a natural number – a1, a2, a3, and so on –
and that every agent in w1 has a utility 0 life, So if we arrange the agents by their names
then their utilities are (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, ...). Now suppose that the odd-numbered agents all
donate 1 util to the agent whose name is 1 greater than their own, so the agent utilities
are (−1, 1,−1, 1,−1, 1,−1, ...). But if we accept Subpopulation Transformation Indifference
then these two worlds are incomparable, since they are equivalent to the following:
a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 a6 a7 a8 ...
w1′ 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 ...
w2′ 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 ...
Figure 85: A counterexample to unrestricted transfer principles
Since these worlds are incomparable by a four world argument, we cannot endorse unre-
stricted transfer principles in infinite worlds without violating one of these principles. Val-
lentyne and Lauwers argue that when comparing infinite worlds we should, however, accept
a weaker transfer principle. They define a ‘restricted transfer’ as ‘(1) a transfer of a positive
amount of value from a location with positive value to a location with negative value such
that (2) after the transfer, the donor location still has non-negative value and the recipient
location still has non-positive value.’ [148, p. 323]. The example above did not involve
restricted transfers since the transfers fail to satisfy either of these conditions.
Restricted transfers can only be used to bring both the donor agent and the recipient agent
closer to zero. Vallentyne and Lauwers believe that the following principle is plausible:
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Restricted Transfers
If w1 and w2 contain identical populations and w1  w2 and we can obtain w3 by performing
finitely or infinitely many restricted transfers between the agents of w1, then w3  w2.
It is important that we only let each agent in a world transfer utility to at most one other
agent in the world or else Restricted Transfers will conflict with the irreflexivity of .188
Vallentyne and Lauwers argue that Restricted Transfers and Zero Independence plus certain
further axioms entail that Weak Catching-Up is necessary and sufficient for ranking infinite
world pairs with identical populations. We can use Neutral Addition to show by a similar
method that if w1 and w2 are not comparable by the Weak People Criterion then w1 and w2
are incomparable if we accept the following additional principle:
No Transfer Dominance
If w1 and w2 contain identical populations and we can obtain w2 by performing finitely or
infinitely many restricted transfers between the agents of w1, then w1 6 w2.
We can show that if we accept Neutral Addition, Transformation Indifference and these
transfer principles then w1 and w2 are comparable if and only if they are comparable by the
Weak People Criterion.
Result 16: The Weak People Criterion is Necessary and Sufficient for <
If we accept Neutral Addition, Transformation Indifference, Restricted Transfers, No Trans-
fer Dominance, and transitivity then if w1 and w2 are not comparable by the Weak People
Criterion then w1 and w2 are incomparable.
To show this, suppose for contradiction that w1 and w2 are not comparable by the Weak
188Suppose we don’t adopt this restriction. Consider ordered streams of agent utilities: a1’s utility always
comes first, a2’s always second, and so on. we can transform the utilities of the ordered stream (2,-1,2,
-1,2,-1,...) into the ordered stream (0,0,0,0,0,0,...). Considered the stream (1,-1,1,-1,1,-1,...) that is worse
than the first by Pareto. We can also transform this into the ordered stream (0,0,0,0,0,0,...).
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People Criterion and that w1 and w2 are comparable: either w1 < w2 or w2 < w1.
Suppose that w1 < w2. Let w3 be a neutral expansion of world w1 such that for all agents
x that exist in w2 but not w1, x exists in w3 with a utility zero life. Let w4 be a neutral
expansion of world w1 such that for all agents x that exist in w1 but not w2, x exists in w4
with a utility zero life. Therefore w3 and w4 have identical populations. Since w1 < w2 by
hypothesis and 〈w3, w4〉 is a neutral expansion of 〈w1, w2〉, w3 < w4 by Neutral Addition.
Since w1 and w2 are not comparable by the Weak People Criterion it must be the case
that there are infinitely many agents such that uw3(x) < uw4(x) and infinitely many agents
such that such that uw4(x) < uw3(x) and there may be any number of agents such that
uw3(x) = uw4(x). Let y be an agent that has strictly greater utility in w4 than in w3 and let
X be the set of all other agents 〈w3, w4〉. By performing infinitely many restricted transfers
we can, without altering the utility of agent y, transfer utility between the positive utility
agents in X in w3 to the negative utility agents in w4 and between the positive utility agents
in X in w4 to the negative utility agents in w3 until all for all x ∈ X, uw3(x)− uw4(x)=0.
Let w5 be a world we obtain by performing these restricted transfers between the agents of
w3 and let world w6 be a world we obtain by performing these restricted transfers between
the agents of w4. World w5 and world w6 have identical populations. For all x ∈ X,
uw5(x) = uw6(x) = 0 and for the agent y, uw5(y) < uw6(y). Therefore w6  w5 by Pareto.
Since we obtained w6 be performing infinitely many restricted transfers between the agents of
w4, w4  w5 by Restricted Transfers. Since w3 < w4 and w4  w5 it follows that w3  w5 by
transitivity. But we derived w5 by performing infinitely many restricted transfers between
the agents of w3. Therefore w3 6 w5 by No Transfer Dominance. We have derived a
contradiction from our supposition that w1 < w2. Therefore w1 6< w2.
We can use the same method to show that w2 6< w1 by letting y be an agent that has strictly
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greater utility in w3 than in w4. Therefore w1 6< w2 and w2 6< w1. This contradicts our
assumption that w1 and w2 are comparable.
The key problem with the restricted transfers principles is that they lack independent mo-
tivation. Many transfer principles in infinite ethics produce results that are in tension with
Pareto. Moreover, restricted transfers treat the zero point as ethically relevant for transfers,
despite the fact that principles like Transformation Indifference and Zero Independence are
in tension with the claim that there is a privileged zero point of utility. For these reasons I
am inclined to think that we should be suspicious of any result that is based on restricted
transfer principles, though I include this one here for completeness.
I have now shown that if we accept the Weak Catching-Up and Neutral Addition, which are
jointly equivalent to the Weak People Criterion, then we can expand the set of infinite worlds
that are comparable beyond those that are merely Pareto comparable and, in doing so, we
expand the set of world pairs that are incomparable by four world and cyclic arguments. If
we accept Subpopulation Transformation Indifference then we can further expand the set of
world pairs that are incomparable by four world and cyclic arguments. Finally, if we accept
the less well-motivated Restricted Transfers and No Transfer Dominance principles, we can
show that infinite worlds are comparable only if they are comparable by the Weak People
Criterion. If we accept the Weak People Criterion and these axioms, we must conclude
that infinite worlds are comparable if and only if they are comparable by the Weak People
Criterion. This will entail a great deal of incomparability between infinite worlds.
I have argued that Restricted Transfers and No Transfer Dominance are fairly objectionable
principles, and so many will reject the claim that infinite worlds are comparable if and only
if they are comparable by the Weak People Criterion. Weak Catching-Up, Neutral Addition,
and Subpopulation Transformation Invariance are also not entirely uncontroversial principles,
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however, and how much we can expand the results of the previous chapter depends on which
of these principles we accept (if any). The goal of this section was not to definitively show
that all infinite world pairs can be shown to be either comparable or incomparable, however.
The goal was merely to show that if we accept certain principles that at least some will find
plausible, then more infinite worlds can be shown to be comparable than are comparable by
Pareto and more infinite worlds can be shown to be incomparable by four world and cyclic
arguments. I have shown that this is true of each of the principles outlined in this section.
We might be tempted to offer alternative principles for comparing infinite worlds than those
outlined in this section. In particular, we might be tempted to use facts about the accumu-
lation intervals of infinite worlds to try to rank them. In the next section I argue that we
ought to reject these stronger principles.
4.3 Against Accumulation Principles
Before moving on I want to briefly consider a class of principles that we might be inclined
use to rank infinite world pairs that are not comparable by the Weak People Criterion
(assuming that we reject at least one axiom appealed to in Result 16). When w1 and w2
are not comparable by the Weak People Criterion, we might think that we can ethically
rank these worlds using their accumulation intervals. This has some intuitive appeal to
it. After all, if world w1 contains infinitely many agents at utility 100 and infinitely many
agents at utility 4, while world w2 contains infinitely many agents at utility 5, it is tempting
to conclude that w1 is better than w2. Consider the following accumulation principles for
disjoint population world pairs:
Accumulation 4
< If w1 and w2 have disjoint populations and identical, non-degenerate
accumulation intervals then w1 and w2 are ethically incomparable (w1 4
< w2)
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Accumulation ∼ If w1 and w2 have disjoint populations and identical, degenerate accumu-
lation intervals then w1 and w2 are equally good (w1 ∼ w2)
Accumulation  If w1 and w2 have disjoint populations and non-identical accumulation
intervals and the midpoint of the accumulation interval of w1 is strictly greater than the
midpoint of the accumulation interval of w2 then w1 is strictly better than w2 (w1  w2)
Accumulation 4
< follows from Result 12, since if w1 and w2 have disjoint populations and
identical, non-degenerate accumulation intervals then there is a strict upgrade from a subset
of w1 to w2 and there is a strict upgrade from a subset of w2 to w1. This subset satisfies the
conditions of Result 1 and therefore of Result 8. If we accept the Accumulation 4
< principle
then we won’t run into conflicts with Pareto if we accept transitivity, the Permutation
Principle, and that < is a qualitative relation.
The Accumulation ∼ principle says that if two worlds with disjoint populations have degen-
erate accumulation intervals – both worlds contain infinitely many agents at some utility
level n and there is no other utility level such that infinitely many agents have that utility
level in w1 or w2 – then w1 and w2 are equally good. Accumulation ∼ is consistent with
Lauwers’ ‘Infinite Sensitivity’ principle from Chapter 1 but is inconsistent with Pareto using
four world or cyclic arguments in cases where no agents are worse off in w1 than in w2 and
finitely many agents are strictly better off in w1 than in w2. Suppose w1 contains a thou-
sand agents at utility 100 and infinitely many agents at utility 0, while world w2 contains
infinitely many agents at utility 0. The accumulation interval of w1 and w2 are the same:
the degenerate interval [0,0] and yet w1 is clearly better than w2. I believe this is sufficient
reason to reject this principle and so I will focus on the Accumulation  principle below.
The Accumulation  principle says that one infinite world is strictly better than another if
the midpoint of its accumulation interval is higher. For example, if w1 comprises infinitely
173
many agents at utility 4 and infinitely many agents at utility 1 and w2 comprises infinitely
many agents at utility 2, then w1 is strictly better than w2 by the Accumulation  principle
since the midpoint of the accumulation interval of w1 is 3 and the midpoint of the accumula-
tion interval of w2 is 2. We can think of this as a kind of ‘average utility’ principle in infinite
worlds. This may be appealing to those who favor average views in finite ethics, since it is
difficult to transfer these principles to infinite worlds.189
The Accumulation  principle also entails plausible weaker principles like ‘if the lower end-
point of the accumulation interval of w1 is strictly greater than the upper endpoint of the
accumulation interval of w2 then w1  w2’. The Weak People Criterion entails that if the ac-
cumulation interval of w1 is non-negative and the accumulation interval of w2 is non-positive
then w1 ∼ w2 if the accumulation interval of both worlds is [0, 0] and w1  w2 for any other
values of the accumulation intervals of w1 and w2. But, unlike the Accumulation  principle,
it does not entail that that if the lower endpoint of the accumulation interval of w1 is strictly
greater than the upper endpoint of the accumulation interval of w2 then w1  w2.
I have restricted Accumulation principles to disjoint population world pairs. This is because
we cannot straightforwardly use accumulation intervals to rank identical or overlapping world
pairs as we do above. To see why, suppose that w1 and w2 have identical populations and
the accumulation interval of w1 and w2 is [2, 4]. This is consistent with w1 and w2 being
incomparable (if infinitely many agents that have utility 2 in w1 have utility 4 in w2 and
infinitely many agents that have utility 2 in w2 have utility 4 in w1) or with w1 being strictly
better than w2 by Pareto (if all of the agents that have utility 4 in w2 have utility 4 in w1
and some of the agents that have utility 2 in w2 have utility 4 in w1) or with w1 and w2
being equally good by Pareto (if all of the agents that have utility 2 or 4 in w1 have the same
189Average utility is not well-defined in infinite worlds if agents lack a privileged order. If we reject the
midpoint view then it is likely that the only alternative will be to identify average utility of a world with its
entire accumulation interval, since its average utility as defined by something like a natural density function
can, under different orderings, be made to converge on any value in the accumulation interval.
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utility in w2). It is possible to extend Accumulation principles to identical or overlapping
worlds, but I will focus on the disjoint population principles here.190
I believe that we ought to reject the Accumulation  principle because it is inconsistent with
Benevolent Addition, Malevolent addition and the Weak People Criterion. We can see this
in the following two cases:
A B C D
# ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞
w1 3 - - -
w2 - 3 2 -
w3 3 - - 1
A B C
# ∞ ∞ ∞
w4 -3 - - -
w5 - -3 -2 -
w6 -3 - - -1
Figure 86: Two problematic cases for the Accumulation  principle
By the Accumulation  principle, w1  w2  w3. But w3 is strictly better than w1 by
both Benevolent Addition and by the Weak People Criterion. Therefore the Accumulation
 principle violates both of these principles. And by the Accumulation  principle, w6 
w5  w4. But w6 is strictly worse than w4 by both Malevolent Addition and by the Weak
People Criterion. Therefore the Accumulation  principle violates both of these principles.
The following weaker Accumulation  principle does not violate the addition principles:
‘if the lower endpoint of the accumulation interval of w1 is strictly greater than the upper
endpoint of the accumulation interval of w2 then w1  w2’. However, this principle is
190To extend Accumulation principles to the overlapping sets of agents in worlds, we need to appeal not
to the accumulation interval but to what I will call the ‘difference interval’ of the world pair. A difference
interval is an accumulation interval in which accumulation points have been replaced with differences in
utility across the two worlds (meaning that difference interval of each world with itself is [0, 0]). So if
infinitely many agents have utility 2 in w1 and infinitely many agents have utility -2 in w1 and the same
agents all have utility 1 in w2 then the difference interval of (w1, w2) is [−3, 1] and the difference interval
of (w2, w1) is [−1, 3]. Accumulation theorists can then say, that if the difference interval of w1 and w2 is
identical and non-degenerate then w1 and w2 are incomparable, and if the the difference intervals are non-
identical and the midpoint of the difference interval of (w1, w2) is strictly greater than the midpoint of the
difference interval of (w2, w1) then w1  w2, and if the midpoint is identical then w1 ∼ w2. We can combine
this with the disjoint Accumulation principles to rank overlapping worlds, but I will not do so here.
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produces counterintuitive results of its own. Consider the following case:
A B C
# ∞ ∞ ∞
w1 3 3 -
w2 - - 3+ε
w3 (3+ε)+ε - -
Figure 87: A problematic case for the weakened Accumulation  principle
According to the weak Accumulation  principle, w3  w2  w1. This means that it can
be good to prevent infinitely many agents in set B from existing at utility level 3 in order
to increase the utility of infinitely many agents in set A by an arbitrarily small amount of
utility. It is not clear why we should consider this an improvement.
For these reasons I believe that we should not attempt to rank infinite world pairs using
Accumulation principles. Despite their prima facie plausibility, they often conflict with
Benevolent and Malevolent Addition or produce counterintuitive rankings.
Summary
At the beginning of this chapter I showed that a modest extension of Pareto – the Weak
Catching-Up principle – allows us to compare more worlds than Pareto and to extend the
incomparability results of the previous chapter. I then demonstrated that we can increase
the number of demonstrably comparable worlds and demonstrably incomparable worlds if
we accept further principles like Neutral Addition and Subpopulation Transformation Indif-
ference. I also showed that if we accept these principles plus the Restricted Transfer and
No Transfer Dominance principles then we can reduce the number of worlds that are neither
demonstrably comparable nor demonstrably incomparable to zero. Finally, I argued that
Accumulation principles for comparing infinite worlds are not a plausible extension of or
alternative to the Pareto principle. I do not take a strong stand on which of the principles I
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have discussed in this chapter we should accept, but I believe that I have demonstrated the
potential to extend the incomparability results of the previous chapter.
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Chapter 5
The Implications for Ethics
In this chapter I consider the ethical consequences of the incomparability results of Chapters
2 and 3. In section 5.1 I characterize the incomparability results as an impossibility result:
we cannot accept the Transitivity of <, the Permutation Principle, the Qualitativeness of <
and Pareto without concluding that most infinite worlds are incomparable. In section 5.2 I
argue that the first three axioms are highly plausible and show that rejecting any of them
has unacceptable consequences. In section 5.3 I defend the Pareto principle. If we accept the
Transitivity of <, the Permutation Principle, the Qualitativeness of < and Pareto, however,
then we must conclude that there is pervasive incomparability between infinite worlds.
In section 5.4 I formulate new problems for objective and subjective permissibility that arise
if there is pervasive incomparability between infinite worlds. I show that if we accept in-
comparability then we are forced to reject at least one analogue of the four axioms above for
objective and subjective permissibility. This problem applies not only to consequentialist
theories of permissibility but to all theories of objective and subjective permissibility, includ-
ing deontological theories and virtue ethics, which are not premised on there being a close
connection between the value of worlds and the permissibility of actions. This shows that
the pervasive incomparability problem creates serious problems for ethics and not merely
for consequentialists. I conclude that the incomparability results of Chapters 2 and 3 leave
ethics radically altered, regardless of which axioms we ultimately reject.
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5.1 The Incomparability Result as an Impossibility Result
In the previous chapter I considered several possible extensions of the incomparability results
of Chapters 2 and 3. In this chapter I am going to return to the original incomparability
results that did not assume any ethical principles stronger than Pareto. As I argued in
Chapters 2 and 3, if we accept Pareto, the Qualitativeness of <, the Permutation Principle,
and the Transitivity of <, then we can show that many infinite worlds are incomparable: w1
is not at least as good as w2 and w2 is not at least as good as w1. If we accept these four
axioms we must therefore conclude that the completeness axiom is false: not all worlds are
ethically comparable. This is not merely incomparability between a small subset of infinite
world pairs, however. If we accept these axioms then incomparability between infinite world
pairs is ubiquitous. Whenever there is a bidirectional upgrade from w1 to w2 and vice versa,
w1 and w2 are incomparable (Result 8). And for any randomly selected pair of infinite worlds
〈w1, w2〉, it is likely that we will be able to find a bidirectional upgrade from w1 to w2 and
from w2 to w1.
191 Therefore incomparability between infinite worlds will be ubiquitous.
If one infinite world least as good as the other by Pareto or some extension of Pareto such
as the Weak People Criterion, then those worlds be shown to be incomparable by a four
world or cyclic argument. This makes up an extremely small fraction of infinite world pairs.
however. To give an intuitive story about why this is uncommon, suppose that two agents
were to play a game in which they each flip a fair coin independently of one another. An
agent wins a round every time their coin comes up heads and the other person’s comes up
191There is not a bidirectional upgrade from w1 to w2 and from w2 to w1 only if there is some agent in w1
with utility strictly greater than or strictly less than that of any agent in w2 (and, if we accept the Weak
People Criterion, only if there are infinitely many such agents). Unless there is something preventing any of
the agents in w2 from having utility levels above or below some threshold, it would be extremely surprising
to find that this condition is satisfied. Suppose we rolled two infinite-sided dice (representing possible utility
levels) infinitely many times (representing the number of agents in each world). The probability that the
maximum [minimum] throw of the first die is strictly greater than [less than] the maximum [minimum] throw
of the second die is close to zero. The case is trickier if agents can have any real-valued utility level.
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tails. If the two coins land on the same side, the round is tied. Now suppose that the two
agents played infinitely many rounds of this game. We would be extremely surprised if we
were to find out that one agent had won the game only finitely many times over the course
of infinitely many rounds. But if two identical population worlds are strictly ranked by the
Weak People Criterion, it must be the case that only finitely many locations are worse off in
one world than they are in the other. This is akin to finding out that one agent winning only
finitely many games over infinitely many rounds.192 Finding out that one world is better
than another by Pareto is akin to finding out that one of the agents never lost a game!
Arntzenius [6, p. 51-52] points out that if worlds are infinite then almost all ‘random walk’
world pairs 〈w1, w2〉 will such that infinitely many agents are better off in w1 than in w2 and
infinitely many agents are better off in w2 than in w1, and will therefore be incomparable by
either the Pareto principle or extensions of it like the Weak People Criterion.
The incomparability results of Chapters 2 and 3 can therefore be characterized as an impos-
sibility result showing that we cannot jointly accept the following five axioms:
(1) Transitivity of < If w1 < w2 and w2 < w3 then w1 < w3
(2) Permutation Principle For any world pair 〈w1, w2〉 and any bijection g from the
population of 〈w1, w2〉 onto any population, there exists a world pair 〈w3, w4〉 that is a qual-
itative duplicate of 〈w1, w2〉 under bijection g.
(3) Qualitativeness of < If the pair 〈w3, w4〉 is a qualitative duplicate of the pair
〈w1, w2〉, then w3 < w4 if and only if w1 < w2
(4) Pareto Principle If w1 and w2 have identical populations and for all agents
x in w1 and w2, uw1(x) ≥ uw2(x), then w1 < w2. If there is also some agent x in w1 and w2
such that uw1(x) > uw2(x), then w1  w2.
192See Zame [247, p. 51-2].
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(5) Minimal Completeness of < Comparability between infinite worlds (w1 < w2 or
w2 < w1) is not incredibly rare
Most of us would want to retain all five of the axioms above, but the arguments of Chapters
2 and 3 show that they cannot be jointly retained. We must therefore determine which of
the five axioms is the least plausible. If we want to retain the Pareto principle and Minimal
Completeness, for example, then we must reject the Transitivity of <, the Permutation
Principle, or the Qualitativeness of < (we may, of course, reject more than one axiom). In
the next section I will consider the consequences of rejecting the first three axioms.
5.2 Transitivity, the Permutation Principle, and Qualitativeness
The four world and cyclic arguments of Chapters 2 and 3 relied on the Transitivity of
<, the Permutation Principle, and the Qualitativeness of <. We can therefore block the
incomparability results of these chapters if we deny at least one of these three axioms. In
this section I will consider the consequences of denying each of these axioms in turn.
5.2.1 The Transitivity of <
The four world and cyclic arguments appeal to the Transitivity of < when they claim that
if w2  w3 by Pareto and w3 < w4 by the Qualitativeness of < and w4  w1 by Pareto, then
it follows that w1 6< w2. If we reject Transitivity then we would not be entitled to conclude
this, since we could instead conclude that w2  w3 < w4  w1 < w2.
While Transitivity was once considered entirely uncontroversial, some objections to this
principle have emerged in recent years. The objection that is most relevant to the four
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world and cyclic arguments is Temkin’s ‘different criteria’ objection.193 Temkin argues that
if multiple criteria are being used to generate a ranking, then those criteria can result in
intransitive rankings if criteria are given different weights across comparisons.194 We might
think that this is at play in the four world argument: the verdict that w2  w3 is driven
by the Pareto criterion but the verdict that w1 < w2 is driven by some other criterion,
such as spatiotemporal configuration. Perhaps spatiotemporal configuration should be given
less weight in the comparison between worlds that are Pareto comparable than it is in the
comparison between Pareto-incomparable worlds, resulting in intransitivity.195
I do not believe that we have good reasons for thinking that this is what is going on in
comparisons between infinite worlds. If criterion A is given greater weight when we compare
x and y, such that x  y, and criterion B is given greater weight when we compare y and
z, such that y  z, then surely we should at least be somewhat compelled to maintain that
y  z even if this conflicts with Transitivity.196 When we compare infinite worlds, however,
the intransitivity results seem to undermine our belief that the non-Paretian criterion should
be given any weight. Consider the case of Clement and Stormy from Chapter 2:
193Temkin’s other main objections to Transitivity are based on ‘spectrum arguments’, which are less
relevant to four world and cyclic arguments. For responses, see Norcross [175], Voorhoeve [240], and Nebel
[168]. Further arguments against Transitivity can also be found in Rachels [187] and Temkin [224].
194This argument can be found in [226, p. 219-221]. Note that if there are multiple criteria but their
weight does not vary across comparisons, then the < relation would remain transitive.
195This would make the four world argument a lot like the infinite puzzle discussed by Kagan [119, p.
471-8].
196For example, suppose we believe that when comparing one finance job over another, we should give a
lot of weight to which has the greater salary and less weight to how pleasant we would find the work. We
also believe that when comparing a finance job with a job in the arts, we should give less weight to which has
the greater salary and more weight to how pleasant we would find the work. We could end up concluding
that having a high paying but unpleasant finance job is better than having a low paying but very pleasant
finance job (since it has a higher salary) and having a low paying but very pleasant finance job is better
than having a typical job in the arts (since it affords greater pleasure) but that having a typical job in the
arts is better than having a high paying but unpleasant finance job (since it affords greater pleasure). If we
genuinely believe that these criteria are given different weight across comparisons, then we should continue
to find each of these pairwise rankings plausible even after we discover that they are jointly intransitive.
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A B C D E G
Clement - / / — — —
Stormy — — — - - /
Duplicate Clement — — — - / /
Duplicate Stormy - - / — — —
Figure 88: Clement, Stormy, and duplicates again
When we see that Stormy is better than Duplicate Clement by Pareto and that Duplicate
Stormy is better than Clement by Pareto, this undermines our initial intuition that Clement
is better than Stormy and that Duplicate Clement is better than Duplicate Stormy. Facts
about the spatiotemporal configuration of agents suddenly seem to lose their relevance for
comparing infinite worlds: they don’t strike us as different criteria that should be given
more weight when the Pareto criterion can be applied and no weight when it can be applied.
If this is correct then we may be using locations-based criteria as some kind of proxy for
improving the lives of agents when worlds are not Pareto comparable. Once we realize that
locations-based criteria are not proxies for improving lives, we cease to find them compelling.
Temkin also acknowledges that if the goodness of a world is an intrinsic property – the
goodness of a world is fixed solely by its ‘internal features’ [226, p. 229] – then the ‘better
than’ relation would indeed be transitive because the goodness of each world would be fixed
by these features: it would not vary depending on what we are comparing it with and can
therefore be represented on the same linear scale. Therefore Temkin would presumably agree
that the relation ‘is at least as good as’ is transitive if how good a world is does not vary
depending on which world we are comparing it with.
Broome [46, p. 124] argues that the Transitivity of comparative properties like goodness is
an undeniable principle of logic. In defense of Transitivity, Broome [46] argues that we can
derive the Transitivity of betterness from the fact that goodness is a property of worlds,
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regardless of whether it is an intrinsic property of worlds. He states:
Now, this derivation of the transitivity of betterness does not actually require
the premise that goodness is an intrinsic property. If A is at least as good as
B and B is at least as good as C, then A’s goodness is at least as great as B’s,
and B’s is at least as great as C’s. Consequently A’s goodness is at least as
great as C’s. So A must be at least as good as C. The basis of this argument
is simply that goodness is a property, and that betterness is the comparative
of goodness. There is no need for goodness to be an intrinsic property. The
comparative of any property is necessarily transitive. [46, p. 233]
Broome argues that if different criteria are relevant across comparisons, then we are not
using the comparative of a single property: namely the property of goodness. He concludes
that if our judgments about worlds are intransitive even upon reflection – we do not drop our
initial judgment that Clement is at least as good as Stormy – then those judgments cannot
be about the < relation, since this is the comparative of goodness. [46, p. 234].
Broome’s argument is consistent with the claim that < is an incomplete relation. Broome
notes that Transitivity is consistent with what he calls ‘hard indeterminacy’. He states:
‘Transitivity requires that if x is F er than y and y is F er than z, then x is F er than z. If
it turns out that neither x is F er than y nor y F er than x, then in this case Transitivity is
vacuously satisfied.’ [46, p. 126] Broome’s argument is also consistent with the claim that <
is a qualitative but not a qualitative internal relation. If goodness were an intrinsic property
of worlds, it would follow that if < is a qualitative relation it is a qualitative internal relation.
But, as Broome points out, goodness need not be an intrinsic property.
I will not offer an extensive defense of the Transitivity < here. Most of us consider this
principle so plausible that we will be compelled to reject our judgment that Clement is at
least as good as Stormy or to reject our judgment that Stormy is at least as good as Duplicate
Clement long before we will doubt our judgment that the ‘at least as good as’ relation is
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transitive.197 The Transitivity of < seems like one of the axioms we are least likely to deny
out of the five axioms listed above.
5.2.2 The Permutation Principle
The Permutation Principle acts as a kind of existence axiom in the four world and cyclic
arguments. It states that for any world pair and any bijection from the population of that
world pair onto any population of possible people, there exists another world pair that is
a qualitative duplicate of the original world pair under that bijection. If we reject the
Permutation Principle then we will not always be able to find a qualitative duplicate of
〈w1, w2〉 that results in a violation of Transitivity. So we will not be able to show that w1
and w2 are incomparable even if we accept Transitivity, the Qualitativeness of < and Pareto.
The Permutation Principle could be interpreted in two ways, depending on whether we take
the relevant notion of possibility in the principle to metaphysical possibility or something
broader than this, such as logical possibility or some intermediate concept of possibility that
is broader than metaphysical possibility but narrower than logical possibility. Two notable
views are inconsistent with the stronger, metaphysical interpretation of the Permutation
Principle. The first is essentialism. Essentialists believe that agents cannot play any qualita-
tive role whatsoever in a world: for ancestor essentialists they cannot play the role of someone
with different ancestry, for example. But facts about ancestry can be qualitative. You have
many ancestors who existed before you. Therefore, according to ancestor essentialism, you
cannot play the qualitative role of an agent that lacks any ancestors. Any permutation that
fails to preserve these essential qualitative properties and relations does not correspond to
a metaphysically possible world pair. The second view that is in tension with this claim is
197If we reject the first judgment then we must reject either the Permutation Principle, the Qualitativeness
of <, or Minimal Completeness. If we reject the second judgment then we must reject the Pareto principle.
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anti-haecceitism. Anti-haecceitists believe that a difference in identity entails, as a matter of
metaphysical necessity, a difference in some qualitative property or relation at the relevant
world pair. This means that no world pair that is a qualitative duplicate of 〈w1, w2〉 under
a non-trivial permutation is a metaphysically possible world pair.
Suppose we believe that facts about whether one world is ethically at least as good as an-
other (facts like ‘w1 < w2’) are metaphysically necessary but not logically necessary. When
combined with the view that there are essential characteristics, this would prevent us from
constructing many four world and cyclic arguments. If there are differences between the es-
sential characteristics of different possible people then permuting agents in ways that change
their essential characteristics will result in metaphysically impossible world pairs. And if
facts of the form ‘w1 is at least as good as w2’ need not extend to metaphysically impos-
sible worlds and the world pair 〈w3, w4〉 is metaphysically impossible qualitative duplicate
of 〈w1, w2〉, then we can maintain that w1 < w2 and deny that w3 < w4 without violating
the claim that < is a necessary qualitative relation. If < need not hold between metaphys-
ically impossible worlds, then the claim that < is qualitative only entails that if 〈w3, w4〉 is
a metaphysically possible qualitative duplicate of 〈w1, w2〉, then w1 < w2 iff w3 < w4.
If we hold this view, the reasons that we had for accepting the Permutation Principle are
only reasons for accepting the a version of that principle that is restricted to the qualitative
duplicates of a world pair that are metaphysically possible:
Restricted Permutation Principle
For any world pair 〈w1, w2〉 and any bijection g from the population of 〈w1, w2〉 onto any
population that preserves essential properties and relations, there exists a metaphysically
possible world pair 〈w3, w4〉 that is a qualitative duplicate of 〈w1, w2〉 under bijection g.
The Restricted Permutation Principle can be used to show that infinite worlds are incompa-
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rable whenever there is a metaphysically possible permutations of the agents of a world pair:
a possible permutation of the agents of the world pair that preserves the essential character-
istics of the populations. Note that unless we have an extremely broad account of essential
characteristics – including features like spatial location and birth order – we will often be
able to find such a metaphysically possible world pair. Therefore rejecting the Permutation
Principle on these grounds will not entirely recover completeness. It will, however, reduce
the amount of incompleteness that can be established. The more properties and relations
that are metaphysically essential, the fewer world pairs that can be shown to be incompa-
rable by a four world or cyclic argument using the Restricted Permutation Principle. Just
what qualitative properties are essential is an open question, but there are few who would
claim that an agent can play any qualitative role whatsoever.198
The term ‘fragility’ is used to describe the extent to which our identity depends on the
qualitative properties and roles that we have. One extreme is that identity is not fragile at
all: our identity does not depend on any of our qualitative properties whatsoever. The other
extreme is that identity is perfectly fragile: any change in qualitative properties will result
in a change in identity. This view is clearly inconsistent with the Permutation Principle.199
If identity is ‘perfectly fragile’ across all qualitative dimensions (psychology, genetics, etc.)
then any change in qualitative properties will result in a change in identity. On this view I
am just the sum of my qualitative parts. I could not have been happier than I currently am
because this would mean that I have different qualitative properties than those I actually
198Suppose world w1 contains infinitely many happy humans and infinitely many sad humans and w2
contains infinitely many happy hamsters and infinitely many sad hamsters. In order to show that w1 6< w2
by a four world argument, we would have to suppose that each of the humans in w1 can play the qualitative
role of a hamster in w4. Many of us will be inclined to think that this is not possible. We need not restrict
ourselves to objects capable of happiness and sadness when making this point if we extend the Permutation
Principle to permutations of all objects.
199If we hold this view of personal identity then we must believe that world w3 can only be a qualitative
duplicate of world w2 that contains the agents of w1 if world w1 is a qualitative duplicate of w2.
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have, and this is not possible.200 This view is not only inconsistent with the Permutation
Principle: it also entails that no world can be strictly better or worse than another world by
Pareto because it is not possible for identical populations to have distinct utility levels.201
The primary response to the this argument against the Permutation Principle is simply
that we have no reason for thinking that identity is perfectly fragile across all qualitative
dimensions. How robust or fragile our identity is remains an open question, but the claim
that identity is perfectly fragile is in tension with our intuitions about cases and our ordinary
use of the term. Surely you could have been slightly happier when you woke up this morning.
Surely you could have had slightly shorter hair than you currently do.202 For this reason
many, including Hare [102, Ch. 7], simply assume that identity (or essence) is not perfectly
fragile across all qualitative dimensions. I will also assume that this is not the case.203
The claim that qualitative duplicates under a permutation are metaphysically possible is
also in tension with anti-haecceitism. Consider Lewis’s characterization of anti-haecceitism:
200The claim that identity is perfectly fragile is consistent with the claim that there can be identity across
time. If agents have temporal parts as Lewis [153] argues then the view that identity is perfectly fragile
entails that people could not have had temporal parts that are different from those that they actually have.
201Those who believe that identity is perfectly fragile could in principle accept if the Pareto principle is
metaphysically necessary then it is vacuously satisfied: it just entails that two qualitatively identical worlds
are equally good. But we cannot use Pareto to generate four world or cyclic arguments because these
arguments involve qualitatively distinct worlds that contain identical populations, which is impossible.
202Those who believe that identity is perfectly fragile could adopt an error theory about ordinary identity
talk, but the fact that our concept of identity is not perfectly fragile is a pro tanto reason against the view.
If we accept that identity is perfectly fragile then we are still faced the difficult task of producing a suitably
plausible and complete ranking of infinite worlds.
203If essence is not perfectly fragile then we Hare’s [103] [102, Ch. 11] ‘morphing’ argument can be raised
as a challenge for essentialist and anti-haecceitists. For any world pair 〈w1, w2〉 we can find a sequence of
(non-duplicate) world pairs 〈w′1, w′2〉, 〈w′′1 , w′′2 〉, and so on such that w′1 has the same population as w2 but
the agents of w′1 play qualitative roles that are slightly closer to those played by agents in w1, and so on.
Suppose that at some point in this sequence we reach a world pair 〈w′′,...,′1 , w
′′,...,′
2 〉 such that w
′′,...,′
1 contains
the same agents as w2 but playing the qualitative roles played by agents in w1 and w
′′,...,′
2 contains the same
agents as w1 but playing the qualitative roles played by agents in w2. But if we accept that each ‘almost
duplicate’ and its predecessor contain identical populations, we can use such sequences to generate violations
of Transitivity across metaphysically possible world pairs.
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‘If two worlds differ in what they represent de re concerning some individual, but
do not differ qualitatively in any way, I shall call that a haecceitistic difference.
Haecceitism, as I propose to use the word, is the doctrine that there are at least
some cases of haecceitistic difference between worlds. Anti-haecceitism is the
doctrine that there are none.’ [152, p. 221]
Haecceitism, as Lewis understands it, is the view that two possible worlds can be qualitatively
identical in all respects and yet different individuals can be represented in those worlds. The
claim that it is metaphysically possible to permute the population of a disjoint world pair
so that a world w3 contains the same agents as w1 even though w3 is qualitatively identical
to w2 would seem to commit us to haecceitism as Lewis understands it.
Anti-haecceitism does not commit us to the claim that the same agent could not have had
different qualitative properties and relations.204 However, anti-haecceitists will reject the
claim that for some non-trivial bijection from the population of a world pair onto another
population, there exists a metaphysically possible qualitative duplicate of that world pair
under that bijection, since this requires some haecceitistic difference between the two world
pairs. Lewisian anti-haecceitists will therefore reject that the claim that permuting the
population of a world pair results in a metaphysically possible qualitative duplicate.
In summary: essentialists will reject the claim that all qualitative duplicate world pairs
under a non-trivial permutation are metaphysically possible because they believe that certain
qualitative properties are necessary for identity and these will not always be preserved by
the permutation in question. Anti-haecceitists will reject the claim that any qualitative
duplicate world pairs under a non-trivial permutation are metaphysically possible because
204Lewis’s [152, §4.3] view is that the same individual cannot exist in different possible worlds but that
the same individual can be be represented de re in different worlds even if their qualitative properties are
different. Representations of the same individual in different possible worlds are the individual’s counterparts.
Therefore to say that I could have been happier yesterday is to say that I have a counterpart in a possible
world that has this property. We can need not adopt this counterpart-theoretic framework, however. Section
1.3 of Hare [103] discusses similar issues without appeal to counterpart theory.
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the believe that qualitative differences are necessary for differences in identity. They will
therefore deny that we can produce a qualitative duplicate world pair under a permutation.
So it seems that all but the most extreme haecceitists will agree that many permutations of
a population will result in metaphysically impossible qualitative duplicates.
In order for this to constitute an objection to the Permutation Principle, however, we must
also hold that the domain of the < relation does not include metaphysically impossible
worlds. I believe that we should reject this crucial claim. The claim that facts about the
< relation holds necessarily between some metaphysically impossible worlds seems to be
consistent with what we generally take to be entailed by claims involving the < relation.
Suppose that the following is a fact: if w1 and w2 contain only a single agent and that agent
is happy in w1 and miserable in w2 then w1  w2. Suppose that John is happy in one
world and miserable in another and no other agents exist in these worlds. It seems we must
conclude that the first world is better than the second. But now suppose that you found
out that John was born to different parents in the second world than in the first. Would we
now feel in no way compelled to say that the first world is better than the second? Surely
not. If we believe that if w1 and w2 contain only a single agent and that agent is happy in
w1 and miserable in w2 then w1  w2, then it seems to follow that the world in which John
is happy is better than a world in which John is sad and was born to different parents. The
second world may not be metaphysically possible but the world pair still has a property that
we believe is sufficient for the better than relation to hold between them.
Claiming that the domain < includes metaphysically impossible worlds does not commit us
to the claim that the relation is logically necessary since its domain need not include all
logically possible worlds. It is even possible that the domain of the < relation includes some
metaphysically impossible worlds but that it does not include all metaphysically possible
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worlds.205 All that we require is that the < relation holds necessarily between any qualitative
duplicate of a world pair 〈w1, w2〉, even if these worlds are metaphysically impossible.
It seems plausible that for any world pair 〈w1, w2〉 and any bijection g from the population
of 〈w1, w2〉 onto any population, there is a logically possible world pair 〈w3, w4〉 that is a
qualitative duplicate of 〈w1, w2〉 under g even if the metaphysical possibility of 〈w3, w4〉 is
not guaranteed. Rejecting the Permutation Principle therefore rests on the claim that facts
of the form ‘necessarily, if w1 and w2 stand in relation R to one another then w1 < w2’ can
be true even if two logically possible but metaphysically impossible worlds w1 and w2 stand
in relation R to one another and w1 6< w2. If we believe that the < relation is a necessary
relation that holds between these worlds even if they are metaphysically impossible, then it
is difficult to see any grounds on which we could challenge the Permutation Principle.206
If we reject the claim that the domain of < includes metaphysically impossible world pairs,
we can still show that worlds w1 and w2 are incomparable if there is a bidirectional upgrade
from w1 to w2 and from w2 to w1 under a restricted permutation. This constrains the class of
worlds that can be shown to be incomparable. Before concluding this section, I wish to point
out that many infinite wolrds can be shown to be incomparable using restricted permutations
if we adopt a plausible strengthening of the claim that < is a qualitative relation.
Suppose that w1 < w2. The Permutation Principle guarantees that we can find a pair
205A detailed discussion of the relationship between metaphysical and normative necessity is beyond the
scope of this document. For more on this topic, see [81], [130, §5.3.2], and [150].
206Those who insist that the < relation is at most metaphysically necessary face the difficult task of showing
how facts about haecceities can be used to generate an adequately complete ranking of infinite worlds that is
not entirely ad hoc or inequitable. Haecceitistic rankings are not difficult to generate. We could, for example,
rank infinite worlds based entirely on Obama’s happiness levels (and be indifferent between worlds in which
Obama does not exist and worlds at which he has zero utility) but this would hardly be plausible. Those
who advocate using haecceitistic facts to rank infinite worlds must also offer an account of how haecceitistic
relations hold between existent and non-existent objects in order to rank non-identical populations. Whether
a haecceitistic relation holds between an existent and non-existent object may be subject to vagueness, which
would mean that we could at best yield only vague rankings of infinite worlds from such haecceitistic rankings.
There are clearly great difficulties facing anyone who chooses to go down this path.
191
of worlds 〈w3, w4〉 under a permutation that is a duplicate of 〈w1, w2〉 in absolutely every
qualitative respect. This is important because the claim that < is a necessary qualitative
relation entails that w3 < w4 only if this pair is a perfect qualitative duplicate of 〈w1, w2〉.
We cannot conclude that w3 < w4 if the pair differs in any qualitative respect, even if the
difference between the pairs seems entirely ethically irrelevant. For example, suppose that
〈w3, w4〉 is qualitatively identical to 〈w1, w2〉 in all respects except the following: in w1 there
is a blade of grass that is wilting, while in w3 the same blade of grass is not wilting. Since
〈w3, w4〉 is not a perfect qualitative duplicate of 〈w1, w2〉 we can no longer conclude from the
qualitativeness of < that w3 < w4. Yet surely if w1 < w2 and 〈w3, w4〉 differs from 〈w1, w2〉
in this ethically irrelevant respect only, we must conclude that w3 < w4.
It seems uncontroversial to claim that if 〈w3, w4〉 differs from 〈w1, w2〉 only in respects that
are ethically irrelevant, such as the dry blade of grass, then if w1 < w2 it must also be the
case that w3 < w4. If this is correct then we are in a position to endorse a claim is stronger
than the claim that < is a necessary qualitative relation, namely the following:
Ethically Relevant Qualitativeness of < If the pair 〈w3, w4〉 is a qualitative duplicate
of the pair 〈w1, w2〉 in all ethically relevant respects, then w3 < w4 if and only if w1 < w2
We need not take strong stand on which qualitative properties and relations are ethically
relevant or irrelevant. Many qualitative properties, such as agent utilities, relationships
between agents, and so on, are plausibly ethically relevant. But the ethical irrelevance of
some qualitative properties and relations, such as the color of an agent’s hair or the name of
a street or the most popular flavor of jam, seems to be uncontroversial. The principle above
commits us to the view that if one world pair differs from another in only these ethically
irrelevant respects, whatever these turn out to be, then < relation holds between the first
pair of worlds if and only if it holds between the second pair of worlds.
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If we accept the Ethically Relevant Qualitativeness of < and there is a bidirectional upgrade
from w1 to w2 and from w2 to w1 then we can show that w1 and w2 are incomparable if there
exists a metaphysically possible world pair 〈w3, w4〉 that is an ethically relevant qualitative
duplicate of 〈w1, w2〉 under some bijection g. This greatly reduces the extent to which anti-
haecceitism represents a challenge to the incomparability results. Suppose that 〈w3, w4〉 is a
qualitative duplicate of 〈w1, w2〉 in all ethically relevant respects and w3 contains the same
population as w2 and w4 contains the same population as w1. Anti-haecceitists objected to
this possibility in pairs that are perfect qualitative duplicates because it required that there
can be a difference in the identity of agents between w1 and w3 (and w2 and w4) without
there being a qualitative difference between the two worlds. This is not true, however, if
the world pair is an ethically relevant qualitative duplicate rather than a perfect qualitative
duplicate. Assume that w1 contains men with red hair and w2 contains women with blond
hair. If gender and hair color are not ethically relevant then we can suppose that the identical
populations of w2 and w3 are composed of women that have blond hair and that the identical
populations of w4 and w1 are composed of men that have red hair. Since we are assuming
that gender and hair color are not ethically relevant, this is consistent with the claim that
w1 and w3 (and w2 and w4) are qualitatively identical in all ethically relevant respects.
The only world pairs that meet the conditions of the results of Chapter 2 but that cannot be
shown to be incomparable using the Restricted Permutation Principle and the Ethically Rel-
evant Qualitativeness of < are those in which there are ethically relevant essential properties
or relations that some agent in w1 has and that no agent in w2 has. Suppose that ‘having
ancestors’ is an essential property that the agents in world w1 have and the agents in world
w2 lack. If ‘having ancestors’ is not ethically relevant then we can find a metaphysically
possible world pair 〈w3, w4〉 that is a qualitative duplicate of 〈w1, w2〉 in all ethically relevant
respects in which w2 and w3 have identical populations of agents with no ancestors and w4
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and w1 have identical populations of agents with ancestors. But suppose that it is good to
honor your ancestors if you have ancestors and that the agents of w1 all honor their ancestors
while the agents of w2 do not (since they do not have any ancestors). If w3 is a qualitative
duplicate of w1 in all ethically relevant respects then this would require that the agents of
w3 all honor their ancestors, which is not possible since they do not have any. Therefore
if having ancestors is an ethically relevant essential property, the pair 〈w3, w4〉 cannot be a
qualitative duplicate of 〈w1, w2〉 in all ethically relevant respects.
Whether there are any ethically relevant essential properties and how common these prop-
erties are depends on both what kind of essentialism or anti-haecceisitism is true, if any, and
what qualitative properties are ethically relevant. Answering these questions are not always
trivial. For example, suppose that species essentialism is true. This might seem like a plau-
sible candidate for an ethically relevant essential property because, on many moral theories,
species is treated as an ethically relevant property. Humans may have rights that birds lack
and the wellbeing of humans may be given more moral weight than the wellbeing of birds.
But the property of ‘being a human’ may not actually be ethically relevant according to
these theories. Instead, other properties that humans have and birds lack may be what truly
matters. For example, if there existed a bird with the same capacity to reason, the same
capacity to foresee the future, and the same capacity to suffer as a human, then many moral
theories that generally distinguish between birds and humans would not distinguish between
this bird and humans.207 If this is the case then it is not ‘being human’ that is ethically
relevant, but one or more of these underlying properties. And species essentialism may be
true while essentialism about these underlying properties is not.
I cannot offer a compelling answer to the question of whether and to what extent there are
207Whether there are any ethically relevant qualitative properties that can ground distinct moral treatment
of human and non-human animals is the subject of much debate. Singer [209] argues that none of the
qualitative properties that none of the commonly cited properties of humans is able to play this role. And
the property of ‘being human’ is not, by itself, considered sufficient grounds for distinct moral treatment.
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ethically relevant essential properties. But I believe we can say with some confidence that
world pairs in which there are ethically relevant essential properties or relations that some
agent in w1 has and that no agent in w2 has are likely to be far less common than world pairs
in which there are any essential properties or relations that some agent in w1 has and that
no agent in w2 has if we consider the most commonly held views about which qualitative
properties are essential and which qualitative properties are ethically relevant. If this is
correct then endorsing the Ethically Relevant Qualitativeness of < seems to greatly weaken
the objection to the Permutation Principle on essentialist and anti-haecceitist grounds.
5.2.3 The Qualitativeness of <
In the four world and cyclic arguments it is assumed that < is a necessary qualitative
relation. If < is a non-qualitative relation then even if 〈w3, w4〉 is a qualitative duplicate of
〈w1, w2〉 under some permutation of the population of 〈w1, w2〉, it is possible that w1 < w2
but w3 6< w4. Therefore if we deny that < is a qualitative relation then we can block the
four world and cyclic results even if we accept Transitivity and the Permutation Principle.
If < is not a qualitative relation then then whether it holds between two worlds depends not
only on facts about whether the same people or different people exist at a given world pair,
but on facts about the identities of the agents that exist in each world. For example, it’s
possible that 〈w3, w4〉 is a qualitative duplicate of 〈w1, w2〉 but w1 < w2 and w3 6< w4 simply
because one of the agents in 〈w1, w2〉 is Obama and the agent playing the qualitative role of
Obama in 〈w3, w4〉 is merely a qualitative duplicate of Obama and not Obama himself.
There are two key arguments against the claim that < is a non-qualitative relation. The
first is that, as I argued in Chapter 2, the Qualitativeness of < seems to capture a very basic
notion of equity. Those who accept Pareto acknowledge that whether one world is better
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than another is sensitive to facts about whether the two worlds contain the same agents or
not. But if ethics is to be equitable then it seems that, at a minimum, it should be insensitive
to facts about which particulars exist at those worlds. Ethics should be sensitive to the fact
that the same agent exists in w1 and w2 and is better off in w1 than in w2, but it should
not be sensitive to the fact that the agent in question is Obama. This notion of equity is
captured by the claim that < is a necessary qualitative relation. The claim that < is a
non-qualitative relation is in tension with this basic notion of equity.
A further argument against the claim that < is a non-qualitative relation is simply that it
is not clear how we could possibly use haecceitistic facts to produce a ranking of infinite
worlds that avoids the incomparability results that is not entirely ad hoc, even if we did
accept that haecceitistic facts can affect the ethical ranking of worlds.208 Given this, I do
not believe that rejecting the Qualitativeness of < is a viable option for those wishing to
avoid the incomparability results of the preceding chapters.
5.3 Rejecting Pareto
A final option for avoiding ubiquitous incomparability is to reject the Pareto principle. If
we reject Pareto then we can deny that Stormy is better than Duplicate Clement and that
Duplicate Stormy is better than Clement in the case from Chapter 2, thus blocking the
four world result in this case. This generalizes to all of the four world and cyclic results
of Chapter 3. If we reject Pareto then we can then attempt to identify qualitative features
208Haecceitistic rankings are not difficult to generate. We could, for example, rank infinite worlds based
entirely on Obama’s happiness levels and be indifferent between worlds in which Obama does not exist and
worlds at which he has zero utility, but this would hardly be plausible or equitable. Those who advocate
using haecceitistic facts to rank infinite worlds must also offer an account of how haecceitistic relations hold
between existent and non-existent objects in order to rank non-identical populations. Whether a haecceitistic
relation holds between an existent and non-existent object may be subject to vagueness, which would mean
that we could at best yield only vague rankings of infinite worlds from such haecceitistic rankings.
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of world pairs, such as agents’ spatiotemporal locations and utility levels, that can be used
produce something close to a complete and transitive ranking of infinite worlds. For example,
in the case of Stormy and Clement, Expansionism entails that the four worlds can be ranked
as follows: Clement ∼ Duplicate Clement  Stormy ∼ Duplicate Stormy.209
I have argued that Pareto is a fundamental principle of ethics. Much of the discussion of
this principle has occurred in previous chapters. In Chapter 2, I considered an objection to
Pareto offered by Hamkins and Montero. They argue that we should reject Pareto because
it is inconsistent with the claim that a world is as good as a copy of that world which
preserves ‘the topological structure of locations and and the amount of local goodness at
those locations’ of a world [100, p. 235]. I showed that this argument assumes that < is a
qualitative internal relation, which we have no reason to believe.
The structure of this section is as follows. First, I will ask whether there are independent
reasons to reject the Pareto principle. I consider what I believe constitute the most note-
worthy independent reasons to reject Pareto: objections to the moral importance of persons
rather than experiences in the principle, and objections to the principle based on its tension
with distributive principles. Second, I will explore what options are available to us if we do
reject Pareto on independent grounds and how attractive these non-Paretian views are. I do
so because, although we should want to look for independent reasons to give up Pareto, how
compelled we will be to give up the axiom also depends on how attractive the alternatives
to Pareto are. I will argue that although non-Paretian methods for ranking infinite worlds
produce intuitively acceptable rankings that are either total orderings or at least generate
less incomparability than Pareto does, they are not plausible on reflection.
209Some qualitative properties, such as the midpoints of the accumulation intervals of worlds, may be used
to produce a total order over all infinite world pairs. (See Armstrong [1] for another proposed method for
producing a ordering using accumulation intervals.) Other qualitative properties may be used reduce but
not entirely eliminate incomparability between infinite worlds.
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The core assumption of the Pareto principle is the claim that people are the ‘basic locations
of value’ in our sensitivity principles (principles that prevent us from being indifferent about
increases in utility at these locations). If people are not the sort of thing that our ethical
theories can or should be sensitive to then we ought to reject the Pareto principle.
One prominent view that is in tension with the Pareto principle is the Reductionist view
of personal identity: the view that facts about personal identity can be reduced to further
facts, typically about physical or psychological continuity, that can be described wholly
impersonally [179, p. 210-211] and that ‘the existence of a person to involve nothing more
than the occurrence of interrelated mental and physical events’ [179, 341]. Parfit characterizes
the ramifications of Reductionist beliefs about personal identity as follows:
‘These [Reductionist] beliefs support certain moral claims. It becomes more
plausible, when thinking morally, to focus less upon the person, the subject
of experiences, and instead to focus more upon the experiences themselves. It
becomes more plausible to claim that, just as we are right to ignore whether
people come from the same or different nations, we are right to ignore whether
experiences come within the same or different lives.’ [179, p. 341]
‘If we cease to believe that persons are separately existing entities, and come
to believe that the unity of a life involves no more than the various relations
between the experiences in this life, it becomes more plausible to be more con-
cerned about the quality of experiences, and less concerned about whose expe-
riences they are.’ [179, p. 346]
Parfit [179, p. 339] argues that if we hold this view of personal identity then those do
not think that the equal distribution of benefits at different times is of moral importance
independent of its effects should also not believe that the equal distribution of benefits for
different people is of moral importance independent of its effects. He appeals to an analogy
between persons and nation states. If we could yield a greater benefit to the people of one
nation over another then many of us would not see the fact that the first nation happened
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to have a history less full of of suffering than the second nation as a reason to relieve the
suffering of fewer people in the second nation today. He argues that, by analogy, ‘We may
believe that, when we are trying to relieve suffering, neither persons nor lives are the morally
significant unit. We may again decide to aim for the least possible suffering, whatever its
distribution.’ [179, p. 341].
Parfit does not deny the existence of persons or claim that identity is perfectly fragile.
Instead, he argues that whether an instance of suffering occurs in the same person or in a
different person is no more morally relevant than whether an instance of suffering occurs at
one time or at a different time. In worlds that contain finite utility, there Parfit’s position
is consistent with the Pareto principle. For example, the utilitarian criterion ‘world w1 is
better than world w2 iff the total utility of world w1 is greater than the total utility of world
w2’ is clearly consistent with Parfit’s claims about the role of personal identity in ethics.
And if world w1 and world w2 contain finite utility then whenever w1 is better than w2 by
Pareto, w1 is better than w2 by the utilitarian criterion.
Tension arises between Parfit’s claim that persons are not morally significant units and the
Pareto principle when we compare worlds that contain infinite utility. Suppose that world
w1 and world w2 both contain infinitely many days of subjective experience that are at
utility level 1 and infinitely many days of subjective experience that are at utility level -1.
If we believe that persons and lives are not morally relevant units, then whether these days
of subjective experience occur in one agent or another agent should make no difference to
our evaluation of w1 and w2. We may conclude that w1 and w2 are equally good (perhaps
because both have infinitely many utility 1 and infinitely many utility -1 days of subjective
experience) or that w1 and w2 are incomparable (perhaps because the total utility of each
world is not well defined) or that w1 is better than w2 or vice versa (perhaps because we
accept Expansionism or some other principle). The key point is that our evaluation is not
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sensitive to which agents these subjective experiences occur in.
Suppose that in w1 each agent lives for three days: two days at utility -1 and two days at
utility 1. In w2 the same agents live for three days: two days at utility 1 and two days at
utility -1. World w2 is better than world w1 by Pareto. If this were to coincide with our
person-indifferent evaluation – e.g. w2 is better than w1 by Expansionism – then we could
construct a symmetrical case that is inconsistent with our person-indifferent evaluation.
Therefore the claim that people or lives are not morally relevant units is in tension with the
Pareto principle when we are comparing worlds that contain infinite utility.210
One response to this Reductionist objection to Pareto is to reject Parfit’s claim that the
Reductionist view entails that people or lives are not morally relevant units. Parfit concludes
from fission cases – cases in which each of an agent’s hemispheres are transplanted into two
bodies such that each half is psychologically continuous with the original whole brain – that
the continued existence of someone psychologically continuous with ourselves (‘survival’)
matters but identity does not. Lewis [153] offers an alternative four-dimensionalist account
of personal identity.211 Lewis argues that there are two temporally extended agents in each
of the hemispheres that coincide prior to fission and that cease to coincide after fission.
This view is consistent with the Reductionist view of personal identity and, on this view,
the identity relation holds between the whole brain and the two transplanted hemispheres.
Those who adopt a view like Lewis’s can maintain that people and lives are morally relevant
units without rejecting the Reductionist view of personal identity.212
210Note that even when we are comparing infinite worlds, Pareto is consistent with Parfit’s view that how
much an agent has suffered in the past is not morally significant.
211Not all four-dimensionalists will endorse Lewis’s account of personal identity. For an in depth discussion
of the distinction between four-dimensionalism and three-dimensionalism, see Sider [207, Ch. 3].
212An interesting question that arises is how we should count the utility experienced by coinciding agents.
Suppose that world w1 contains infinitely many brains that exist for one day at utility 1 and then experience
fission and on day two each hemisphere experiences utility 1. Is this world composed of infinitely many
agents with utility 2 lives, or infinitely many agents with utility 1.5 lives, or something else? See Briggs &
Nolan [43] for a discussion of these issues.
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If we do decide to reject Pareto because we believe that identity is perfectly fragile (as
discussed in section 5.2.2) or because we believe that people are not morally relevant units,
an attractive alternative to the view that people are ‘basic locations of value’ may be Parfit’s
[179, p. 344] view that ‘people’s experiences at each particular time’ are the basic location
of value. On this view, whether these subjective experiences occur ‘in the same agent’
is ethically irrelevant.213 If a world contains agents with lives that are composed of four
subjective periods of time s1, s2, s3, and s4, then all that matters is the amount of utility
being experienced at s1, s2, s3, and s4 regardless of the order these periods come in or who
is experiencing them.214
As we have seen, this view is in tension with Pareto because in infinite worlds it is possible
to increase the utility experienced by some agents without making anyone worse off without
increasing the cardinality of positive utility subjective experiences in the world. Suppose
that world w1 and world w2 are both composed of infinitely many days in which there is one
agent experiencing a utility 1 day. In w1, each agent in the world lives for a single utility 1
day before dying. In w2, the same agent lives for 100,000 utility 1 days before dying. Since
w1 and w2 contain identical populations and each agent experiences 99,999 more utility 1
days in w2 than in w2, world w2 is strictly better than world w1 by Pareto. But since w1
and w2 are both composed of infinite streams of utility 1 subjective experiences, these two
worlds will not be differentiated by the subjective experience view.
Those who endorse the subjective experiences view must either endorse or reject an analogue
of Pareto for subjective experiences: if w1 and w2 contain the same subjective experiences
and every subjective experience in w1 is at least as good as it is in w2 then w1 is at least
213Since this view ascribes no importance to the distinction between one person and the next. It therefore
represents a total rejection of the ‘separateness of persons’ – the claim that ethics should take seriously the
distinction between persons. Rawls [189, p. 26-7] famously argues that Utilitarianism does not respect the
separateness of persons’. See Norcross [?] for a critical response to this objection to Utilitarianism.
214The view may also be indifferent to the length of each period, as long as they are all of equal length.
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as good as world w2, and if some subjective experiences in w1 are strictly better than they
are in w2, then w1 is strictly better than w2. Let us call this ‘Experiences Pareto’. It is
not entirely clear what it means for worlds to contain the same subjective experiences, but
suppose that defenders of the subjective experiences view offer some plausible account of the
modal profile of subjective experiences.215
Suppose that those who adopt the subjective experience view endorse Experiences Pareto.
It is worth noting that even fewer worlds will be comparable by this principle than they
are by Pareto. Experiences Pareto requires not only that a world contains the same agents
but that it contains the same experiences. It requires not only that no agent has a worse
life in w1 than in w2, but that no experience is worse in w1 than in w2. These conditions
will rarely be satisfied. Moreover, unless they reject Transitivity, the Permutation Principle,
or the Qualitativeness of <, it may be possible to use Experiences Pareto to generate even
greater incomparability between infinite world pairs using four world and cyclic arguments,
since two worlds will be incomparable if there is a biconditional upgrade from the subjective
experiences of w1 to the subjective experiences of w2. Many infinite world pairs will have
this property, including many world pairs that are comparable by Pareto.216
Suppose that those who endorse the subjective experience view reject Experiences Pareto.
The problem is that we are still left with no obvious way to rank worlds that contain infinitely
many experiences at some upper level of utility and infinitely many experiences at some
lower level of utility. Therefore those who accept the subjective experiences view and reject
215Perhaps we could claim that the subjective experiences of agent x on day n of their life in w1 are
the same as the subjective experiences of agent x on day n in their life in w2 or that the same subjective
experiences are just experiences with the same phenomenological properties. I take no stand on this here.
216Suppose that w1 contains infinitely many agents with utility 2 lives composed of three subjective expe-
riences of utility 1, utility 0, and utility 1 (in that order), while w2 contains the same agents with utility 1
lives composed of three subjective experiences of utility 0, utility 1, and utility 0 (in that order). Suppose
also that the subjective experiences of agent x on day n of their life in w1 are the same as the subjective
experiences of agent x on day n in their life in w2. These worlds are comparable by Pareto, but can be shown
to be incomparable by a four world argument if we accept Experiences Pareto plus our auxiliary axioms.
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Experiences Pareto must supplement their view with some method for ranking infinite worlds
if want to establish some minimal level of comparability between infinite worlds.
A very different independent objection to Pareto principle that deserves consideration is that
the Pareto principle is in tension with certain distributive principles in ethics. Those who
endorse distributive principles believe that when we are ranking worlds the distribution of
utility across agents in those worlds matters. They may reject the claim that making some
agents better off and no agents worse off necessarily makes a world better (rejecting the 
component of Pareto) or that if we make no agents worse off then we do not make the world
worse (rejecting the < component of Pareto) because in doing so we can negatively affect the
distribution of utility. Objections to Pareto based on distributive principles are consistent
with the claim that people are ‘basic locations of value’.
Consider the following distributive claims, the ‘strong’ claim that is inconsistent with the 
condition of Pareto and the ‘weak’ claim that is inconsistent with the < condition of Pareto:
Strong Distributive Claim217
It is possible that w1 and w2 contain the same agents and some agents are better off in w2
than in w1 and no agents are better off in w1 than in w2 but w2 6 w1 because the distribution
of utility in w2 than is less equal than the distribution of utility in w1
Weak Distributive Claim
It is possible that w1 and w2 contain the same agents and no agents are better off in w2 than
in w1 but w1 6< w2 because the distribution of utility in w1 is less equal than the distribution
of utility in w2
217The Strong Distributive Claim assumes that it is possible for us to improve the welfare of some agents
while reducing the equality of the utility distribution across all agents, but if we vastly increase the utility of
the agent that already has the highest utility level in a world, we will increase the inequality the distribution
of utility in that world according to most standard measures of inequality. See De Maio [65] for a survey of
standard measures of income inequality in economics.
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The Strong Distributive Claim conflicts with Pareto because it entails that if w1  w2 by
Pareto but the distribution of utility in w1 is less equal than the distribution of utility in
w2, then w1 may not be strictly better than w2. The Weak Distributive Claim conflicts with
Pareto because it entails that if w1 < w2 by Pareto but the distribution of utility in w1 is
less equal than the distribution of utility in w2, then w1 may not be at least as good as w2.
Many distributive principles do not entail either of these distributive claims. For example,
the ‘average utilitarian’ claim that w1 is better than w2 if and only if the average utility of
the population of w1 is greater than the average utility of w2 does not entail either claim.
If w1 is strictly or weakly better than w2 by Pareto then the average utility at w1 must be
at least as great as the average utility at w2.
218 There are, however, distributive principles
that entail one or both of these claims and that therefore conflict with Pareto.
One example of a distributive principle that entails the Strong Distributive Claim (and is
therefore inconsistent with Pareto) is the following version of Maximin: world w1 is strictly
better than world w2 only if the life with the minimum utility level in w1 is strictly greater
than the life with the minimum utility level in w2.
219 This Maximin principle entails the
Strong Distributive Claim because if we improve the lives of those who are not the worst off
then this does not result in a better world according to this Maximin principle. This is an
atypically strong formulation of Maximin, however. Often Maximin is formulated in such a
way that it does not adjudicate between worlds if the worst off agents are not affected. In
such worlds Leximin is often proposed as an alternative.220 And the Leximin principle does
not entail the Strong Distributive Claim or conflict with Pareto.
Other principles that entail the Strong Distributive Claim include egalitarian principles that
218See Tungodden and Vallentyne [229] for a discussion of Paretian egalitarian theories.
219The original Maximin criterion is a criterion for decision making under uncertainty. It identifies the
value of a gamble with its lowest possible payoff.
220See Tungodden [228, p.415] [227] for a discussion of these principles.
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are committed to ‘Leveling Down’: the claim that if the welfare of those with utility levels
at the higher end of the distribution is reduced, this is either better than or at least not
worse than the original distribution.221 The fact that certain views, such as prioritarianism,
entail Leveling Down has generally been considered an objection to those views, though
Temkin [222] argues that the Leveling Down objection is far from fatal.
If the Weak Distributive Claim is true then one world can fail to be at least as good as
another even though all of the agents have at least as much utility in the first world as they
do in the second. This also seems most plausible if we accept an egalitarian or prioritarian
theory that embraces Leveling Down, since the principle implies that we can make a world
better without improving the lives of any of its agents. I will therefore assume that the sort
of distributive principles we have in mind are principles that tolerate a certain degree of
Leveling Down in order to increase the equality of the distribution of utility.222
This gives us some reasons to be wary of Pareto principles in finite worlds. Showing that
there is a conflict between Pareto and the Strong Distributive Claim or the Weak Distribu-
tive Claim in infinite worlds is not so easy, however. Suppose that we have two distributions
of utility and we are trying to determine which of them is more equal. In finite worlds, a
distribution is typically considered less equal the more that individual’s utility levels tend
vary from the utility levels of other agent world. For example, Rabinowicz [186, p. 61]
proposes that ‘the degree of inequality in a social state X is then just the average pair-
wise inequality in X, i.e., the average welfare distance between the individuals in X.’ It
is not clear how we should extend such definitions to worlds that contain infinitely many
agents. Consider two possible distributions of infinite utility: (2, 2, 2, ..., 1, 1, 1, ..., 0, 0, 0, ...)
and (2, 2, 2, ..., 0, 0, 0, ...). We might be inclined to think that the first distribution is more
221See Rabinowicz [185, p.81] on the leveling down objection.
222Some theories might state that we can make a world worse by improving the lives of immoral agents.
This principle concerns the justice of adding utility to these agents’ lives rather than the equality of the
distribution of utility, but such principles of justice are also inconsistent with Pareto.
205
equal than the second because in the second distribution there are two extreme utility lev-
els, while in the first distribution there are some agents with utilities between these two
extremes.223
This conclusion does not follow from Rabinowicz’s measure in infinite utility distributions
like the ones above, however, because the average pairwise inequality is not well-defined if
agents come in no natural order. This reasoning also holds for any measure of inequality that
appeals to average utility since this is also not well-defined in most infinite worlds.224 Even
if we attempt to identify inequality by looking at how far each agent’s utility is from the
midpoint of the accumulation set of a world (intuitively, the world with infinitely many 1’s
has more agents near the midpoint) we can arrange the agents of either distribution above so
that the limit of the average distance from the midpoint is anything in the [0,2] interval.225
Many principles of distributive justice are not based on utility distribution alone, however. It
is certainly possible for many of these principles to come into conflict with Pareto in infinite
cases. Suppose the agents in w1 have qualitative properties that make them less deserving of
utility than the agents in w2: for example, the agents of w1 have some important character
failing such as being greedy while the agents of w2 do not. Suppose that 〈w2, w3〉 is a
qualitative duplicate of 〈w1, w2〉 such that w2  w3 by Pareto and w3  w4 by Pareto. We
might endorse a desert-based principles which says that even if some agents are better off
in w2 than in w3 and no agents are better off in w3 than in w2 then w2 is not better than
w3 if the agents that are better off in w2 do not deserve to be better off than the agents in
w3. Since the agents in w1 are less deserving of utility than the agents in w2 because they
223Notice that the finite distribution (2, 2, 2, 0, 0, 0) is less equal than the distribution (2, 2, 1, 1, 0, 0) by
Rabinowicz’s proposed measure of inequality because the average distance between individuals in the first
distribution is 1 while the average distance between individuals in the second distribution is 89 .
224If agents came in a natural order, we could define the average utility as the Cesáro sum of the series.
However, these utility levels can be arranged so that its Cesáro sum is anything in the [0, 2] interval, and so
this cannot be used to define average utility if agents come in no natural order.
225We might be able to formulate distributive principles for worlds with distinct accumulation intervals
but – as was noted above – most infinite world pairs will not have distinct accumulation intervals.
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are greedy, it follows that when the the agents of w2 play the qualitative roles of the agents
in w1 they too are less deserving of utility because they are now playing the roles of greedy
agents. Therefore w2 is not better than w3 by our imaginary desert-based principle.
There are at least two problems for this view. The first problem is that for any qualitative
property that we use in a distributive principle, we will be able to find a permutation of
the population of 〈w1, w2〉 such that w3 is strictly worse than w2 by both Pareto and our
distributive principle. For example, since there are infinitely many agents in w1 and w2, it is
likely that we can find a permutation of this pair such that each agent in w2 has at least as
much utility in w3 and at least as much of any other property we use to ground desert. The
second problem is this: for most infinite world pairs 〈w1, w2〉 that contain agents at some
upper and lower level of utility, we can find a qualitative duplicate pair 〈w3, w4〉 such that
infinitely many agents are better off in w2 than they are in w3. Even if we accept principles
of distributive justice, we may be disinclined to endorse the claim that world w3 can be at
least as good as world w2 because of the way in which utility is distributed in w3 if infinitely
many agents are worse off in world w3 than they are in world w2.
If we reject Pareto either because we deny that people are ‘basic locations of value’ or because
it is in tension with distributive principles, many theories for ranking infinite worlds become
available to us. Rejecting Pareto lets us accept theories that rely on some natural ordering of
utility levels in infinite worlds – often an ordering based on the spatiotemporal location of the
bearers of these utilities – without rejecting the Transitivity of <, the Permutation Principle,
or the Qualitativeness of <. Most order-dependent theories also have the advantage of
producing a much more complete ranking of infinite worlds than order-independent theories
do. At the beginning of this section, I noted that how attractive we will find rejections of
Pareto depends on how attractive we find non-Paretian theories for ranking infinite worlds.
Let us therefore turn to consider some of the most plausible alternatives to Pareto.
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Many order-dependent theories in infinite ethics, some of which we encountered in Chapters
1 and 2, are in tension with Pareto if we accept the Transitivity of <, the Permutation Prin-
ciple, and the Qualitativeness of <. Discounting principles rank infinite worlds by applying a
spatiotemporal discount rate to utility from some point of origin.226 UDASSA, which stands
for ‘Universal Distribution plus the absolute self-selection assumption’ is a theory developed
by Paul Christiano that gives ethical weight to an agent’s experience in accordance with
the length of the shortest specification of that experience, including its spatiotemporal loca-
tion.227 Ordered Catching-Up, Ordered Overtaking, utility density principles, the hyperreal
approach and the surreal approach using limits all depend on there being a natural ordering
of agents or subjective experiences. Expansionism ranks infinite worlds based on their dis-
tribution of utility across spacetime. All of these theories conflict with Pareto if we accept
Transitivity, the Permutation Principle, and the Qualitativeness of <.228
We can use the term ‘locationism’ to describe this collection of theories, since each of them
uses the spatiotemporal locations of agents to generate a privileged order of utility that can
then be used to generate a ranking of worlds. One of the most promising locationist theories
in infinite ethics is the Expansionist view that was discussed in Chapter 2. I will argue
that the appeal to the spatiotemporal locations of agents to generate a ranking of worlds in
Expansionism is unjustified. This objection to using the spatiotemporal locations of agents
226The most natural point of origin is the point of action, which makes discounting views more plausible as
accounts of right action than as methods for determining whether one world is at least as good as another.
227Paul Christiano [57] argues that the goal of UDASSA is to give a probability distribution over all possible
experiences or observer-moments, though we can imagine a version of UDASSA that gives a probability
distribution over all possible agents insofar as it is possible to describe whole agents rather than observer-
moments. If we believe that persons are not basic locations of value and that the identity of observer-moments
is perfectly fragile, then UDASSA may appear to be a plausible alternative to Expansionism in infinite worlds.
UDASSA has some disadvantages relative to Expansionism, however. For example, the simplest description
of observer-moments relies on some ‘naturally specified time zero’. This means that two worlds with identical
distributions of subjective experiences across spacetime can be ranked differently if the ‘naturally specified
time zero’ is different in each world (see the case below for an example). This is not an objectionable feature
of the view, however, if there exists a naturally specified time zero and it is of ethical relevance.
228I have give several examples of permutations that conflict with Expansionism in Chapter 2, but it is
not difficult to generate similar examples for the other theories mentioned here.
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to generate a ranking of worlds generalizes to the other locationist views mentioned above.
As a reminder, Arntznius [6, p.53] defines an ‘allowable expansion’ as one that ‘at at each
time expands at the same rate in each direction in space, and at each location in space
expands at the same rate in each direction of time’. Expansionism states that if w1 and
w2 share the same spacetime with the same metric, and for all allowable expansions in this
metric there exists an integer n such that for every k > n, the total utility in rk at w1 is
greater than or equal to the total utility in rk at w2 then w1 is at least as good as w2. And
if there exists an integer n such that for every k > n, the total utility in rk at w1 is strictly
greater than the total utility in rk at w2 then w1 is strictly better than w2.
Expansionism does not entirely recover completeness, even among worlds have the same
spacetime with the same metric. For example, we saw that Expansionism cannot compare
the Sphere of Suffering world and the Sphere of Happiness world from Chapter 1 since, as
Artnzenius [6, p. 41] notes, ‘In this case whether one gets dominance depends on how fast
one expands in the temporal and spatial directions. It follows that for any pair of such
worlds it is not true that the utility of the one world is greater or smaller than the utility of
the other.’ This is a result that Arntzenius takes to be intuitively satisfactory, however, and
so he does not take this result to be a problem for the Expansionist view.
Even if Expansionism does not entirely recover completeness, it can be used to rank most
infinite worlds that are physically plausible. It therefore avoids the sort of ubiquitous in-
completeness that characterizes theories that are consistent with Pareto. Expansionism also
ranks infinite worlds in a way that we generally find plausible when considering the spa-
tiotemporal distribution of utility. For example, suppose w1 and w2 both contain agents
that have utility 1 and utility 0 lives. The agents are distributed across spacetime as follows:
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Figure 89: A world pair strictly ranked by Expansionism
The total utility of each region of this allowable expansion in w1 is 1, 1, 9, 9, 25, 25, ... while the
total utility of each region of this allowable expansion in w2 is 0, 9, 16, 40, 56, 96, .... There is
therefore a region (in this allowable expansion, the second region) such that, for every region
after this one, the total utility of the regions of w2 are strictly greater than the total utility
of the regions of w1. There will be such a region regardless of which point of origin and
rate of expansion we select. Expansionism therefore entails that world w2 is strictly better
than world w1. It seems intuitively plausible that we should prefer worlds in which agents or
subjective experiences with positive utility are more densely distributed across spacetime.
My main concern for Expansionism is that the intuition that we should prefer a world with
a more dense distribution of utility across spacetime may arise from a misapplication of
intuitions about finite worlds to infinite worlds. One reason that we might be inclined to say
that world w2 is better than world w1, for example, is that if we had to gamble on being an
agent in w1 or an agent in w2, we would prefer to be an agent in w2. This likely arises out of
an intuition that we have a greater chance of being an agent with a utility 1 life in w2 than
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in w1. But we are only justified in believing that we have a greater chance of being an agent
with a utility 1 life in w2 than in w1 if we are justified in using the spatiotemporal ordering
of agents to assign probabilities to the claim that we will have a utility 1 life in w1 or in w2
from behind the veil of ignorance.229 If we are justified in using the spatiotemporal ordering
of agents for this purpose, we can assign probabilities to being in a given infinite subset of
the population of w1 and w2 in accordance with their densities under this ordering.
I believe we should not be so quick to think that we are justified in using the spatiotemporal
ordering of agents to assign a greater probability to being a utility 1 agent in w2 than in
w1. To show this, suppose, first, that w1 and w2 contain identical populations and that you
know from behind the veil of ignorance that you are in the population of w1 and w2 but you
do not know whether you will have a utility 1 or a utility 0 life in these worlds. Suppose you
are told that all of the agents that exist at utility 1 in world w1 are in set X1 that all the
agents that exist at utility 0 in w1 are in two infinite sets X2 and X3. And the agents in X1
and in X2 both have utility 1 lives in w1 and the remaining agents in X3 have utility 0 lives
in w1. This means that if you are an agent in X1 or X3 then your utility will be the same in
both w1 and w2. But if you are an agent in X2 then you will have a utility 1 life in w1 and
a utility 0 life in w2. If you use the spatiotemporal ordering of agents to assign probabilities
to being a utility 1 agent in w1 and w2, however, then you will assign a greater probability
to being a utility 1 agent in w1 than in w2 even though, without knowing more about the
identities of agents in w1 and w2, you have no clear reason to think that the distribution of
utilities described above is less likely than a distribution that would cause you to prefer w2.
What if you know that the populations of w1 and w2 are not identical?
230 When you consider
229We might think that spatiotemporal ordering is a natural ordering of agents but deny that it has this
epistemological significance.
230If you do not know whether the population is identical or overlapping or disjoint from behind the veil of
ignorance, then the reasoning I give in both the identical population case and the variable population case
should cause you to doubt your intuition that you have a greater chance of a utility 1 life in w1 than in w2.
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whether you prefer one world or another world from behind the veil of ignorance and the
populations of the two worlds are non-identical, it is important that you do not assume that
our existence is guaranteed in either world.231 If you were to assume that our existence is
guaranteed then you would prefer a world that contains a single agent with a utility 2 life
over either w1 or w2 as depicted above. Yet such a world is clearly worse than w1 and w2.
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Suppose that you do not know whether you will exist in w1 or w2 but you do know that
these worlds have non-identical populations. You are told that the agents that exist in world
w2 are the same as the agents that exist in world w1 at utility level 1. Let X be this set of
shared agents between w1 and w2 and let Y be the remaining agents that exist at utility 0
in w1 and do not exist at all in w2. It seems that, insofar as you believe that you could be
any possible person, you should think that you have a greater chance of a utility 1 life in w1
than in w2. After all, if you are an agent not in Y then you won’t exist in w1 or w2. If you
are an agent in Y then you will have a utility 0 life in w1 and you won’t exist in w2. If you
are an agent in X then you are guaranteed to have a utility 1 life in w1 but you may have
a utility 1 or utility 0 life in w2. If you use the spatiotemporal ordering of agents to assign
probabilities to being a utility 1 agent in w1 and w2, however, then you will assign a greater
probability to being a utility 1 agent in w1 than in w2 in this case. This seems wrong.
I believe that these scenarios give us reasons to doubt our intuition that we have a greater
chance of being an agent with a utility 1 life in w2 than in w1. Whether we have a greater
chance of being a utility 1 agent in w1 than in w2 depends on the identities of the utility 1
and utility 0 agents in w1 and w2. And we cannot infer the likelihood that the identities of
231The veil of ignorance was formalized by Harsanyi [105] [106] to analyze social policy from the perspective
of one who does not know which position in society one will occupy. If we are assessing the value of different
possible populations of agents, however, it seems important that one also does not know whether one will
exist in the population in question for the reasons that I give below.
232If we assume that we will exist in the populations in question, then it is likely that we will favor
something like average utilitarianism. We will care about whether a world produces greater expected utility
for those who exist and will be indifferent to the number of people that exist in a given population.
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the agents in w1 and w2 will be such that we have a greater chance of being a utility 1 agent
in w1 or in w2 from the spatiotemporal distribution of those agents.
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The ‘greater chance of a better life’ reason for favoring Expansionism and my response
to it may not be compelling to those who believe that subjective experiences rather than
whole lives are what matter in ethics, since this reasoning seems to be premised on the
idea that improving lives is of ethical importance. However, Expansionism produces highly
counterintuitive results even if we adopt the subjective experiences view. According to
Expansionism, a world with more densely packed agents with low utility levels can be better
than a world with less densely packed agents at higher utility levels. We can also make
worlds worse by having each positive subjective experience be moved a little further apart
in spacetime. It is difficult to see why we should think that rearranging the subjective
experiences of the same utility level can make a world better or worse. This problem arises
regardless of whether we take subjective experiences or agents to be of importance.
We might think that we can get around this kind of problem by replacing ‘total utility’ with
‘average utility’ in our formulation of Expansionism. If we adopt this average utility variant
of Expansionism, however, we can still improve a world by moving agents with higher utility
closer together. For example, imagine an infinite world composed of infinitely many uniform
squares spread out like a checkerboard. On each square there lives two agents: one with a
utility 2 life and one with a utility 1 life. Now suppose we move each of the utility 1 agents
so that they are further apart so that there is one utility 1 agent for every four squares, while
keeping the utility 2 agents in their original locations. For all allowable expansions there will
233This claim seems to be in tension with the ‘Limiting Proportion’ principle formulated by Dorr and
Arntzenius [71, p. 413]. To give a rough summary, this principle says that if H entails that every finite
region of the world contains finitely-many finitely-lived agents and agents can move only a finite distance then,
if the limit of the proportion of agents that have a certain property G is n across all allowable expansions,
you are justified in having credence n that you have property G. The tension between my argument and this
claim is somewhat indirect, since Limiting Proportion is a principle about what credence we should have
conditional on hypothesis H rather than being on conditional on finding ourselves in a given world. If my
argument is correct, however, then we may be able to construct analogous worries for this principle.
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exist a region such that the average utility at every subsequent region is greater in the world
in which we have moved the utility 1 agents than in the original world. Therefore the second
world is better than the first according to the average utility variant of Expansionism. Again,
it seems implausible that we can make a world better simply by rearranging the subjective
experiences of the same utility level across spacetime.
Expansionists might respond by arguing that spatiotemporal regions are ‘basic locations of
value’, rather than agents or subjective experiences. If this is correct then we should care
about how much utility there is at each spatiotemporal region rather than at each agent or
at each subjective experience or in each agent’s life. The main consideration against this
claim is that in cases where increasing utility at each spatiotemporal regions decreases the
amount of utility per agent or per subjective experience, the claim that the spatiotemporal
distribution of utility matters does not seem compelling.
Arntzenius [6, p. 55] states that a reason for dealing with locations rather than agents is that
‘the structure of locations can provide us with a natural ordering which allow us to apply
dominance reasoning to infinite worlds’. The key concern I want to express for Expansionism
or any other theory in infinite ethics that appeals to the spatiotemporal locations of subjective
experiences is that there doesn’t appear to be any reason to think that where positive and
negative subjective experiences are located in spacetime is of any ethical relevance. In finite
worlds, ethical theories that are sensitive to increases in utility but reject spatiotemporal
discounting tend to be indifferent to when and where positive and negative utility experiences
occur in spacetime. It is difficult to see why this is a feature of that we should start to consider
morally relevant if worlds happen to be spatiotemporally infinite.234
234Here is a possible response to this argument that I do not find convincing. Suppose that in finite worlds
it is better for there to exist a series of utility 2 subjective experiences every three seconds for one minute
rather than a series of utility 1 subjective experiences every 1 second for 20 seconds. The former sequence
has fewer utils per second but more total utils (40 vs. 10). If such sequences lasted an equally long time,
however, then it will always better to have a sequence with more utils per second: one minute of the second
sequence is better than one minute of the first sequence. If we apply this same reasoning to worlds that are
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Expansionism is just one example of an intuitively plausible theory that generates a far more
complete ordering of worlds than is possible if we endorse Pareto. Most theories of this sort
rely either on a natural ordering of agents or of subjective experiences – generally one that
is based on their location in spacetime – or on the claim that ‘basic locations of value’ come
in a natural order – perhaps because spatiotemporal regions play this role. The principal
objection to both kinds of theory is that there is no clear reason to think that spatiotemporal
orderings are of ethical importance, even if they happen to make it easier to rank infinite
world pairs. There is no use in producing a complete ordering of infinite world pairs unless
that ordering is based on something that is of ethical importance.
In Chapters 1 and 2 I responded to objections to Pareto that were premised on the claim
that < is a qualitative internal relation. In this section I have considered two alternative
classes of objection to Pareto. I have argued that if we reject the primacy of people in infinite
ethics then we face even greater incomparability unless we can find a privileged ordering of
‘basic locations of value’. I then argued that spatiotemporal locations – the most plausible
candidate to ground a privileged ordering of agents or subjective experiences – do not seem
to have the ethical significance required to provide such a privileged ordering. It may be
tempting to appeal to such orderings because they can be used to produce rankings of infinite
worlds that conform to our prima facie intuitions about cases. If spatiotemporal orderings are
not ethically relevant, however, then I believe that these intuitions may fade upon greater
reflection. Finally, I have noted that although some principles of distributive justice are
inconsistent with Pareto in finite worlds, it is difficult to formulate similar objections when
comparing worlds with infinitely many agents at some upper and lower level of utility.
temporally infinite, surely we can conclude it is better to have a utility 1 experience every 1 second for an
infinitely long period of time than it is to have a utility 2 experience every three seconds for an infinitely
long period of time. But this depends entirely on what we think is grounding the claim that having more
utility per second is better if the lengths of time are equal. If we believe that this is true in the finite
case because such sequences produce more total utility, then we are not justified in concluding that if two
temporal sequences are infinite then we ought to prefer the sequence with more utility per second.
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When faced with the impossibility result I have formulated above, rejecting Pareto may
ultimately be considered the least bad option out of a set of bad options. My goal has been
to explore this option and show that rejecting this axiom is far from cost-free. If we are not
willing to accept these costs then we must either reject one of the first three axioms or we
must accept that most infinite worlds are incomparable. In the next section I will consider
the consequences of embracing ubiquitous incomparability.
5.4 Embracing Incomparability
If we accept the first four axioms listed at the beginning of this chapter – Transitivity, the
Permutation Principle, the Qualitativeness of <, and the Pareto principle – then we must
conclude that all infinite world pairs that can be shown to be incomparable by a four world
or cyclic argument are, in fact, incomparable. Incomparability is not the same as mere
ignorance about whether one of the worlds is better than another: if the two worlds are
genuinely incomparable then neither world is better than or as good as the other. Even if
we knew all true facts, we would still conclude that these two worlds are incomparable. If
we accept the first four axioms we must therefore reject the Minimal Completeness axiom,
which says that comparability between infinite worlds is not incredibly rare.
Rejecting completeness might not seem like such a cost if it were only a small fraction of
world pairs that were expected to be incomparable. Perhaps ethics can function adequately
if most worlds are incomparable but a small subset of worlds are incomparable. If we accept
the four axioms above, however, then ethical incomparability between infinite worlds is not
uncommon: it is ubiquitous. If worlds contain infinitely many agents and those agents can
have any finite level of utility, then almost all infinite worlds will contain infinitely many
agents at each possible utility level. This means that the fraction of world pairs such that
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there is not a bidirectional upgrade from the population of w1 to the population of w2 and
from the population of w2 to the population of w1 will be very small. Therefore, by Result
8 alone, very many infinite world pairs will be incomparable.
Since it has been shown that the five axioms listed in section 5.1 are not jointly satisfiable, one
compelling reason to accept ubiquitous incomparability between infinite worlds is simply that
this is the least bad option available. This is not the only reason to accept the incomparability
results, however. The claim that almost all infinite world pairs are incomparable may, on
reflection, begin to seem somewhat intuitive as we reflect more on the cases in question.
Suppose that a single world contains infinitely many agents at utility 1 and infinitely many
agents at utility 0. Would switching the utilities of the agents of this world result in a
world that is better than, equal to, or worse than the original? We may initially be inclined
to think that the resulting world must be just as good as the first world, perhaps because
the cardinality of utility 1 and utility 0 agents remains the same after they are switched.
However, once we notice that the cardinality of utility 1 and utility 0 agents would remain
the same even if we were to increase the utility of infinitely many agents at utility 0 while
also leaving infinitely many agents at utility 0 (resulting in a better world by Pareto) or if we
were to decrease the utility of infinitely many agents at utility 1 while also leaving infinitely
many agents at utility 1 (resulting in a worse world by Pareto), we may divorce the concept
‘is as good as’ from the concept ‘has the same cardinality of agents at each utility level’.235
In the case above we could appeal to some other qualitative properties of to rank the original
world and the world in which its agents’ utilities have been inverted. We could, for example,
use facts about the spatiotemporal locations of utility 1 and utility 0 agents at each world
to rank them. But, as I have argued, it seems implausible that the ethical ranking of worlds
235Suppose that it is not the cardinality of utility 1 and utility 0 agents that generates our equality intuition
but the measure or ratio of these agents. This will not vindicate the intuition since the measure of utility 1
and utility 0 agents is not well-defined, and the ratio of utility 1 to utility 0 agents is an indeterminate form.
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depends on qualitative properties that have nothing to do with improvements in agents’
lives, such as the order in which the agents are born at each world or their spatiotemporal
locations. If the ethical better than relation does not supervene on such qualitative properties
or on the cardinality of agents’ utility levels in infinite worlds, it does not seem so implausible
conclude that in this case the original world is not better than, worse than, or equal to the
world in which the utilities of its agents have been inverted.
A principal concern for views that accept ubiquitous incomparability between worlds is the
affect that this will have on what people ought to do. So far I have focused almost entirely
on the objective rankings of worlds: on whether world w1 is in fact better than world w2.
But the primary concern of ethics is arguably not whether a given world is better than or
worse than another, but whether a given action is permissible, obligatory, or forbidden.
One might think that incomparability between infinite worlds will only generate problems
for permissibility and obligation only for consequentialist moral theories. This is because,
for consequentialists, there is a strong connection between the permissibility of an action
and the and the world that results from that action. This is not true of non-consequentialist
moral theories, however. Most deontological theories are premised on much weaker connec-
tions between the permissibility of an action and the world that results from that action.
Deontologists argue that we can be permitted or obligated to perform actions even if these
actions do not produce the best consequences.236 For example, doctors have a duty to avoid
killing their patients even if, by doing so, they could save the lives of many other patients.237
Many deontologists do take into account the consequences of action to some degree, but the
236Scheffler [199] identifies two different kinds of agent-centered non-consequentialist moral theories. The
first are ‘hybrid’ theories, which ‘depart from consequentialism to the extent of incorporating an agent-
centred prerogative, and which thus hold that one is always permitted but not always required to do what
would have the best available outcome overall’ [199, p. 116]. The other are ‘fully agent-centred’ theories,
which ‘incorporate both an agent-centred prerogative and agent-centred restrictions, and which thus hold
that one is neither required nor permitted always to do what would have the best outcome’ [199, p. 116].
237See Foot [88] for a discussion of this well-known case.
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consequences of an action do not fully determine its permissibility.238
We might think that any problems of permissibility that arise out of the incomparability
of worlds cannot affect these deontological moral theories the link between worlds and the
permissibility of actions is much weaker on these theories. In the next two sections I will
show that this is not the case. I show that we can use the incomparability of infinite
worlds to generate new puzzles for permissibility that highly general. These puzzles apply
to consequentialist theories and to non-consequentialist theories – such as deontological and
virtue ethical moral theories – that are premised on a much weaker connection between the
outcomes of actions and their permissibility. The puzzles that I present in these sections do
not depend on the assumption of a consequentialist ethical framework.
In ethics it is typical to distinguish between what agents objectively ought to do and what
they subjectively ought to do. Objective oughts are not sensitive to the information that the
agent has, while subjective oughts are sensitive to the information available to the agent.239
What an agent ought to do in a given scenario therefore generally coincides with what she
subjectively ought to do in that scenario if she had perfect information.240 In this section I am
going to offer a separate treatment of objective and subjective permissibility. I will show that
the incomparability results generate a puzzle for theories of objective permissibility, before
238Kagan [118, p. 79] characterizes ‘moderate deontologists’ as those who ‘believe that the constraint
[against harming] has a threshold: up to a certain point - the threshold point - it is forbidden to kill or harm
an innocent person, even if a greater good could be achieved by doing it; but if enough good is at stake -
if the threshold has been reached or passed - then the constraint is no longer in force, and it is permissible
to harm the person.’ In The Right and the Good, Ross [192] formulates an influential form of moderate
deontology.
239Here I assume that the subjective ought is sensitive to an agent’s empirical uncertainty only, but it is
possible that the subjective ought should also be sensitive to an agent’s moral uncertainty (see Bykvist [47])
or to the agent’s moral imperfections and the options available to her (see Hedden [107]).
240As Yetter Chappell [246] notes, we might be worried that identifying the objective ought with the
subjective ought under conditions of perfect information will involve committing Schope’s [206] ‘conditional
fallacy’. For example, it will never be the case that an agent objectively ought to gather more information
because if she had perfect information then information gathering would never be required. I am sympathetic
to the view that information gathering is only ever something that an agent subjectively ought to do, but
we need not take a stand on this issue here since cases like this will not arise in the discussion below.
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showing that we can generate an analogous puzzle for theories of subjective permissibility.
The case most often used to demonstrate how objective and subjective oughts can diverge
is the ‘miners puzzle’.241 To give a variant of this puzzle: suppose that ten miners are
trapped in either shaft A or shaft B and you do not know which. You can press a button
to secure shaft A or you can press a button to secure shaft B but not both. If you secure
the correct shaft then all of the miners will live but if you secure the wrong shaft then all
of the miners will die. Alternatively, you can press a button that will partially secure both
shafts. If you press this button then it is certain that one and only one miner will die. If
you had full information about this case then you would know where the miners are located
and would press the button corresponding to their location. You would certainly not press
the button that partially secures both shafts. Given your imperfect information about the
miners’ location, however, it would seem reckless of you to gamble and press one of the first
two buttons rather than pressing the button that will partially secure both shafts. So what
you objectively ought to do and what you subjectively ought to do seem to diverge.
In the next section I will show that rejecting Minimal Completeness generates problems for
theories of objective permissibility. In the final section I will show that rejecting Minimal
Completeness generates similar problems for theories of subjective permissibility.
5.4.1 Incomparability and Objective Permissibility
In this section I will address the question of what agents are objectively permitted to do if
some of the actions available to them will result in infinite worlds that are incomparable.242
It will be helpful to proceed in one of two ways. First, we could begin by assuming that all
actions are objectively permissible if some of the actions available to the agent will result in
241This case can be found in Parfit [180] who attributes the case to Regan [190].
242The outcome of an action is the entire world that will result if the action is performed, including both its
immediate and long-term consequences. Therefore the outcomes of actions can be infinite and incomparable.
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infinite worlds that are incomparable. We could then search for principles that restrict the
set of permissible actions. Alternatively, we could begin by assuming that all actions are
objectively impermissible if some of the actions available to the agent will result in infinite
worlds that are incomparable. We could then search for principles that broaden the set of
permissible actions. I will begin by assuming that all actions objectively permissible and we
that must search for search for principles that restrict the set of permissible actions. After
this, I will briefly address what happens if we adopt the opposite view.
In this section I will talk about an agent’s ‘choice set’. This is the set of all acts available
to the agent in a given scenario. Following Savage [198, p. 13-15] I will assume that actions
are functions from states of the world to outcomes. The outcome of an action is the entire
world that will result if the action is performed, including both its immediate and long-term
consequences.243 We can therefore treat outcomes as worlds that result from an act being
performed in a particular state of the world.
According to utilitarians, the objective permissibility of actions depends entirely on the
total utility that the world will have if the action is performed. In finite worlds, an act a is
objectively permissible according to utilitarianism if and only if there is no other available act
b such that the total utility that the world will have if b is performed is strictly greater than
the total utility that the world will have if a is performed. In this section I will formulate
a general puzzle for permissibility that does not assume consequentialism. Let us start
by exploring the problems that incomparable infinite worlds generate for consequentialist
theories, however, while noting that these theories are controversial and will be rejected by
many ethicist. In the interest of exploring the difficulties that consequentialist theories of
objective permissibility faces if some of the outcomes of our actions are incomparable, let us
243If the world is infinite and someone saves the life of a stranger and that stranger goes on to have living
descendants, for example, the outcome of this action could be a future in which infinitely many different
people exist than those thats would have existed otherwise.
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assume for the time being that the objective permissibility depends entirely on the utility
levels of the people that will exist if we undertake a given action.
Those who adopt a consequentialist approach to objective permissibility cannot simply ap-
peal to the utilitarian criterion of objective permissibility in infinite worlds because we do
not yet have a method for assigning real-valued utilities to worlds that contain infinite utility.
If one world contains infinitely many agents at utility level 2 and another world contains the
same agents at utility level 1, the total utility of both worlds is positively infinite. If we were
to infer from this that both worlds have the same total utility then the utilitarian criterion
would entail that if act a results in the first world and act b results in the second world, then
act a and b are both permissible. Since the outcome of a is better than the outcome of b by
Pareto, this means that if we extended the utilitarian criterion to infinite worlds in such a
way that it treated ‘positively infinite’ worlds as the same, it would conflict with Pareto. I
assume that most utilitarians would not wish to extend their theory in this way.
In order to identify what actions are objectively permissible or impermissible for outcomes-
based moral theories like consequentialism, we can first identify weak restrictions on what an
agent objectively permitted to do if the outcomes of some of her actions are infinite before
assessing whether more robust restrictions are possible. I believe that most consequentialists
will be inclined to accept the following restriction on what an agent is objectively permitted
to do, based on the Weak People Criterion outlined in the previous chapter:
Weak People Criterion for Objective Permissibility (WPCO)
It is objectively permissible for an agent to perform action a only if there is no action b
available to the agent such that the outcome of action b is strictly better than the outcome of
action a by the Weak People Criterion.
In finite worlds, WPCO entails the maximizing utilitarian principle ‘an act a is objectively
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permissible if and only if there is no action b available to the agent that produces more
utility than action a does’. This should at least make it somewhat attractive to those who
are inclined to accept utilitarian principles in finite cases. In infinite worlds, however, WPCO
places fewer restrictions on what an agent is objectively permitted to do.
Suppose that an agent can choose whether to cure a small population of people (action a)
or to leave them sick (action b). If the agent cures the people then they will be happier:
they will each experience utility 1 instead of utility 0. Some of the cured people will also
conceive children other than those they would have conceived if they had been left sick, and
this will completely change who exists in the future. We can represent the utilities of the
future people in this world as follows, where S is the actual state of the world and X is the
small population of people that the agent must decide whether to cure:
S
X Y1 Y2 Z1 Z2
50 ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞
a 1 1 0 − −
b 0 − − 1 0
Figure 90: Curing a small population or leaving them sick
In this case we are inclined to say that it is objectively permissible (or even obligatory) to
cure the small population and objectively impermissible to fail to do so. But the WPCO
principle does not entail that a or b is objectively impermissible.
The WPCO does place some restrictions on what an agent is objectively permitted to do.
Suppose, for example, that the agent in the case above has a third option (action c) that
involves curing the small population but passing on the cost of this to their first 50 happy
descendants (50 agents in Y1) reducing their utility from 1 to 0:
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S
X Y1a Y1b Y2 Z1 Z2
50 50 ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞
a 1 1 1 0 − −
b 0 − − − 1 0
c 1 0 1 0 − −
Figure 91: Curing the small population but passing on the cost
Let’s use wa to represent the world that results if act a is performed. By WPCO the outcomes
of a, b, and c in the case above form the following partial order:
wa wb
wc
Figure 92: A partial order of outcomes under WPCO
If we accept WPCO then act a and act b are both objectively permissible but act c is not.
More generally, an act will be objectively permissible according to WPCO if and only if there
is nothing higher than its outcome in the partial order of outcomes generated by WPCO.
The main problem with WPCO, as noted above, is that is that if the world is infinite then
the WPCO principle will rarely entail that an action is impermissible. The only actions that
are impermissible will be those with outcomes that are strictly worse than the outcomes of
another action by the WPCO principle. But if the world is infinite then we can expect this
to make up a small fraction of the actions available to an agent, since we have already argued
that only a small fraction of infinite worlds are comparable by the Weak People Criterion.
It might be objected that WPCO would place adequate restrictions on which actions are
objectively permissible if the causal ramifications of our actions are finite since, if this is the
case, the outcomes of all of our actions can be totally ordered by the Weak People Criterion.
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An act a is impermissible by WPCO only if the sum of the difference of utility between the
outcome of a and the outcome of an alternative action b converges absolutely and is positive,
or diverges to positive infinity. But if the causal ramifications of our actions are finite then
the sum of the difference of utility between any two actions will always converge absolutely.
It will consist of a finite sequence of positive and negative differences in utility while at least
one of the actions have causal ramifications. Since the part of the world that is beyond
our causal influence will be the same regardless of how we act, this finite sequence will be
followed by an infinite sequence of zeros after the point at which neither action has any
further causal ramifications. Therefore, if the causal ramifications of our actions are finite,
the outcomes of all actions can be totally ordered using the Weak People Criterion. However,
there is no guarantee that the causal ramifications of our actions are finite. Arntzenius [6, p.
52] points out that ‘in Newtonian worlds, and in relativistic worlds with an infinite future,
on the most natural understanding of what our causal sphere of influence is, it is infinite’.
If the world is in fact finite or the causal ramifications of our actions are in fact finite then
WPCO can be used to identify a small set of objectively permissible actions. If, however,
the causal ramifications our actions are infinite, then WPCO will generally entail that only
a very small fraction of the actions available to an agent are objectively impermissible.
The inverse problem arises if we assume that all actions are impermissible by default and then
use an analogue of the WPCO principle to broaden the set of actions that are objectively
permissible. The most natural analogue to use would be the following: it is objectively
permissible for an agent to perform an action a if, for every action b available to the agent,
the outcome of a is at least as good as the outcome of b by the Weak People Criterion plus
Transitivity. But if the world is infinite then in most situations all no action available to
an agent will be objectively permissible by this principle. A single pair of incomparable act
outcomes would be sufficient to prevent any act from being permissible by this principle.
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If consequentialists cannot appeal to something stronger than WPCO-like principles to deem
an action objectively impermissible or permissible, they will face serious difficulties in infinite
worlds. I have shown that if we assume that actions are objectively permissible by default,
WPCO fails to adequately restrict the set of permissible actions. And if we assume that
actions are objectively impermissible by default, its analogue fails to adequately broaden the
set of actions that are permissible. Consequentialists must therefore look for principles of
objective permissibility and impermissibility that are stronger than WPCO.
One option available to the consequentialist is to try to appeal to more restrictive principles
than WPCO. For example, the consequentialist could claim that if act a produces more
spatiotemporally discounted utility than act b, then act b is impermissible. This rule depends
not only on the distribution of utility but on qualitative properties of the outcomes of actions,
but it is still in the spirit of consequentialism. Consequentialists could also try to find rules
that depend solely on the distribution of utility but that are more restrictive than WPCO.244
The key point is that principles as weak as WPCO do not produce plausible accounts of
objective permissibility if we accept that many infinite worlds are incomparable.
Thus far I have been discussing consequentialist principles of objective permissibility. At
this point I want to turn to principles are not premised on the idea that the objective
permissibility of actions depends solely on the utility levels of the people that will exist if
we undertake a those actions. Many theories within ethics, such as deontological theories
and virtue-based theories, do not assume that there is such a direct connection between the
objective permissibility of actions and the utility levels of the people that will exist if we
undertake a given action. These theories can base the permissibility of curing the small
population in the case above on features of the action itself rather than its outcome: for
244For example, they could claim that if act a produces an outcome with a higher utility midpoint than
act b, then act b is impermissible. One problem is that these purely utility-based rules will often not entail
that it is impermissible to fail to cure the small population in the case above. According to the midpoint
rule, neither curing the population nor failing to cure the population are objectively impermissible.
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example, they can state that one has a duty to alleviate the suffering of nearby agents, or
that acting with the intention of alleviating the suffering of nearby agents is virtuous.
I believe that many non-consequentialist principles can be used to vindicate this judgment.
Kant [129, 4: 398], for example, argues that we have a duty to be beneficent when we can be.
Curing the small population of agents clearly seems to constitute a beneficent act, since it is
done in order to help those who are sick. Aristotle [111, 1120a33-b3] argues that those who
are virtuous will use their property to help others.245 Insofar as this indicates that donating
one’s money to cure the small population would be virtuous, it surely indicates that curing
the small population if one can do so at no cost to oneself would also be virtuous.
Suppose we are not convinced that non-consequentialist ethicists will claim that it is imper-
missible to fail to cure the small population of sick agents in the case above. We can simply
replace this act pair with any other act pair whose outcomes result in the same utility levels
as the act above. For example, suppose that instead of choosing between curing the small
population of agents and failing to do so, the agent is choosing between allowing a small
population of agents to live happy lives (replacing act a) or depriving them of their liberty
and torturing them so that they live miserable lives (replacing act b). The outcomes of these
actions in terms of their utility may be identical to those in the case above, but many non-
consequentialist theories will state that it is not permissible to deprive the small population
of their liberty and torture them. If the reader is not convinced that non-consequentialist
moral principles entail that it is impermissible to fail to cure a sick population of agents at
no cost to oneself, they may substitute each instance of this act in the discussion that follows
with the act of torturing an otherwise happy population of agents for no reason.
Suppose we endorse a non-consequentialist principle like ‘if you can easily alleviate the suffer-
245Aristotle believes that it worse to fail to help those with whom we have special relationships than it is
to fail to help strangers [111, 1160a4-1166] but this is not relevant to the case considered here.
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ing of nearby agents at little or no cost to yourself, you are permitted to do so and forbidden
from failing to do so’. This principle would entail that failing to cure the sickness in the case
above is objectively impermissible. Perhaps we can use principles like this – principles that
appeal to properties of actions and not just properties of outcomes – to determine whether
actions are permissible or impermissible when their outcomes are incomparable. Rather
than assessing such principles one by one, I will show that we can construct a new puzzle
for any principle that entails curing the small population is objectively permissible and that
failing to do so is objectively impermissible.246 In order to construct this general puzzle, I
will first assume that even non-consequentialist ethical theories should endorse the following
very weak link between objective permissibility and the outcomes of actions:
Infinite Act Pareto
If the outcome of act a and the outcome of act b contain the same people and infinitely many
people are worse off by at least some finite amount if act b is performed than if act a is
performed and no people are better off if act b is performed than if act a is performed, then
(i) act b is objectively impermissible and (ii) if a and b are the only actions available to the
agent, then act a is objectively permissible
Infinite Act Pareto simply says that an action cannot be permissible if it results in a world
that is worse for infinitely many people and better for no people. It also says that if our only
options are to perform an action that results in a world that is worse for infinitely many
people or to perform an action that does not, it is permissible to perform the action that
does not. I believe that a violation of Infinite Act Pareto would be considered unacceptable
by most ethical theorists. Even if we believe that we have a general duty to avoid lying, we
are surely not permitted to avoid lying if, in doing so, infinitely many people will be worse off
246This includes both consequentialist principles that go beyond WPCO and non-consequentialist principles
that appeal to properties like intentions, rights, duties, and so on. It also applies to any principle that says
it is impermissible to torture an otherwise happy population of agents for no reason in the case given above.
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than they would have been and no one will be better off than they would have been. Infinite
Act Pareto says that the same is true not only of lying, but of any property of actions that
could ground facts about objective permissibility and impermissibility.
This link between the permissibility of actions and the outcomes of actions is extremely
weak and will hopefully appear plausible to those who reject stronger principles linking the
objective permissibility of actions to the outcomes of those actions. It is a principle that will
surely be endorsed by moderate deontologists who believe that we are permitted to violate
deontological constraints when the stakes are high enough.247 This will not be true of all
deontologists, however. Kant believed that many duties are absolute. A stark example of
this is given in On a Supposed Right to Lie because of Philanthropic Concerns [124] in which
Kant argues that if a man bent on murder comes to our door asking for the location of
a potential victim, it is our duty to tell the truth to them.248 Williams [210, p. 98-100]
indicates that it may be better to let twenty people die at the hands of others than to kill
one person oneself. Since some non-consequentialists are willing to commit to the view that
certain actions are wrong even if, by performing them, we can prevent large finite amounts
of harm from occurring, they may also be willing to commit to the view that those actions
are to wrong even if, by performing them, we can prevent an infinite amount of harm from
occurring. Non-consequentialists that adopt this view will reject Infinite Act Pareto.
I do not claim that all non-consequentialists will be committed to Infinite Act Pareto. I
do claim that if non-consequentialists deny Infinite Act Pareto then this will, in the eyes
of many, constitute a powerful objection to those non-consequentialist theories. Denying
similar finite principles strikes us as implausible enough. Even if I have a duty not to lie
247Nussbaum [83, p. 101] discusses similar views under the banner of ‘sensible deontologies’. For discussion
of the possibility moderate deontology see Smilansky [212] and Cook [61].
248Korsgaard argues that lying to the murderer can be permissible within a Kantian framework. [128, p.
339] She argues that, on her modification of Kant’s views, aways telling the truth is an ideal to live up to
but it is not always feasible to live up to this ideal when doing so would involve great evil. [128, p. 349]
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or cheat or kill, there is surely some point at which, if the harm of my carrying out these
duties is great enough, I am no longer permitted to do so. Suppose that I am forced to
choose between the following by some evil mastermind: either I kill a single person or the
mastermind will torture every person on earth for a decade before killing them (this includes
the person I am being asked to kill). To avoid killing is one of the strongest duties we have,
and yet in such a case as this it seems highly immoral to privilege satisfying this duty over
protecting the lives of those who will be tortured and killed. And yet this case only involves
finite harms. How much stronger the case against the absolutist seems to be when there
were infinitely many people who would be tortured and killed in this scenario.
Given this, I believe that most non-consequentialists will accept Infinite Act Pareto and that
a failure to do so constitutes a powerful objection to a moral theory. I will argue that we
should also accept three further principles about objective permissibility:
Qualitativeness of Objective Permissibility
If act pair 〈c, d〉 is a qualitative duplicate of act pair 〈a, b〉, then d is objectively impermissible
if and only if b is objectively impermissible
Permutation Principle over Act Outcomes
For any act pair 〈a, b〉 and any bijection g from the population of the outcomes of a and b
onto any population, there exists an act pair 〈c, d〉 that is a qualitative duplicate of 〈a, b〉 but
whose outcome population has been permuted by g
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (Objective)
If b is objectively impermissible if an agent’s choice set is {a, b} then b is objectively imper-
missible under any expansion of these options
The Qualitativeness of Objective Permissibility just says that objective permissibility should
not vary across acts that are qualitative duplicates. The properties of actions or the rela-
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tions between actions that ground their objective permissibility and impermissibility must
be qualitative properties and relations. Although theories of objective permissibility may
depend on the relationships between agents, for example, they surely should not depend on
which particular agents exist in a given world. Among other things, theories of objective
permissibility that appeal to haecceitistic facts seem unacceptably inequitable. I believe that
many of the reasons we presented for accepting the Qualitativeness of < give us reasons to
accept this analogous principle for objective permissibility.249
The Permutation Principle over Act Outcomes claims that we can find a qualitative duplicate
of an act pair such that the population affected by those actions has been permuted. Suppose
that act a involves pulling a lever to divert a train in order to save the lives of Alice and
Bob and an act b involves failing to do so, the Permutation Principle over Act Outcomes
says we can find some possible pair of actions c and d that are qualitatively identical to a
and b. In this case, act c involves pulling a lever in exactly the same way and in exactly the
same circumstances as in act a, while act d involves failing to do so.250 Act c and d have
qualitatively identical outcomes to acts a and b respectively, but the two people affected by
these actions have been permuted. For example, if f(Alice)=Carl and f(Bob)=Dave, then
in the outcome of acts c and d Carl plays the qualitative role that Alice plays in the outcome
of acts a and b and in the outcome of acts c and d Dave plays the qualitative role that
Bob plays in the outcome of acts a and b. As with the original Permutation Principle, the
act pair that is a qualitative duplicate under a permutation in the Permutation Principle
over Act Outcomes could be logically possible but not metaphysically possible. As with the
previous principle, I believe that many of the reasons we presented for accepting Permutation
249I also believe that we should accept the analogous principle to the Ethically Relevant Qualitativeness
of < for objective permissibility, but I do not utilize such a principle here.
250Since c and d are qualitative duplicates of a and b, any morally important properties that the pair a
and b has, the pair c and d also has. For example, if act a involves rights violations while act b does not
then act c involves rights violations while act d does not.
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Principle give us reasons to accept this analogous principle for objective permissibility.
Finally, the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives is a widely accepted principle which says
that if an act b is impermissible when we can only perform a or b, then adding a further
option c cannot render b permissible.251
Consider, once more, the example in which the agent must choose between curing a small
population of people or leaving them sick. Here I will divide the agents in the original set
Y2 into three sets: two infinite sets of agents, Y3 and Y4, and one set of 50 agents, Y2 (not to
be confused with the original). I will also divide the agents in the original set Z1 into three
sets: two infinite sets of agents, Z2 and Z3, and one set of 50 agents, Z1 (again, not to be
confused with the original). Under this way of carving up agents, the example is as follows:
S
X Y1 Y2 Y3 Y4 Z1 Z2 Z3 Z4
50 ∞ 50 ∞ ∞ 50 ∞ ∞ ∞
a 1 1 0 0 0 − − − −
b 0 − − − − 1 1 1 0
Figure 93: Subsets of agents in the cure vs. leave sick case
By the principle ‘if you can easily alleviate the suffering of nearby agents at little or no
cost to yourself, you are permitted to do so and forbidden from failing to do so’, act b is
objectively impermissible and act a is objectively permissible. However, by the Permutation
Principle over Act Outcomes, for any bijection g from the population of the outcomes of a
and b onto any population, there exists an act pair 〈c, d〉 that is a qualitative duplicate of
〈a, b〉 but whose outcome population has been permuted by g. Let g be as follows, where J1,
J2, and J3 are three infinite sets of agents that do not exist in the outcomes of act a or b:
251Rulli and Worsnip [193] argue that non-consequentialist beliefs about permissibility support violations
of the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives. I believe that many will find this principle acceptable in the
cases I discuss, but I will formulate a variant of the problem below that does not require it.
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X Y1 Y2 Y3 Y4 Z1 Z2 Z3 Z4 J1 J2 J3
Figure 94: A permutation of subsets of agents in the cure vs. leave sick case
Let the pair of actions 〈c, d〉 be a qualitative duplicate of 〈a, b〉 but whose outcome population
has been permuted by g. And let the pair of actions 〈e, f〉 be a qualitative duplicate of 〈c, d〉
but whose outcome population has been permuted by g (i.e. 〈e, f〉 is a qualitative duplicate
of 〈a, b〉 under g ◦ g). Suppose we were to add 〈c, d〉 and 〈e, f〉 to the agent’s choice set:
S
X Y1 Y2 Y3 Y4 Z1 Z2 Z3 Z4 J1 J2 J3
50 ∞ 50 ∞ ∞ 50 ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞
a 1 1 0 0 0 – – – – – – –
b 0 – – – – 1 1 1 0 – – –
c 0 – – – – 1 0 1 0 – – –
d – – 1 – – 0 – – – 1 0 1
e – – 1 – – 0 – – – 0 0 1
f 1 1 0 1 0 – – – – – – –
Figure 95: The outcomes of 〈a, b〉 and its duplicates under a permutation
By the principle ‘if you can easily alleviate the suffering of nearby agents at little or no cost to
yourself, you are permitted to do so and forbidden from failing to do so’, act b is impermissible
when our choice set is {a, b}. If our choice set is extended to include c and d then b remains
impermissible by the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives, c is impermissible by Infinite
Act Pareto, and d is impermissible by the Qualitativeness of Objective Permissibility.252 If
252Depending on our theory of act individuation, it may be claimed that the pair 〈c, d〉 cannot be part of
the same choice set as the pair 〈a, b〉 while remaining a qualitative duplicate of this pair. The problem I pose
below does not depend on the pair 〈c, d〉 being part of the same choice set as 〈a, b〉.
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we include e and f in our choice set then b, c and d remain impermissible by the Independence
of Irrelevant Alternatives, e is impermissible by Infinite Act Pareto and f is impermissible
by the Qualitativeness of Objective Permissibility. But now that f is in the choice set, a is
also impermissible by Infinite Act Pareto. So none of the acts are permissible!
Therefore if we accept the four axioms above and we claim that act a is permissible and act b
is impermissible then, in a choice situation like this one involving two qualitatively identical
pairs of acts, all of the actions are objectively impermissible. Note that this will be true
regardless of which ethical principle we appeal to when we claim that it is permissible to
cure the small population and impermissible to fail to do so. For any such principle, we can
find a qualitatively identical pair of actions such that, when faced with the choice between
these actions, all of the actions available to us are objectively impermissible.
It might be objected that the existence of moral dilemmas in choice scenarios is not so
concerning if agents will rarely face the choice scenarios in question. While the argument
above shows that all principles that a is permissible and b is impermissible when the outcomes
of a and b are incomparable will in principle lead to moral dilemmas like the one above, agents
will rarely face such dilemmas. I believe that the existence of such choice scenarios should
cause us to be more wary of principles which says that a is permissible and b is impermissible,
even if agents will rarely be faced with scenarios in which an actual conflict arises. We can,
however, generate a more direct problem for the claim that such principles exist if we replace
the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives with an analogue of Transitivity for objective
permissibility, such as the following:
Strong Transitivity of Objective Permissibility
If act a is permissible when an agent can perform a or b and act b is permissible when the
agent’s choice set is {b, c} then act a is permissible when the agent’s choice set is {a, c}
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The Strong Transitivity of Objective Permissibility says that the relation ‘is a morally per-
missible alternative to’ is a transitive relation. If a is permissible when b is the alternative
and b is permissible when c is the alternative then a is permissible when c is the alterna-
tive. Many have taken this principle to be plausible because what it is morally permissible,
obligatory, or impermissible for us to do is generally thought to depend on the moral reasons
we have for acting. If we have more moral reasons to do a than to do b (because doing a
will easily alleviate the suffering of nearby agents while b will not) and we have more moral
reasons to do b than to do c (because b will make infinitely many agents better off than c
will), then it seems to follow that we must have more moral reasons to do a than to do c.
Kamm [123] and Dorsey [72] both raise a problem for this principle in cases that involve
choice sets containing a supererogatory action and a permissible action, however. Let me
offer my own version of this problem.253 Suppose that if you have the choice between donating
half of a pile of money and burning the other half (act a) or keeping the pile of money for
yourself (act b), it is morally permissible to do either because donating half of the money is
supererogatory and keeping it is permissible. Suppose that if you have the choice between
keeping the pile of money for yourself (act b) or donating all of the money (act c), it is
morally permissible to do either because donating all of the money is supererogatory and
keeping it is permissible. Now suppose that you have the choice between donating half of
the pile of money and burning the other half (act a) or donating all of the money (act c). It
would be impermissible to donate half of the pile of money and burn the other half in this
scenario. This seems to violate the Strong Transitivity of Objective Permissibility.
There have been several responses to the ‘transitivity problem’ for supererogation.254 One
key thing to notice is that it is your self-interested reasons that make it permissible for you
to keep the $100 when your other option is to donate all or half of the money. In the final
253A problem with the case discussed in Dorsey [72, p. 365-6] is that it does not involve identical actions.
254See, for example, Portmore [183] and Archer [5].
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choice scenario, however, it is impermissible to choose the action that you have fewer moral
reasons to perform because there are no self-interested reasons at play.255 Importantly, for
supererogatory acts to generate a violation of the Strong Transitivity of Objective Permissi-
bility, the agent must have self-interested reasons that make b permissible when the choice
set is {a, b} and self-interested reason that make b permissible when the choice set is {b, c}.256
We can therefore avoid the problems generated by choice sets containing supererogatary acts
by endorsing a weaker principle, which is as follows:257
Transitivity of Objective Permissibility
If a is objectively permissible and b is objectively impermissible when an agent’s choice set is
{a, b} and act b is objectively permissible and c is objectively impermissible when the agent’s
choice set is {b, c} then a is objectively permissible when the agent’s choice set is {a, c}
The Transitivity of Objective Permissibility says that if a is permissible and b is impermissible
when these are our only two options, then a must be permissible relative to any action that
is an impermissible alternative to b. It is consistent with the claim that permissibility is
intransitive across choice sets in which both actions are permissible.
The Transitivity of Objective Permissibility is in tension with contrastivism about objective
permissibility. Contrastivists about objective permissibility hold that what an agent is ob-
jectively permitted to do is relative to a comparison set: I am objectively permitted to save
one child if the comparison is saving no children, but not if the comparison is saving three
children. Some contrastivists about reasons, such as Snedegar [213], argue that something
can be a reason for A when the comparison is B and a reason for B when the comparison
255This is unsurprising if we think that whether an action is supererogatory or not is a function of the
moral reasons for performing the action and the self-interested reasons for failing to perform the action.
256Interestingly, we cannot generate a similar problem for the Strong Transitivity of Impermissibility using
suberogation, since suberogation states that an action is wrong but not impermissible.
257Alternatively, we could deny that non-moral reasons can make actions that one has fewer moral reasons
to perform permissible or we restrict this principle to cases that involve no non-moral reasons.
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is C, but can fail to be a reason for A when the comparison is C. This causes Snedegar to
reject the following transitivity principle: ‘If there is more reason to choose A than to choose
B, and more reason to choose B than to choose C, then there is more reason to choose A
than to choose C’ [213, p. 94]. If it is objectively permissible to perform a if and only if
one has more moral reasons for performing a than for performing b, then the Transitivity of
Objective Permissibility is in tension with the claim that moral reasons have this structure.
The reasons that Snedegar gives for rejecting the Transitivity of ‘More Reasons’ mirror
the reasons that Temkin gives for rejecting the Transitivity of <. Snedegar argues that
different ‘reason-providing objectives’ such as happiness or justice [213, p. 68] – ‘vary in
importance across comparisons’ [213, p. 109] and that this variation in importance results
in violations of transitivity across choice sets. If we believe that there are different moral
objectives that vary in importance across choice sets, then we can reject the Transitivity of
Objective Permissibility.258 If, on the other hand, we believe that moral objectives do not
vary in importance depending on what is being compared, then the Transitivity of Objective
Permissibility looks like a highly plausible principle of objective permissibility.
Suppose we find the Transitivity of Objective Permissibility more compelling than con-
trastivism about moral reasons. When our choice is between curing the small population
(act a) and failing to do so (act b), act a is permissible and act b is impermissible by hypothe-
sis. When our choice is between act b and act c, act b is permissible and act c is impermissible
by Infinite Act Pareto. When our choice is between act c and act d, act c is permissible and
act d is impermissible by the Qualitativeness of Objective Permissibility (QOP). When our
choice is between act d and act e, act d is permissible and act e is impermissible by Infinite
Act Pareto. When our choice is between act e and act f , act e is permissible and act f
258In the case in which we can cure the small population, contrastivists can claim that a is permissible
when b is the alternative and b is permissible when c is the alternative and c is permissible when d is the
alternative and d is permissible when a is the alternative. An important outstanding problem for this view
is to provide an account of what it is objectively permissible or impermissible to do in these circumstances.
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is impermissible by the Qualitativeness of Objective Permissibility. And when our choice
is between act f and act a, act f is permissible and act a is impermissible by Infinite Act
Pareto (IAP). Let a −→ b mean that act a is permissible and act b is impermissible if the











Figure 96: Violation of the transitivity of objective permissibility
Act a is impermissible when the agent’s choice set is {a, f}, which violates the Transitivity
of Objective Permissibility. Therefore it cannot be the case that a is permissible and b is
impermissible. It is easy to see that if act a were impermissible and act b were permissible
by hypothesis, we could produce a violation of the Transitivity of Objective Permissibility
by the same reasoning.259 Therefore we cannot use any principle to say that it is permissible
to cure the small population and impermissible to fail to do so unless we reject Infinite Act
Pareto, the Qualitativeness of Objective Permissibility, the Permutation Principle over Act
Outcomes, or the Transitivity of Objective Permissibility.
If we accept Infinite Act Pareto, the Qualitativeness of Objective Permissibility, the Permu-
tation Principle over Act Outcomes, and the Transitivity of Objective Permissibility then we
must conclude that if there is a bidirectional upgrade from the population of the outcome of
259This direction is much easier: we can show it using an argument that involves just two act pairs. For
the structure this will take, see the four world example immediately preceding Result 10 of Chapter 3.
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act a to the population of the outcome of act b and there is a bidirectional upgrade from the
population of the outcome of act b to the population of the outcome of act a, then it cannot
be the case that one of these actions is objectively permissible and the other is objectively
impermissible. As I argued above, if the world is infinite then most of the actions available
to an agent in a given choice scenario will have incomparable outcomes. This view therefore
leads to either ubiquitous permissibility or ubiquitous impermissibility in infinite worlds.
In this section I have presented a new argument for the claim that in cases where the
outcomes of our actions differ over infinite populations, there is either ubiquitous objective
permissibility across actions or there is ubiquitous objective impermissibility across actions.
This result holds regardless of whether we adopt a consequentialist or non-consequentialist
theory of objective permissibility. In the next section I will demonstrate that a similar
problem also affects all theories of subjective permissibility.
5.4.2 Incomparability and Subjective Permissibility
Actions are subjectively permissible or impermissible if they are permissible given an agent’s
imperfect information. As we saw in the miners puzzle, actions that are objectively permis-
sible may be subjectively impermissible and actions that are subjectively permissible may be
objectively impermissible. In this section I will show that existing outcomes-based accounts
of subjectively permissible actions are inadequate in cases where the outcomes of some of
our actions are incomparable. I will then show that the puzzle of permissibility outlined in
the last section can be applied to subjective permissibility also.
In this section I will use Savage’s framework for decision making under uncertainty to model
subjective ethical decisions. I assume that agents assign credences to different possible ways
that the world might be.260 Each action available to the agent leads to some outcome in
260Credences are subjective probabilities in the [0, 1] interval that obey the standard probability axioms.
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each possible state of the world. As before, actions are assumed to be functions from states
to outcomes, where the outcome of an action is the entire world that will result if the action
is performed, including both its immediate and long-term consequences.
As was noted in the previous section, some theories of permissibility – consequentialist
theories in particular – posit a strong connection between the outcome of an action and
the objective permissibility of an action. Unsurprisingly, these theories also tend to posit
a strong connection between the outcomes that an agent expects her actions to produce
and the subjective permissibility of those actions in finite worlds. For example, maximizing
utilitarians claim that agents are permitted to perform an action a if and only if there is no
action b available to the agent that produces more expected utility than action a does, where
the expected utility of an action is the sum of the total utility of each possible outcome of
the action multiplied by the agent’s credence that the action will yield that outcome.
One natural constraint on subjective permissibility for utilitarian moral theories is a subjec-
tive variant of WPCO, which is as follows:261
Weak People Criterion for Subjective Permissibility (WPCS)
If, summing over all epistemically possible agents x, the sequence of differences in expected
utility for x conditional on act a being performed rather than act b being performed converges
and is greater than zero or diverges to ∞, then (i) act b is impermissible and (ii) if a and b
are the only actions available to the agent, then act a is permissible
We could add an equality condition to this principle which says that if the sequence of
261This is this is modeled on Arntzenius’ ‘Weak People Criterion’ [6, p. 55] which says that the expected
utility of act A is greater than the expected utility of act B iff ‘
∑
P (EU(P |A) − EU(P |B)) is absolutely
convergent and > 0, where we are summing over all (epistemically possible) people p.’ Artnzenius extends the
definition of ‘absolutely convergent’ to include cases where the sum diverges to positive infinity or negative
infinity but not both. To this we could add that the expected utility of act A is equal to the expected utility
of act B iff ‘
∑
P (EU(P |A) − EU(P |B)) is absolutely convergent and equal to 0. Utilitarians that endorse
this account of the expected utility of actions in infinite worlds are likely to endorse WPCS as a principle of
subjectively permissible and impermissible actions.
240
differences in expected utility conditional on act a being performed rather than act b being
performed is equal to zero then (i) act a is permissible [impermissible] iff act b is permissible
[impermissible], and (ii) if a and b are the only actions available to the agent, act a and
act b are both permissible. If we were to add this equality condition then in finite worlds
WPCS would entail the maximizing utilitarian criterion of subjective permissibility: act a is
subjectively permissible if and only if there is no action b available to the agent that produces
more expected utility than act a does. We will not need this condition here, however.
By utilitarian lights, WPCS has some fairly plausible results for actions that have infinite
outcomes. Suppose that the same agents in set X will exist regardless of what we do. These
agents are unhappy (utility 0) by default but the agent knows that either act a will make
all future agents happy or act b will. She has a credence of 0.1 that act a will make them






Figure 97: High probability improvement vs. low probability improvement
For each agent in set X, the expected utility of their lives conditional on a being performed
minus the expected utility of their lives conditional on b being performed is -0.8 and the
expected utility of their lives conditional on b being performed minus the expected utility
of their lives conditional on a being performed is 0.8. So, summing over all epistemically
possible agents (all x ∈ X), the sequence of the difference in expected utility for x if act
a rather than act b is performed diverges to −∞ and the sequence of the difference in
expected utility for x if act b rather than act a is performed diverges to ∞. Therefore act a
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is subjectively impermissible and act b is subjectively permissible according to WPCS. This
is what we would expect, since in this example act b is more likely to make all agents happy.
Although it produces plausible results in the cases to which it applies, WPCS places an
extremely weak restriction on subjective permissibility if agents have a non-zero credence
that the world is infinite. For example, suppose that instead of the same agents being affected
by her choice, the agent has a credence of 0.9 that if she performs act a then infinitely many
agents in set Y will be unhappy and if she performs act b then those same agents will be
happy. She also has a credence of 0.1 that if she performs act a then infinitely many agents






Figure 98: Disjoint population high probability improvement vs. low probability improve-
ment
We might think that act b is permissible and act a is impermissible in this case since act b
makes infinitely many people happy in the state of the world that is the most likely given
the agent’s evidence. But WPCS does not entail that act a is subjectively impermissible in
this case. For each agent in set X, the expected utility of their lives conditional on a being
performed minus the expected utility of their lives conditional on b being performed is 0.1.
For each agent in set Y , the expected utility of their lives conditional on a being performed
minus the expected utility of their lives conditional on b being performed is −0.9. So the
sequence of the difference in expected utility for all possible agents if act a rather than act
b is performed does not converge: it diverges to ∞ under some orderings and to −∞ under
other orderings. Therefore neither of these actions is subjectively impermissible by WPCS.
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More generally, if there is some infinite set of agents that have more expected utility condi-
tional on a being performed than b being performed and there is some infinite set of agents
that have more expected utility conditional on b being performed than a being performed
(where agents who don’t exist are treated as thought they have utility zero lives) then nei-
ther action a nor action b will be impermissible by WPCS. Given this, very few actions will
be subjectively impermissible by WPCS. For any pair of actions 〈a, b〉 that an agent can
perform, it is extremely likely that the agent will have a rational non-zero credence in some
possible state Si in which an infinite set of agents are better off if a is performed than if b
is performed and that she will also have a rational non-zero credence in some possible state
Si in which some different infinite set of agents are better off if b is performed than if a
is performed. The evidence required to justify a non-zero credence in such a state is very
low.262 Such states may be highly unlikely given our evidence but they are consistent with
our current best theories in physics and we will almost never be in a position entirely rule
them out.263 Therefore WPCS will deem very few actions subjectively impermissible.
To give an example, WPCS will fail to deliver a verdict in the subjective variant of the case
given in the previous section. Suppose that an agent is confident that the world is finite
(state S1) but has a non-zero credence that it is infinite (state S2). She can cure a small
population of 50 agents (act a) or she can fail to do so (act b). If the world is finite then this
will result in these agents having utility 1 rather than utility 0 lives. If the world is infinite
then the action will still result in these agents having utility 1 rather than utility 0 lives, but
curing the population will also affect the utility levels of infinitely many future agents. The
262The claim that agents can even have a rational credence of zero in logical and mathematical falsehoods
is a controversial one (see Garber [90]). We might worry that there are infinitely many possible worlds
consistent with the laws of physics and so the agent ought to have an infinitesimal credence in each of them
(see Pruss [184]). But is seems likely that even if we have credence 0 in particular possible worlds consistent
with our current best theories in physics, a probability density function would assign non-zero credence to
the set of worlds that, for any given act pair, result in neither act being impermissible by WPCS.
263Even if they were inconsistent with our current best theories in physics, it would seem irrational to have
credence zero in such states since we cannot be certain that our current best theories in physics are true.
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a 1 1 0
b 0 0 1
Figure 99: Subjective variant of cure vs. leave sick case
It is intuitively better to cure the small population of agents than to fail to do so, but neither
of these actions is subjectively impermissible by WPCS.
In the previous section it was demonstrated that principles stronger than WPCO will violate
one of four plausible axioms for objective permissibility. We might think that subjective
permissibility principles will succeed where objective permissibility principles did not. Here
I will show that we can generate a similar problem for subjective permissibility principles
that entail a is permissible and b is impermissible in the case above.
There are several kinds of principles that we could use to restrict the set of actions that are
subjectively permissible if some of the actions available to an agent produce incomparable
outcomes. For example, consider the following intuitively plausible dominance principle for
subjective permissibility if the outcomes of some acts in our choice set may be incomparable:
Näıve Dominance
If, for every possible state S the outcome of act a in S is not worse than the outcome of
act b in S, and for some possible state S the outcome of a in S is strictly better than the
outcome of b in S, then (i) b is subjectively impermissible and (ii) if a and b are the only
options available to the agent, then a is subjectively permissible
Näıve Dominance entails it is better to cure the small population of agents than to fail to do
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so in the case given earlier, because the outcome of curing the population (act a) is better
in state than failing to cure the population (act b) in state S1, and the outcomes of both
acts are incomparable in state S2. I will now show that any principle that says it is better
to cure the small population of agents than to fail to do so in the case above will violate one
of four plausible principles of subjective permissibility.
The first principle of subjective permissibility that I take to be plausible is a subjective
analogue of Infinite Act Pareto. Like infinite Infinite Act Pareto, it posits a weak connection
between the outcomes of actions and the subjective permissibility of actions:264
No Infinite Risks
If an agent has a non-zero credence that she is in a state in which infinitely many people will
be worse off by some positive finite amount if act b is performed than if act a is performed,
and the agent has credence zero that she is in a state in which infinitely many people will
be worse off by some positive finite amount if act a is performed than if act b is performed,
then (i) act b is subjectively impermissible and (ii) if a and b are the only options available
to the agent, then act a is permissible
No Infinite Risks says that we should not risk undertaking an action that has some chance
of making infinitely many agents worse off and no chance of making infinitely many agents
better off, even if there are some states of the world in which this action benefits finitely
many agents. I believe that many ethicists will be inclined to endorse this weak link between
the outcomes of actions and the subjective permissibility of actions.
If we accept Näıve Dominance and No Infinite Risks, then we will end up violating a further
264We may believe that we can generate this puzzle using an even weaker principle than No Infinite Risks
that does not involve trade-offs. The key problem with using principles that do not involve trade-offs when
we are dealing with decisions under uncertainty is that we must preserve the qualitative properties of each
outcome under a permutation. Since some outcomes (the finite ones) will not admit of bidirectional upgrades
in both directions, we cannot show that acts with a non-zero chance of producing these outcomes are better
than a principle that is more like Pareto: i.e. one that does not involve any trade-offs.
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plausible principle of subjective permissibility. To show this, consider the following case:
S1(0.9) S2(0.1)
X Y Z1 Z2
50 ∞ ∞ ∞
a 2 1 0 0
b 0 0 1 1
c 0 1 1 0
Figure 100: Problem case for joint acceptance of Näıve Dominance and No Infinite Risks
If the agent’s choice set were {a, b} then a would be permissible and b would be impermissible
by Näıve Dominance. If the agent’s choice set were {b, c} then b would be permissible and
c would be impermissible by Näıve Dominance. But if the agent’s choice set were {a, c} (or
{a, b, c}) then c would be permissible and a would be impermissible by No Infinite Risks.
This violates the subjective variant of the Transitivity of Objective Permissibility:
Transitivity of Subjective Permissibility
If, relative to a single credal distribution that an agent has across possible states, act a is
subjectively permissible and b is subjectively impermissible when the agent’s choice set is
{a, b} and b is subjectively permissible and c is subjectively impermissible when the agent’s
choice set is {b, c} then a is subjectively permissible when the agent’s choice set is {a, c}
The Transitivity of Subjective Permissibility is restricted to a single credal distribution across
states because it is possible that a is subjectively permissible and b is subjectively impermis-
sible relative to one credal distribution and b is subjectively permissible and c is subjectively
impermissible relative to a different credal distribution. In this case it would not follow that a
is subjectively permissible relative to the second credal distribution. This subjective variant
of the Transitivity of Subjective Permissibility is intuitively plausible, especially if we believe
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that different moral reasons should not be given different weights across choice scenarios.265
The case above shows that if we accept the Transitivity of Subjective Permissibility and No
Infinite Risks then we must reject Näıve Dominance.
In the case above I simply assumed that we could find three acts a, b, and c that generate
a conflict between Näıve Dominance and No Infinite Risks. We can generalize this problem
to any principle that entails that it is better to cure the small population of agents than to
fail to do so in the case given at the beginning of this section. To do so, we simply need
to endorse the Permutation Principle over Act Outcomes from the previous section, and the
following subjective variant of the Qualitativeness of Objective Permissibility:
Qualitativeness of Subjective Permissibility
If 〈c, d, Pr′〉 is a qualitative duplicate of 〈a, b, Pr〉, where Pr and Pr′ are probability functions,
then d is subjectively impermissible if and only if b is subjectively impermissible
If we accept No Infinite Risks, the Transitivity of Subjective Permissibility, the Permutation
Principle over Act Outcomes, and the Qualitativeness of Subjective Permissibility then it
cannot be permissible to cure the small population of agents and impermissible to fail to
do so in the subjective version of this case. To show this, let 〈c, d, Pr′〉 be a qualitative
duplicate of 〈a, b, Pr〉 but whose outcome population has been permuted by g:
X Y1 Y2 Z
Figure 101: A permutation of the outcome population of 〈a, b, Pr〉
The outcomes 〈a, b, Pr〉 and its qualitative duplicate 〈c, d, Pr′〉 are as follows:
265As with the Transitivity of Objective Permissibility, the Transitivity of Subjective Permissibility is in
tension with contrastivism about moral reasons.
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S1(0.9) S2(0.1)
X Y1 Y2 Z
50 ∞ ∞ ∞
a 1 0 0 1
b 0 1 1 0
c 1 1 0 0
d 0 0 1 1
Figure 102: The outcomes of 〈a, b, Pr〉 and 〈c, d, Pr′〉
If the agent’s option set is {a, b} then act a is permissible and act b is impermissible by hy-
pothesis. If the agent’s option set is {b, c} then act b is permissible and act c is impermissible
by No Infinite Risks. If the agent’s option set is {c, d} then act c is permissible and act d is
impermissible by the Qualitativeness of Subjective Permissibility (QSP). And if the agent’s
option set is {a, d} then act d is permissible and act a is impermissible by No Infinite Risks







Figure 103: Transitivity violation from NIR and QSP
It is easy to see that if act a were impermissible and act b were permissible by hypothesis,
we could produce a violation of the Transitivity of Subjective Permissibility by the same
argument. We therefore cannot use any principle to say that a is permissible and b is
impermissible unless we reject one of four plausible axioms of subjective permissibility: No
Infinite Risks, the Qualitativeness of Subjective Permissibility, the Permutation Principle
over Act Outcomes, or the Transitivity of Subjective Permissibility.266
266This applies to non-consequentialist principles such as ‘if you are confident that you can easily alleviate
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This argument shows that if we accept No Infinite Risks, the Qualitativeness of Subjec-
tive Permissibility, the Permutation Principle over Act Outcomes, and the Transitivity of
Subjective Permissibility then it cannot be the case that it is permissible to cure the small
population and that it is impermissible to fail to do so. This is highly troubling when con-
sider the fact that we can replace ‘fail to cure the small population’ with ‘fail to torture an
otherwise happy small population’ or any other action that is intuitively impermissible and
whose outcomes have the same utility profiles as the actions given in this example. If we
want to say that such actions are impermissible then we must reject one of the four plausible
principles for subjective permissibility formulated above.
I will not attempt to establish a generalization of the puzzle for subjective permissibility
that I have constructed in this section. I believe it is sufficiently troubling to show that
we cannot endorse intuitive claims about the subjective impermissibility of failing to cure
a small population of sick agents (or of torturing a small population of otherwise happy
agents) if we have a non-zero credence that the outcomes of these acts are incomparable.267
It may be worth conjecturing about whether and how this result will generalize, however.
It seems plausible that we could establish the following modest generalization of the case
above: if we accept No Infinite Risks, the Qualitativeness of Subjective Permissibility, the
Permutation Principle over Act Outcomes, and the Transitivity of Subjective Permissibility
then if the agent’s choice set is {a, b} and (i) she has a non-zero credence in at least one
the suffering of nearby agents at little or no cost to yourself, you are permitted to do so and forbidden from
failing to do so’. It also applies to more consequentialist principles that are stronger than WPCS, such
as discounted utilitarianism or an ethical variant of Hare’s [104, p. 242-3] ‘Prospectism’ or principles that
appeal to the accumulation intervals of expected utilities. It also applies to principles that tell us to simply
act as if we had credence zero in all states that produce incomparable outcomes.
267A distinct problem for theories of subjective permissibility if act outcomes are infinite but comparable
is the so-called ‘fanaticism’ problem. If act a is guaranteed to produce some very large finite amount of
positive value and act b will almost certainly produce some very large finite negative amount of value but
has a minuscule non-zero chance of producing a positively infinite amount of value, then ‘fanatical’ moral
theories entail that act b is subjectively permissible and act a is subjectively impermissible. Beckstead [26, 6.4,
6.5; 8.2] argues that the alternatives to fanaticism in such cases have similarly undesirable results.
249
possible state Sj such that the outcome of a in Sj is incomparable with the outcome of b in Sj
by the results of Chapter 3, and (ii) there are finitely many other states that she has a non-
zero credence in and all of these states are finite, it cannot be the case that one of the actions
in her choice set is subjectively permissible and the other is subjectively impermissible.
To see why I believe that such a generalization of the puzzle formulated above can be
established, consider two acts a and b. Suppose that an agent’s choice set is {a, b} and there
is some state Sn′ such that (a) the agent has a non-zero credence in Sn′ and (b) the outcomes
of a and b in Sn′ are incomparable by a result from Chapter 3. Let all of the other states that
the agent has a non-zero credence in be finite and let a and b have any properties whatsoever
in these states: the acts can result in any number of agents with any utility levels, can have
any ethically relevant properties like ‘violates rights’ or ‘is virtuous’ and so on. For example:
S1, ..., Sn(0.999) Sn′(0.001)
X1, ..., Xn Y1 Y2 Z
n ∞ ∞ ∞
a i 0 0 1
b j 1 1 0
Figure 104: Case generalizing the subjective permissibility puzzle
For any such act pair, we can permute each of the outcomes of the acts in finite states of
the world by themselves. In other words, if Si is a state that results in a finite outcome
(an outcome in which only finitely many agents have different utility conditional on a being
performed rather than b being performed) then let g be a trivial permutation of the outcomes
of a and b in Si. For all states Sj that can be shown to be incomparable by a result from
Chapter 3, there is either a permutation of the outcomes of a and b in Sj that results in a
four world violation of the Transitivity of Subjective Permissibility (given No Infinite Risks)
or there is a permutation of the outcomes of a and b in Sj that results in a cyclic violation
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of the Transitivity of Subjective Permissibility. Let us permute each of the outcomes of a
and b by these permutations. This means that in the option set {b, g(a)}, b is permissible
and g(a) is impermissible by No Infinite Risks, and in the option set {g(b), g(g(a))}, g(b) is
permissible and g(g(a)) is permissible by infinite risks, and there is some gn(b) such that in
the option set {gn(b), a}, gn(b) is permissible and a is impermissible by No Infinite Risks.
This violates the Transitivity of Subjective Permissibility.
This is a sketch of the sort of argument we would use to show that it cannot be the case that
a is permissible and b is impermissible in these conditions. Since the outcomes of a and b
can be shown to be incomparable by a result from Chapter 3, we will always be able to show
that it cannot be the case that b is permissible and a is impermissible by the same type of
argument. Therefore if the agent’s choice set is {a, b} then it cannot be the case that one of
these actions is permissible and the other is impermissible.
In the case above, we can establish this using a four world argument since the outcomes of
a and b in Sn′ are incomparable by Result 8. Given this, we can establish that it cannot be
the case that a is permissible and b is impermissible by permuting the populations of the
outcome of a and b in Sn′ by g:
Y1 Y2 Z
Figure 105: A permutation of the outcome population of 〈a, b, Pr〉
The outcomes of 〈c, d, Pr′〉, a qualitative duplicate of 〈a, b, Pr〉 under g, are as follows:
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S1, ..., Sn(0.999) Sn′(0.001)
X1, ..., Xn Y1 Y2 Z
n ∞ ∞ ∞
a i 0 0 1
b j 1 1 0
c i 1 0 0
d j 0 1 1
Figure 106: The outcome of 〈a, b, Pr〉 and its qualitative duplicate under g
If a is permissible and b is impermissible when the agent’s choice set is {a, b} then c is
permissible and d is impermissible when the agent’s choice set is {c, d} by the Qualitativeness
of Subjective Permissibility. We can see that if the agent’s choice set is {b, c} then b is
permissible and c is impermissible by No Infinite Risks (since i and j are finite) and if the
agent’s choice set is {d, a} then d is permissible and a is impermissible by No Infinite Risks
(since i and j are finite). Therefore the claim that a is permissible and b is impermissible
violates the Transitivity of Subjective Permissibility.
This is a sketch of a modest generalization of the puzzle that I have formulated in this
chapter. An important outstanding question is how much this puzzle can be generalized
beyond choice situations with these properties. For example, can the puzzle be extended
to actions that produce outcomes that are incomparable in at least one state of the world
if there are also some states of the world in which one act produces an outcome that is
better for infinitely many agents and there are some states of the world in which the other
act produces an outcome that is better for infinitely many agents? What if there are some
states of the world in which one act produces an outcome that is better for infinitely many
agents but there are no states of the world in which the other act produces an outcome that
is better for infinitely many agents? Finally, what if there is no state such that the outcome
of a and the outcome of b are incomparable in that state, but the outcome of act a in some
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state Si is incomparable with the outcome of act b in a different state Sj?
I will not attempt to answer these questions here. I believe that the puzzle for subjective
permissibility that I have introduced in this section gives us sufficient reason to believe that
accepting incomparability between infinite worlds will have important ramifications for both
consequentialist and non-consequentialist ethics. Discovering the extent to which this puzzle
can be generalized must be the subject of future research.
This leaves us in a difficult position, since many of the reasons that have to avoid rejecting any
of the four axioms outlined at the beginning of this chapter – Transitivity, the Permutation
Principle, the Qualitativeness of <, and Pareto – provide us with analogous reasons to want
to avoid the variants of these for both objective and subjective permissibility.
The Transitivity of Subjective Permissibility seems highly plausible if we do not believe
that the permissibility of actions is highly dependent on our choice set. If b is subjectively
impermissible when our choice set if {a, b} and c is subjectively impermissible when our
choice set is {b, c}, then surely a cannot be permissible when our choice set is {a, c}. If we
reject the Transitivity of Subjective Permissibility then we must conclude that, in the case
that has been the focus of this section, it is impermissible to fail to cure the small population
if our choice set is {a, b}, it is impermissible to cure the small population if our option set
is {b, c}, it is impermissible to fail to cure the small population if our option set is {c, d},
and it is impermissible to cure the small population if our option set is {a, d}. This doesn’t
appear to be a plausible account of which actions are permissible and impermissible.
The Permutation Principle over Act Outcomes merely says that we can permute the popula-
tions of the outcomes of our actions. In doing so we can assess how well our ethical principles
work across scenarios that only differ by who is affected by our choices. This too seems like
a relatively unobjectionable axiom. If we reject this axiom on metaphysical grounds then
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it also seems likely that, as with the original Permutation Principle, we can still derive the
problematic results detailed above by weakening our qualitativeness axiom.
If we deny the Qualitativeness of Subjective Permissibility then we must conclude that even
if one act pair and probability function 〈c, d, Pr′〉 is a duplicate of another act pair and
probability function 〈a, b, Pr〉 in all qualitative respects, it can nonetheless be the case that
b is impermissible when our choice set is {a, b} but d is not impermissible when our choice
set is {c, d}. It is difficult to see how we could accept this conclusion unless we believe
that the permissibility of actions is determined not only by qualitative facts about those
who are affected by our actions, such as the nature of our relationship with them, but also
haecceitistic facts like ‘Obama is affected by this action’. Surely most ethicists would want
to reject the claim that haecceitistic facts can play such a role in the permissibility of actions.
One option available to us is to deny No Infinite Risks. If we reject this principle then we
accept that it can be permissible to undertake actions that have some chance of causing
harm to infinitely many people and that have no chance of benefiting infinitely many people.
Denying this principle seems to truly sever even the most basic connection between the
permissibility of our actions and the outcomes of our actions. Suppose we believe, as many
non-consequentialists do, that we have a duty not to steal from others. We also believe that
it can be impermissible to steal from others even if stealing from them will lead to a better
outcome. For example, it may be impermissible to throw someone’s mobile phone from a
moving car in order to prevent them from texting while driving, even if the outcome in
which the person stops texting while driving and must buy a new phone is better than the
outcome in which they continue to endanger others by texting while driving. It is difficult
to maintain this judgment regardless of what is at stake, however. Suppose that you know
someone intends to commit a mass shooting. The only way that you can prevent them from
doing so is to steal the key to the cabinet in which they keep their guns. Surely stealing
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this key is not only permissible but is morally required in these circumstances. This case
only involves finite trade-offs, however. If we deny No Infinite Risks then we must conclude
that an action can remain impermissible even if, by undertaking it, we have some chance of
preventing harms not just to a large finite number of people, but to infinitely many people.
If we do not reject one of these axioms, however, then we will be forced to conclude that it is
permissible to fail to cure a population of sick agents rather than curing them, and that it is
permissible to torture a population of agents rather than refraining from doing so. And these
actions are permissible only because we have a non-zero credence that the world is infinite.
This constitutes a kind of moral nihilism that most of us would consider reprehensible.
Summary
At the beginning of this chapter I characterized the incomparability results of Chapters 2
and 3 as an impossibility result: we cannot accept the Transitivity of <, the Permutation
Principle, the Qualitativeness of <, and the Pareto principle without concluding that almost
all infinite world pairs are incomparable. I have argued that the Transitivity of <, the Per-
mutation Principle, the Qualitativeness of <, and the Pareto principle are all highly plausible
principles and that denying any of them will come at a great cost. I then demonstrated that
accepting ubiquitous incomparability between infinite world pairs creates analogous prob-
lems for accounts of both objective and subjective permissibility: problems that create great
difficulties for both consequentialist and non-consequentialist ethics. The incomparability
results in infinite ethics that I have formulated should therefore not be dismissed as little
more than abstract puzzles. Regardless of which axiom or axioms we ultimately reject, the
possibility that the world is infinite clearly has a profound effect on ethics.
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Conclusion
In this thesis I have argued that if we accept four highly plausible axioms: the transitivity
of <, the Permutation Principle, the qualitativeness of <, and Pareto, there is ubiquitous
incomparability between infinite worlds. In this concluding section I am going to offer a
review of the prior results in infinite ethics and provide an overview of the many ways in
which the results of this thesis improve the framework for infinite ethics and offer novel
results that take important steps beyond these prior results.
Infinite ethics has primarily been discussed in two domains: in the literature on intergener-
ational equity within economics and by aggregative ethicists within philosophy. The most
relevant major results within intergenerational equity are the Diamond-Basu-Mitra results268
which shows that any complete, transitive ranking of possible streams of future generations
cannot satisfy Generational Sensitivity and Finite Generational Anonymity while also be-
ing numerically representable. Generational Sensitivity says that if we make one generation
strictly better off without making any generations worse off, the resulting infinite stream of
generations is better. The Finite Generational Anonymity axiom says that we can can switch
the utilities of finitely many generations in a given infinite stream of generations without
making the infinite stream in question better or worse. The motivation for Generational
Sensitivity is that we should always treat local increases in utility as valuable even if there
are infinitely many generations. The motivation for Finite Generational Anonymity is that
fairness requires that we do not favor increases in welfare at particular generations.
The Diamond-Basu-Mitra result shows that if we try to satisfy both Generational Sensitivity
and Finite Generational Anonymity then we will not be able to generate a ranking from pos-
sible streams of generations onto the real numbers. As I noted in Chapter 1, we might think
268Diamond (1965); Basu and Mitra (2007).
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that this is not such a troubling result since the benefits of numerical representability may
not be that great if we are able to provide a complete, transitive ranking of infinite worlds:
a social welfare ordering rather than a social welfare function, to use existing terminology.
The Lauwers-Zame result creates worries for this approach. Lauwers (2007) and Zame (2006)
show that if we accept Finite Generational Anonymity then any transitive and complete
social welfare ordering will strictly rank very few infinite streams of generations. This means
that such a social welfare ordering will entail that a social welfare ordering that satisfies
Finite Generational Anonymity will entail that most infinite worlds are as good as each
other. Finally, Lauwers and Zame show that describing a social welfare ordering that satisfies
Generational Sensitivity and Finite Generational Anonymity requires the axiom of choice.
This is an important result since the use of non-constructive mathematics in ethics and
economics is considered highly suspect.
Within the literature in ethics, Cain (1995) crucially identified a conflict between agent-
based sensitivity principles and time-based sensitivity principles. Philosophers have also
constructed various methods for ranking infinite world pairs or build upon existing solutions
developed within economics. Many of these are surveyed in the first chapter, but for the
purposes of this thesis the most important theories have been Arntzenius’s (2014) extension of
the Expansionist theory developed by Kagan and Vallentyne (1997) and the characterization
of the Weak Catching-Up principle offered by Lauwers and Vallentyne (2004).
I believe that in this thesis I have developed a general framework for discussing infinite
ethics that offers significant advantages over the frameworks employed by those working
in intergenerational equity and in philosophy. Within intergenerational equity there are
several assumptions made about the framing of the problem that have restricted the scope
of the results that within this literature. First, it has generally been assumed that we
should consider the utility levels of wellbeing of generations of agents. As I demonstrated
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in Chapter 1, the standard interpretation of generations seems to be whatever collection of
agents exist during a given temporal period. This means that Generational Sensitivity can
be shown to conflict with Pareto, our agent-based sensitivity principle, when agents can be
born in different orders. This use of generations has also led to a reliance on order-dependent
principles. If agents are basic locations of value and they lack any natural order, then we
should not expect theories in infinite ethics to appeal to order-dependent principles.
The use of generations within the intergenerational equity literature has also led to a failure
to identify whether future generations are assumed to be identical, overlapping, or disjoint,
or to recognize the moral significance of these differences. If generations are disjoint then
Generational Sensitivity may seem less plausible, since it is not clear that there is any
sense in which we are ‘improving’ finitely many generations rather than simply bringing
different generations with different levels of wellbeing into existence. Philosophers have been
somewhat more sensitive to the ethical significance of whether the populations of worlds
are identical, disjoint, or overlapping, but this has generally only resulted in restricting
principles to identical population cases and noting the difficulties of comparing worlds that
have disjoint or overlapping populations. This is especially troubling when we consider the
fact that, given how easy it is to entirely change the population of the future, it is likely that
disjoint and overlapping population worlds will be the norm and not the exception.
In this thesis I set aside Generational Sensitivity and focused on Pareto, the agent-based
sensitivity principle. I showed that recent objections to Pareto given by Hamkins and Mon-
tero (2000) are based on the implicit idea that < is a qualitative internal relation. I argued
that we have no reason to believe that < is a qualitative internal relation, but that we do
have strong reasons to believe that it is a qualitative relation. If < is a qualitative relation
then the relation holds between the worlds in the pair 〈w2, w2〉 if and only if it holds between
all qualitative duplicates of this pair. In Chapter 2 I argued that the qualitativeness of <,
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in combination with Pareto, constitutes a novel principle that can capture the basic ‘equity’
desideratum that our theory does not favor increases in utility for particular people that
Finite Anonymity axioms were intended to capture. The qualitativeness of < entails that
even if our ethical theories are sensitive to patterns of identities between worlds – as the
must be if our theory is to be Paretian – they should not be sensitive to haecceitistic facts.
An ethical theory that gives priority to increases in utility based on facts like ‘this agent
is Obama’ seem to be clearly inequitable. When we combine the qualitativeness of < with
Pareto it follows that if two worlds are not Pareto comparable and the utility levels of the
agents in the first world is a permutation of the utility levels of the agents in the second
world, then neither world is strictly better than the other.
The introduction and defense of the qualitativeness of < over Finite Anonymity axioms
represents an important step in the literature on infinite ethics. Finite Anonymity axioms
can be denied by anyone who believes that permuting the utility levels of finitely many agents
may sometimes make a world better or worse. They are also too weak to rule our intuitively
inequitable theories like temporal discounting theories. The qualitativeness of < can only be
denied by those willing to defend the claim that haecceitistic facts are of ethical significance.
Moreover, when combined with Pareto and our auxiliary premises, the qualitativeness of <
conflicts with intuitively inequitable theories like temporal discounting.
In Chapters 2 and 5 I defend the Permutation Principle, which allows us to permute the
populations of world pairs, rather than just the utilities of agents in worlds. In Chapter 3
I show that if we accept Pareto, the qualitativeness of <, the Permutation Principle, and
transitivity, then we can show that many infinite world pairs are incomparable. I identified
novel properties of utility distributions – the existence of bidirectional upgrades between
worlds, for example – that entail that any theory that can weakly rank such worlds will
violate transitivity. My results go beyond the results within the intergenerational equity
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literature in three important respects.269
First, my results show not only that a complete, transitive ordering of infinite worlds requires
the use of non-constructive mathematics to be explicitly described. My results show that if
we accept the four axioms listed above then such a complete, transitive ordering of infinite
worlds does not exist. Either we must reject one of these axioms or we must give up on the
project of finding a complete and transitive ordering of infinite worlds.
Second, because I appeal to the qualitativeness of < rather than to anonymity principles,
my results rule out the possibility of there being any method of ranking infinite worlds with
the utility distributions that I describe in this Chapter 3. We can contrast this with Zame’s
results, for example. Although Zame shows that no social welfare ordering that supervenes
only on the utilities of agents can produce a strict ranking over most infinite worlds, his results
do not conflict with theories like Expansionism, which appeal to the qualitative properties of
infinite worlds – in the case of Expansionism, the distribution of utility over spatiotemporal
regions – to produce a ranking of those worlds. By appealing to the qualitativeness of <, my
results show not only that can we not construct a complete ranking of infinite worlds based
solely on the utilities of agents in those worlds, but that we cannot construct a complete
ranking of these worlds by appealing to any other qualitative properties of these worlds.
Third, my results are sensitive to the importance of the identities of agents across worlds. I
establish that my results hold not only for identical population worlds: I also extend these
results to disjoint and overlapping population worlds by formulating conditions for incom-
parability that are sensitive to the identities of agents across worlds. This represents a large
step forward in the literature on infinite ethics, where disjoint and overlapping population
worlds have generally been unexplored, despite the fact that most physically plausible worlds
269Unlike many of the results in the intergenerational equity literature, my results also allow for agents to
have any finite utility levels rather than utility 1 or 0, or utilities in the [0,1] interval. Such restrictions of
possible utility levels are not universal however, and so I do not include this in the list of major contributions.
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will have populations that have few agents in common. Worlds that contain infinitely many
agents that have identical populations are highly idealized, and the results in infinite ethics
should be extended beyond this idealized set of worlds.
In the final two chapters of this thesis I built upon the results of the first three chapters. In
Chapter 4 I demonstrated that the results of this thesis can be extended to more infinite world
pairs if we introduce further axioms from both ethics and population ethics. For example, I
demonstrate that if we accept the Neutral Addition principle and Weak Catching-Up then
we are able to both expand the set of worlds that are comparable as well as the set of worlds
that can be shown to be incomparable by the four world or cyclic arguments of Chapter 3.
Finally, in the second half of Chapter 5 I considered the impact that accepting that many
infinite worlds are incomparable will have on the ethics of objective and subjective permis-
sibility. The impact of infinite ethics on objective and subjective permissibility has been
surprisingly underexplored.270 In this final chapter I show that the principles that generated
the incomparability results of this thesis have permissibility analogs that generate important
problems for both objective and subjective permissibility. Although infinite ethics has often
been the focus of aggregative ethicists, I show that the problems that infinite worlds generate
for objective and subjective permissibility are not restricted to aggregative ethical theories.
All ethicists must deny at least one of the plausible subjective variants of the principles I
have formulated in this thesis. I believe that there is much room for future work on the
puzzles for permissibility that I formulate in this chapter.
This thesis offers important improvements the framework that we ought to use within infinite
ethics. I have produced results that are sensitive to the identities of agents and to the
270Beckstead [26] discusses the ‘fanaticism problem’. Others, like Christiano [57] and Arntzenius [6] at-
tempt to construct subjective ethical theories for agents that are uncertain about whether the world is
infinite. But the impact of conflicts between principles in infinite ethics on subjective decision-making has
not been the subject of much discussion prior to this thesis.
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possibility of using qualitative properties other than agent utilities to rank infinite worlds. I
believe that these aspects of my framework ought to be replicated by future theorists working
in this area. I have also demonstrated important new results using new axioms that I believe
represent significant improvements on those appealed to within the literature.
Prior to this thesis, those writing in the literature on intergenerational equity demonstrated
that a complete, transitive social welfare ordering that supervenes only on the utilities of
each generation and satisfies Generational Sensitivity and Finite Generational Anonymity,
then it cannot provide a mapping from infinite worlds onto the real numbers. They also
established that any complete, transitive social welfare that supervenes only on the utilities
of each generation and satisfies Finite Generational Anonymity produces a strict ranking of
very few possible infinite streams of generations.
I have demonstrated that if we accept Pareto, the claim that if < holds between a world
pair then it also holds between any qualitative duplicate world pair, and the claim that we
can permute the populations of worlds271 then it is not possible to generate a complete,
transitive ranking on the basis of any qualitative properties of infinite worlds. These results
extend to worlds with identical, disjoint, and overlapping populations. Finally, they generate
puzzles for both objective and subjective permissibility that apply to both aggregative and
non-aggregative ethical theories. I believe these constitute significant steps beyond the prior
literature on the problems that infinite worlds pose within ethics.
271This is an alternative principle to the principle implicit in the intergenerational equity literature: namely
that it is possible to permute the utilities of finitely or finitely many generations in any manner.
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